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THE  AMERICANS 
IN  PANAMA 


BV 

WILLIAM    R.   SCOTT 


ILLUSTRATED 


NEW  YORK 
THE  STATLER  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

601    FIFTH    AVENUE 
1913 


COfVRIGHT,    1912,    BY 

WILLIAM   R.    SCOTT 
Second  Edition 


I 


THE   TKOW    PKBSS 
NKW    VOKK 


1^  ;  ■ 


TO 

MY   MOTHER 


C!/f -^  Cni\/I 


PANAMA   CHRONOLOGY 

1501.  Bastides  discovers  Panama. 

1502.  Columbus  explores  coast  of  Panama. 
1509.  Spanish  settle  at  Nombre  de  Dios. 
1513.  Balboa  discovers  the  Pacific. 

1519.  City  of  Panama  is  founded. 

1532.  Pizarro  leaves  Panama  to  conquer  Peru. 

1584.  Town  of  Porto  Bello  founded. 

1668.  Morgan's  pirates  capture  Porto  Bello. 

1671.  Morgan  bums  city  of  Panama. 

1698.  Scotch  colony  perishes  in  Panama. 

1739.  English  destroy  forts  at  Porto  Bello. 

1821.  Panama  revolts  from  Spain. 

1850.  Construction  of  Panama  Railroad  begun. 

1855.  First  train  crosses  the  Isthmus. 
'   U88(r  French  begin  attempt  to  dig  a  canaL 
^  (l889j  French  canal  company  bankrupt. 

a^C  New  French  company  resumes  operations. 
*   W903,)  Republic  of  Panama  is  established. 
*^ ^^i904j} United  States  begins  building  a  canal. 

1905.  Stevens  succeeds  Wallace  as  Chief  Engineer. 
.     12Q6.  Lock  type  of  canal  is  authorized. 
P  il907A Lieut.-CoL  Goethals  becomes  Chief  Engineer. 

iSOST  Maximum  annual  excavation  recorded. 

1909.  Concrete  work  is  begun  in  the  locks. 

1910.  Canal  is  half  done  as  to  excavation. 

1911.  Locks  and  Gatun  Dam  half  done. 

1912.  New  Panama  Railroad  is  finished. 
"^^  ( d!9i3.\  First  ship  passes  through  the  canaL 

l9Tir  Canal  open  to  commerce  of  the  world. 
1915.  San  Francisco  Exposition. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.^ — The  Land  Divided — The  World  United        i 
II. — The  Life  Cost  of  the  Canal 
III. — The  Spanish  in  Panama  . 

-The  Panama  Railroad 
V.V-The  French  in  Panama   . 
^^(vLy-THE  Americans  in  Panama     . 
^  VVTT^The  Roosevelt  Impetus 
M  (  VIILt^Taking  the  Canal  Zone  "       . 
^TX. — The  Geography  of  Panama    . 
X. — Getting  Under  Way. 
XL— ^HE  Canal  Under  Wallace  . 
XII. — The  Canal  Under  Stevens    . 
y  /XIITy— The  Canal  Under  Goethals  . 

xfv. — Locks  and  Dams 

XV.— The  Culebra  Cut     .... 

XVI.— Labor 

XVII. — Commissary — Quarters — Subsistence  .     200 

XVIII. — Civil  Administration 211 

XIX. — The  Society  of  the  Chagres        .       .     218 
XX. — The  Trade  Outlook         .       .       .       .226 


/^ 


9 
21 

30 
39 
46- 

52 

58 

76 

86 

92 

108 

125 

157 

172 


iJ 


XXI. — Settling  Our  Account  With  Colombia    238 
XXII) — The  Monroe  Doctrine    ....     249 


LIST   OF    ILLUSTRATIONS 

The  Chagres  River Frontispiece 

FACmC  PAGE 

Col.  W.  C.  Gorgas        .......  ii 

President  R(X)sevelt 55 

Map  of  Isthmus  of  Panama 76 

John  F.  Wallace 93 

President  Taft loi 

John  F.  Stevens 115 

Col.  Geo.  W.  Goethals 131 

Assistant  and  Division  Engineers      .       .       .       .147 

Profile  Map  of  the  Canal 157 

Entrance  to  a  Lock 159 

Interior  of  a  Lock 165 

The  Culebra  Cut 173 

Deepest  Part  of  the  Cut 181 

Old  and  New  Machinery 191 

Quarters  for  American  Employees     ....  205 

Governors  of  the  Canal  Zone 215 

Gatun  Lake 223 

Map  of  Trade  Routes 227 

Cover  Design  ....  Employee's  Check  Number 


\ 


FOREWORD 

VERACITY  to  the  facts  concerning  the  Panama 
Canal  requires  that  a  writer  not  merely  view 
the  object  which  he  describes,  but  that  he  actually 
become  a  part  of  the  mechanism  that  is  giving  it  form. 
He  may  thus  practically  illuminate  observation  with 
experience,  and  so  vivify  the  object  in  his  own 
thought,  that  his  attempt  to  present  it  to  others  will 
be  a  close  approximation  of  the  truth. 

In  the  five  months  the  author  spent  in  Panama,  he 
was  for  slightly  more  than  three  months  an  employee 
of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  living  the  routine 
life  of  a  canal  employee.  He  discovered  that,  had 
he  followed  the  usual  method  of  coming  into  the 
Canal  Zone  on  one  steamer,  taking  notes,  and  leav- 
ing on  the  next  steamer,  he  would  have  missed  many 
fundamental  facts,  which  absolutely  must  be  known 
if  a  really  trustworthy  account  of  the  greatest  task 
of  the  age  is  desired. 

The  Panama  Canal  is  not  the  monument  of  any  one 
individual  American,  nor  of  any  select  few  individual 
Americans.  In  generations  to  come,  the  canal,  like 
the  skyscrapers  of  our  cities,  will  be  viewed  as  a 
manifestation  of  the  building  genius  of  the  American 
people,  just  as  the  Pyramids  of  Egypt  are  not  re- 

xi 


FOREWORD 

membered  so  much  as  the  work  of  a  given  Rameses 
as  a  manifestation  of  the  big  building  instinct  of  the 
entire  race. 

This  book  is  unjust  to  the  generaHty  of  Ameri- 
cans who  have  helped  to  make  the  canal  a  success. 
Some  day  the  government  will  authorize  a  history  of 
the  canal  that  will  give  the  proper  prominence  to  the 
rank  and  file  as  well  as  to  the  subordinate  officials. 
But  the  treatment  here  undertaken,  through  the  neces- 
sity for  condensation,  touches  only  the  men  who  have 
affected  the  canal  in  the  broadest  way. 

The  average  American  layman  desires  an  authori- 
tative history  of  the  project,  but  he  particularly  de- 
sires a  nontechnical  review,  and  decidedly  one  which 
distinguishes  events  from  mere  incidents,  so  that  he 
may  not  be  burdened  with  a  mass  of  details  which 
make  it  difficult  for  the  essential  facts  to  be  kept  in 
mind  and  at  the  tongue's  end  for  immediate  and  in- 
telligent conversation. 

Those  who  prefer  a  more  exhaustive  treatment 
must  look  to  the  formidable  annual  reports  of  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commissiow,  to  the  files  of  the  Canal 
Record,  the  speeches  of  Col.  Goethals,  and  to  a  bibli- 
ography that  already  is  extensive  and  is  growing  at 
a  lusty  rate. 

Central  America  and  the  islands  of  the  Caribbean 
Sea  afford  a  rich  field  for  historical  writing  of  the 

xii 


FOREWORD 

most  intensely  interesting  character,  but  one  volume 
cannot  adequately  cover  so  much  ground.  The  scope 
of  this  book  is  limited  to  the  Isthmus  of  Panama, 
covering  a  period  of  four  hundred  and  ten  years. 
Only  so  much  of  the  history  of  the  Isthmus  under 
the  Spanish,  and  during  the  construction  of  the  Pan- 
ama Railroad  and  the  French  attempt  to  dig  a  canal, 
is  given  as  was  necessary  to  lend  a  perspective  to  the 
work  of  the  Americans. 

W.  R.  S. 
Paducah,  Kentucky. 


Xlll 


THE  AMERICANS  IN  PANAMA 

CHAPTER   I 

THE   LAND   DIVIDED THE   WORLD   UNITED 

AMERICANS,  your  dream  of  an  interoceanic 
.   canal  is  near  to  realization! 

Where  the  Spanish  scoffed  and  the  French  failed, 
the  Americans  have  triumphed.  South  America,  like 
Africa,  soon  will  become  an  island,  and  the  heroic 
searchings  after  a  passage  to  the  Spice  Islands,  by 
Columbus,  will  reach  fruition  in  191 3,  by  the  hands 
of  a  nation,  not  of  the  world  which  he  knew,  but  of 
that  very  new  world  which  he  discovered! 

The  Panama  Canal  has  its  broadest  significance  in 
the  prodigious  transformations  it  will  make  in  the 
world's  geography.  It  is  a  literal  fulfillment  of  the 
Scriptural  promise  to  man  that  he  should  have  domin- 
ion over  all  the  earth. 

There  is  poetic  justice  in  the  snatching  of  this  vast 
enterprise  from  the  parental  hands  of  Europe  by  the 
lusty  offspring  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  We 
thereby  vindicate  our  slogan  of  America  for  Ameri- 
cans, because  we  have  demonstrated  our  sufificiency 
in  the  face  of  the  largest  demand  upon  man's  engineer- 
ing acumen. 

If  it  should  have  been  said  in  1904  that  in  nine 
years  we  would  have  removed  more  than  200,000,000 

I 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

cubic  yards  of  earth  and  rock,  laid  5,000,000  cubic 
yards  of  concrete,  made  dams  and  fills  of  more  than 
50,000,000  cubic  yards,  relocated  the  Panama  Rail- 
road, spent  less  than  $300,000,000,  and  put  the  first 
ship  through  from  "the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  Europe 
would  have  smiled  at  our  youthful  temerity!  Yet, 
in  19 1 3,  we  will  have  done  precisely  that. 

To-day  there  is  no  reason  for  revising  the  state- 
ment by  Theodore  Shonts  that :  "  The  physical  con- 
struction of  the  Panama  Canal  is,  all  things  consid- 
ered, the  greatest  task  of  modern  times.  It  is  in  the 
highest  degree  exceptional  in  magnitude,  complexity, 
and  cost." 

The  American-Panama  Canal  has  risen  phcenix- 
like  out  of  the  ruins  of  the  French  enterprise.  For 
four  centuries  events  have  been  shaping  at  Panama 
to  make  our  final  attempt  successful.  When  we  be- 
gan, crude  as  the  conditions  were,  the  sting  of  the 
Isthmus,  except  its  diseases,  had  been  drawn.  There 
was  a  beaten  road  from  ocean  to  ocean,  on  every  hand 
were  landmarks  to  warn  our  footsteps  from  perilous 
paths,  the  lives  that  had  been  lost,  the  money  that 
had  been  spent,  all  served  to  make  our  task  achiev- 
able. We  justly  may  be  proud  of  our  deeds,  but  we 
should  not  forget. 

It  may  be  asserted  that  the  exigencies  of  world 
convenience  justified  the  manner  by  which  we  ac- 
quired the  Canal  Zone;  but  in  declining  thus  far  to 
make  reparation  to  Colombia  we  are  violating  the 
essential  ethics  of  Americanism.  Certainly  the  Amer- 
ican people  cannot  afford  to  dedicate  their  crowning 

2 


LAND    DIVIDED 

achievement  in  this  age  with  one  single  nation  enter- 
taining a  sense  of  wrong  because  of  it! 

The  canal  entered  upon  its  last  phase  with  the  an- 
nouncement by  Chief  Engineer  Goethals  that  the  first 
ship  would  go  through  in  September,  191 3.  Thence- 
forward a  definite  goal  was  seen,  and,  despite  the 
slides  in  the  mountain  cut,  or  any  other  obstacles,  that 
program  will  be  kept.  Not  a  sign  of  slackness,  but 
rather  stimulated  activities  have  followed  the  bring- 
ing of  the  end  of  the  task  in  sight.  In  1912  all  rec- 
ords for  excavation  and  concrete  work  were  smashed ! 

During  the  first  two  years  and  a  half  the  canal  was 
in  its  first  phase.  It  was  the  period  of  pioneering, 
preparation,  and  adjustment.  Two  Chief  Engineers 
were  tried,  from  the  ranks  of  civil  life,  accomplishing 
the  main  preliminaries  to  canal  construction  before 
their  departure.  Both  were  men  of  unquestioned  in- 
tegrity and  of  impressive  ability,  but  neither  was  the 
one  of  destiny  to  complete  the  task. 

The  second  phase  of  the  canal  was  from  the  be- 
ginning of  1907  to  the  spring  of  1912.  During  these 
six  years  the  heart  of  the  task  was  accomplished. 
President  Roosevelt  had  found  the  man  who  was  to 
take  the  organization  built  up  by  the  men  from  the 
ranks  of  private  industry  and  hurl  it  against  the 
natural  obstacles  that  stood  in  the  way  of  success. 
Col.  Goethals  was  to  take  the  blue-prints,  and  a  head 
full  of  theories,  and  work  them  out  into  the  locks, 
dams,  and  cuts  in  concrete  mold  to-day. 

The  third  and  last  phase,  as  noted,  began  in  191 2 
when  the  Chief  Engineer  set  a  date  for  the  substan- 

3 


THE    AINIERICANS    IN   PANAMA 

tial  completion  of  the  canal.  'It  is  distinguished  by 
the  gradual  dispersion  of  the  army  of  workers,  by  the 
reverse  process  of  the  first  two  years,  and  by  the 
creation  of  a  permanent  operating  force  with  the  de- 
tail finishing  work  that  attends  every  large  project. 

The  East  has  furnished  the  canal  with  its  Chief 
Engineers  —  Wallace  from  Massachusetts,  Stevens 
from  Maine,  Goethals  from  New  York.  But  every 
State  in  the  Union  has  furnished  the  rank  and  file, 
as  well  as  every  nation  in  the  world. 

Standing  out  distinctly  from  the  construction  phase 
of  the  enterprise  is  the  figure  of  Col.  Gorgas,  the 
Chief  Sanitary  Officer,  now,  as  in  the  critical  days 
of  1905,  quiet,  alert,  confident.  The  last  days  of  the 
canal  find  a  perfect  mechanism  of  his  creation  record- 
ing his  ideas  with  dispatch  and  precision,  receiving 
the  plaudits  of  this  and  secure  in  the  admiration  of 
succeeding  generations. 

With  the  long  ascent  behind,  standing  upon  the 
crest  of  the  work  of  construction,  looking  down- 
grade at  the  early  completion  of  the  canal,  one  fact 
is  emphasized  in  the  minds  of  all  laymen  and  engi- 
neers who  view  the  project  with  open  eyes.  It  is  this. 
A  sea-level  canal,  if  not  an  impossibility,  would  have 
been  an  indefinite  number  of  years  in  building  and 
would  have  cost  an  indefinitely  greater  number  of 
millions.  The  precipitation  of  more  than  20.000,000 
cubic  yards  of  extraneous  material  into  the  Culebra 
cut,  by  slides,  rivets  that  fact  in  the  minds  of  all 
observers. 

The  locks  may  grow  too  small,  the  Gatun  dam  may 

4 


LAND    DIVIDED 

break,  a  caving  in  of  the  foundations  of  the  colossal 
structures  may  occur,  and  other  convulsions  of  nature 
may  disable  the  canal,  but  nothing  can  rob  the  Amer- 
icans of  a  wonderful  achievement,  nor  will  the  work 
have  been  without  glory  and  justification,  no  matter 
what  the  future  holds.  We  still  could  rejoice  in  the 
sheer  courage,  persistence,  and  indomitable  ability 
that  have  wrought  the  work  in  Panama. 

Just  as  the  Civil  War  developed  Grant,  and  the 
Spanish-American  War  Dewey  and  Schley,  so  has 
the  Panama  Canal  developed  Goethals.  He  justly  is 
celebrated  in  the  periodical  and  daily  press  and  in 
books  as  a  splendid  embodiment  of  Americanism — the 
ideal  combination  of  ability  and  integrity. 

It  is  true,  of  course,  that  the  completion  of  the 
canal  substantially  fourteen  months  before  the  esti- 
mated date,  January  i,  191 5,  and  the  saving  of  $20,- 
000,000  in  the  estimated  cost,  may  mean  simply  that 
both  items  were  overestimated  in  1908  by  Col.  Goeth- 
als ;  but  the  tremendous  increase  in  necessary  exca- 
vation, due  to  slides  and  changes  in  plans,  more  than 
offsets  this  consideration  and  forces  the  acknowledg- 
ment that  the  savings  in  time  and  money  represent 
the  increased  efficiency  his  own  preeminent  abilities 
have  been  able  to  produce. 

A  perspective  view  of  the  whole  enterprise  shows 
that  Theodore  Roosevelt,  by  his  individual  actions,  on 
at  least  three  occasions,  vitally  affected  the  canal  and 
its  successful  consummation.  When  he  cut  the  Gor- 
dian  knot  of  diplomacy  and  took  the  Canal  Zone,  he 
made  the  first  long  stride  toward  interoceanic  com- 

5 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

munication.  When  he  threw  his  weight  into  the  scale 
for  a  lock  type  canal,  he  decided  the  most  critical 
question  that  ever  arose  in  the  career  of  the  enter- 
prise. The  third  time  his  judgment  prevented  a  great 
mistake  was  when  the  project  definitely  was  taken 
from  the  possibility  of  private  construction  and  placed 
in  the  hands  exclusively  of  government  supervision. 
There  were  lesser  decisions  of  great  moment,  not- 
ably the  order  for  widening  the  locks  and  the  Culebra 
cut,  and  his  whole  connection  with  the  project  was 
such  as  to  rank  as  the  most  brilliant  phase  of  his 
administrations. 

Before  ten  years  have  passed  the  American  people 
will  realize  that  the  canal  would  have  been  cheap  at 
twice  the  cost.  The  estimated  cost,  $375,000,000,  is 
an  impressive  figure,  but  this  age  is  moving  fast.  As 
great  as  the  enterprise  is,  it  is  not  probable  that,  in  the 
item  of  cost  at  least,  it  will  long  remain  the  record 
achievement.  But  it  is  probable  that  when  the  record 
is  broken,  it  will  be  the  Americans  who  break  it. 

To  July  I,  191 2,  the  canal  had  cost,  fifteen  months 
before  its  completion,  $260,000,000.  This  was  divided 
as  follows:  Canal  Zone,  $10,000,000; French  purchase, 
$40,000,000;  engineering  and  construction,  $152,- 
000,000;  general  expenditures,  $36,000,000;  sanita- 
tion, $15,000,000;  civil  administration,  $5,500,000; 
fortifications,  $1,000,000. 

The  canal  was  half  done  as  to  excavation  and  cost 
in  1 910.  The  toll  in  human  lives,  approximately  6,000 
by  191 4,  for  a  period  of  nine  and  three  quarter  years, 
is  impressive  only  for  its  cheapness.     It  is  estimated 

6 


LAND    DIVIDED 

that  the  building  of  the  Panama  Railroad,  in  1850-55, 
cost  that  number  of  lives,  and  for  the  Americans  to 
build  the  world's  greatest  enterprise  in  ten  years 
at  so  low  a  life  cost  constitutes  for  the  tropics  a  pro- 
foundly admirable  achievement.  Whether  the  gov- 
ernment has  been  economical  in  the  physical  construc- 
tion of  the  canal  may  be  questioned,  but  it  has  been 
positively  parsimonious  in  the  expenditure  of  human 
life  on  the  project. 

It  would  be  fitting  for  the  first  ship  to  pass  through 
the  canal  on  September  25,  191 3,  or  just  four  hun- 
dred years  to  the  day  from  the  discovery  of  the  Pa- 
cific by  Balboa.  Thousands  of  Americans  may  de- 
sire to  go  through  the  canal  on  their  way  to  San 
Francisco's  Exposition,  a  really  delightful  cruise  from 
New  York  of  eighteen  days,  but  if  they  do,  it  will 
be  in  foreign  ships,  because  we  have  no  vessels  that 
could  handle  the  traffic.  It  will  be  a  vivid  object  les- 
son of  our  pitiful  lack  of  a  merchant  marine. 

Less  than  100,000  Americans  will  have  seen  the 
canal  in  course  of  construction  out  of  a  population 
of  90,000,000.  President  Roosevelt  truly  said  that  a 
trip  to  see  this  great  project  in  the  building  was  more 
profitable  than  a  trip  to  Europe.  But  at  the  San 
Francisco  Exposition  some  compensation  will  be 
found  for  a  failure  to  see  the  canal  by  an  exhibit  of 
every  kind  of  machinery  used  by  the  French  and  the 
Americans  in  the  thirty-five  years  of  construction,  or 
from  1880  to  191 5.  When  the  government  finally 
sold  off  the  old  French  machinery  that  had  littered 
the  Canal  Zone  for  three  decades  the  best  specimen 

7 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

of   each   kind   of   apparatus    was   reserved    for   this 
graphic  exhibit. 

Panama  now  becomes  the  farthest  outpost  of 
Americanism  in  Latin  America.  The  peoples  of  that 
continent  have  profited  immeasurably  by  the  prac- 
tical demonstrations  in  sanitation,  civil  government, 
and  engineering  construction.  They  have  learned, 
and  so  has  the  rest  of  the  world,  that  the  tropics  are 
not  necessarily  deadly,  that  order  can  be  maintained, 
not  only  among  a  homogeneous  population,  but  among 
the  heterogeneous  races  that  have  thronged  the 
Isthmus,  and  they  have  seen  that  no  natural  obstacle 
is  insuperable  before  the  intelligence  of  man.  The 
canal  should  be  a  means  of  cementing  these  lessons, 
of  disabusing  mutual  prejudices  between  the  Amer- 
icans to  the  North  and  the  Americans  to  the  South. 
The  American  conquest  of  Latin  America  should  be 
more  through  uplifting  ideals  than  through  bald  com- 
mercialism leading  to  discord  and  unbrotherly  rela- 
tions. 


MEASURED  m  money,  the  Panama  Canal  was 
to  cost  $375,000,000.  This  is  impressive,  but 
there  is  another  item  of  cost  more  important,  namely, 
"  The  Life  Cost,"  or  the  cost,  in  human  lives,  of  dig- 
ging the  canal. 

Contemplating  the  record  of  the  Isthmus  for  un- 
health fulness,  it  could  not  but  be  anticipated,  in  1904, 
when  the  Americans  took  charge,  that  this  cost  would 
be  heavy.  That  it  should  be  surprisingly  low  consti- 
tutes a  more  significant  achievement  than  any  saving 
in  the  money  or  time  cost  of  the  project. 

On  July  I,  19 1 2,  the  Americans  had  been  eight 
years  in  the  actual  work  of  building  the  canal.  In 
that  period  of  eight  years  there  were : 

Deaths  from  disease 4,146 

Deaths    from  violence 995 

Total  deaths 5,141 

Another  full  year  before  the  passage  of  the  first 
ship,  and  eighteen  months  before  the  practical  and 
continuous  operation  of  the  completed  canal,  will 
bring  that  total  of  deaths,  estimating  on  the  average 
of  previous  years  and  not  considering  unprecedented 

9 


Deaths 

Rate  per  1,000 

82 

13.26 

427 

25.86 

,105 

4173 

.131 

28.74 

571 

13.01 

50^ 

10.64 

558 

10.88 

539 

11.02 

226 

10.60 

THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

increases,  to  less  than  6,000  b}^  January  r,  191 4. 
The  Sanitary  Department  makes  the  following  report 
for  the  eight-year  period  ending  July  i,  1912: 


Year  No.  of  Employees 

1904 6,213 

1905 16,512 

1906 26,547 

1907 39-238 

1908 43,891 

1909 47,167 

I9IO 50,802 

191  I 48,876 

1912  (July) .  .  .  48,000 


The  foregoing  figures  not  only  cover  those  actually 
at  work  on  the  canal,  but  as  well  include  those  who, 
while  not  regularly  employed,  are  the  wards  of  the 
Commission  when  idle.  From  1907  onward  health 
has  been  normal  on  the  Isthmus,  within  the  Canal 
Zone,  with  a  death  rate,  among  the  Americans,  fre- 
quently lower  than  in  large  centers  of  population  in 
the  United  States. 

President  Roosevelt  selected  Col.  William  Craw- 
ford Gorgas  to  clean  up  the  Isthmus  because  of  his 
record  in  sanitary  work  in  Cuba  and  elsewhere. 
Chief  Engineer  Wallace  doubted  his  capacity,  and  so 
did  Secretary  of  War  Taft,  but,  by  1906,  the  latter 
was  ready  to  acknowledge  his  mistake.  Col.  Gorgas 
is  a  Southern  man,  a  native  of  Alabama,  and  so  natu- 
rally quiet  and  reser\ed  in  demeanor  and  deportment 

10 


Coiii/riijlit    hit  Uuni.s  iG   Eiiinij. 

Col.  W.  C.  Gorgas. 


LIFE    COST 

that  men  accustomed  to  measure  a  man  by  bluster 
and  self-assertiveness  make  the  mistake  of  assuming 
that  he  is  not  strong.  His  manner  and  methods  sug- 
gest Gen,  Robert  E.  Lee. 

There  were  two  prime  needs,  as  Col.  Gorgas 
viewed  the  Isthmus  in  1904,  in  any  campaign  for  im- 
proved health  conditions.  One  was  to  make  the  Isth- 
mus clean  and  the  other  was  to  kill  the  mosquitoes 
which  he  considered  a  means  of  propagating  disease. 
Practically  everything  done  by  the  health  department 
has  been  along  these  main  lines  of  theory. 

The  United  States  profited  by  the  mistakes  of  the 
French  to  the  extent  of  reserving,  in  the  treaty  with 
the  Republic  of  Panama,  the  exclusive  right  to  con- 
trol the  sanitation  of  Panama  and  Colon.  So,  in 
1904,  the  engineers  immediately  went  to  work  on  a 
sewer,  waterworks,  and  street-paving  plan  that  would 
make  of  these  two  characteristically  filthy  Central 
American  cities,  clean,  decent,  sanitary  places  of 
abode. 

The  native  population  dumped  all  garbage,  and  mat- 
ter usually  consigned  to  sewers,  into  the  streets. 
These  streets  were  mud  holes  which,  with  the  admix- 
ture of  refuse,  made  a  condition  inconceivably  dirty 
and  naturally  unhealthful.  The  Americans  made  a 
reservoir  in  the  mountains  a  dozen  miles  away  for 
the  water  supply  of  Panama,  dug  sewers  and  forced 
the  native  houses  to  connect  with  them,  and  then 
paved  the  streets  with  brick.  A  system  of  garbage 
collection  was  organized,  and  the  city  was  cleared 
of  all  rubbish.    To-day  the  tourist  sees  some  evidence 

II 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

of  slovenly  living,  but  conditions  generally  are  sur- 
prisingly smart. 

The  second  part  of  the  program — killing  the  mos- 
quitoes— was  accomplished  principally  by  the  use  of 
crude  oil.  Every  stagnant  pool  of  water,  and  most  of 
the  running  streams — except  rivers — were  treated 
W'ith  oil,  and  the  rank  grass  and  tropical  growth  was 
kept  cut  by  hundreds  of  scythemen.  As  a  further  war 
measure  all  houses  were  screened,  the  amount  spent 
on  this  item  alone  amounting  to  a  sum  between  $750,- 
000  and  $1,000,000. 

Having  cleaned  up  within,  rigid  quarantine  regula- 
tions were  made  to  keep  out  persons  who  might  be 
brought  in  a  diseased  condition  from  other  ports. 
Vaccination  of  every  person  who  enters  the  Canal 
Zone  is  compulsory,  unless  a  good  scar  can  be  shown. 
In  1905  a  ship  load  of  natives  from  Martinique,  im- 
ported to  work  on  the  canal,  refused  to  land  because 
they  thought  vaccination  was  a  plan  to  brand  them 
so  they  could  never  return  to  their  home.  They  were 
forced  out  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  and  vaccinated. 

It  was  before  these  plans  had  been  matured  that  the 
first  and  only  epidemic  of  yellow  fever  occurred  in 
the  Canal  Zone.  In  April,  1905,  an  employee  in  the 
Administration  building  in  Panama  became  sick  with 
the  fever,  and  from  then  on  to  September  the  Canal 
Zone  was  in  the  throes  of  a  fear  that  was  featured 
by  the  w^holesale  departure  of  employees.  The  news- 
papers gave  the  epidemic  wide  and  oftentimes  errone- 
ous publicity,  with  the  consequence  that  the  govern- 
ment had  to  pay  for  the  fear  of  the  Isthmus  thus 

12 


LIFE    COST 

created,  in  greatly  increased  salaries  and  gratuities,  to 
secure  American  employees. 

By  October,  1905,  Col.  Gorgas  had  mastered  the 
epidemic,  and,  although  isolated  cases  have  occurred 
since,  yellow  fever  was  permanently  banished  as  the 
bugbear  of  Panama.  From  July  i,  1904,  to  Novem- 
ber I,  1905,  44  employees  succumbed  to  this  disease. 
While  the  epidemic  raged,  from  April  to  September, 
1905,  there  were  IJ  deaths  among  employees,  mainly 
among  Americans,  with  whom  the  epidemic  started. 

There  was  a  siege  with  smallpox  and  the  plague, 
but  they,  too,  were  eradicated  in  so  far  as  epidemics 
are  concerned,  and  malaria,  pneumonia,  and  tubercu- 
losis remain  as  the  most  frequent  attributed  causes  of 
death.  Quinine  has  been  bought  by  the  ton  for  the 
Canal  Zone  dispensaries  and  hospitals.  In  1908  each 
employee  averaged  about  an  ounce  of  quinine,  and 
they  were  advised  to  take  three  grains  daily. 

The  French  had  left  hospital  buildings  in  Colon 
and  on  the  side  of  Ancon  hill,  just  outside  of  Pan- 
ama. The  Americans  renovated  these  and  added  to 
them  until  the  present  vast  facilities  came  into  form. 
They  sometimes  have  more  than  1,200  patients.  A 
large  asylum  for  the  insane  also  is  maintained.  Hos- 
pital cars  are  attached  to  the  passenger  trains  to  bring 
in  patients  to  the  Ancon  and  Colon  hospitals  each  day. 
In  every  town  or  settlement  there  is  a  dispensary  with 
a  physician  in  charge  and  a  sanitary  officer  to  inspect 
conditions  of  living.  There  are  about  24  employees 
out  of  every  thousand  constantly  sick. 

For  the  Canal  Zone,  Panama  and  Colon,  in  1905 

13 


THE    A:MERICANS    in    PANAMA 

the  death  rate  was  49.94  per  1,000.  In  191 1  it  was 
21.46,  or  cut  down  more  than  one  half.  In  1906  the 
death  rate  among  the  Americans  from  disease  was 
5.36,  and  in  191 1  it  was  2.82.  In  1908  and  1910  there 
were  more  Americans  killed  in  accidents  or  died  from 
violence  than  died  from  disease. 

lit  necessarily  follows,  from  an  engineering  task  of 
this  magnitude,  where  vast  quantities  of  explosives 
are  handled,  where  there  is  a  considerable  railroad 
mileage  and  other  hazardous  features  of  construction, 
that  the  death  rate  from  violence  or  accidents  would 
be  large. 

Every  month  since  the  American  occupation  began 
in  May,  1904,  there  has  been  an  average  of  10  em- 
ployees killed  or  have  died  from  external  causes.  The 
total  to  July  I,  1 91 2,  was  995,  and  by  the  time  the 
canal  is  completed,  barring  unusual  catastrophes,  the 
deaths  from  this  cause  will  be  around  1,100.  Under 
the  head  of  violence  are  included  deaths  by  drowning, 
suicide,  dynamite  explosions,  railroad  accidents,  poi- 
sonings, homicides,  electric  shocks,  burns,  lightning, 
and  accidental  traumatism  of  various  kinds. 

Scores  of  deaths  have  resulted  from  the  practice  of 
the  native  employees  in  using  the  railroad  tracks  as 
public  highways.  There  have  been  bad  collisions 
and  wrecks  with  fatalities,  and  dynamite  has  claimed 
about  one  tenth  of  the  victims  of  external  violence. 
In  the  handling  of  25,259  tons  of  dynamite,  or  50,- 
517,650  pounds,  to  July  i,  191 2,  the  following  princi- 
pal accidents  have  occurred : 

December  12,  1908,  at  Bas  Obispo,  premature  ex- 

14 


LIFE    COST 

plosion  of  twenty-two  tons  in  the  Culebra  cut,  26 
killed  and  40  injured. 

October  10,  1908,  at  Mindi,  7  killed  and  10  in- 
jured, premature  explosion.  Dredging  in  Pacific  en- 
trance. 

October  8,  1908,  at  Empire,  in  the  Culebra  cut,  5 
killed  and  8  injured,  premature  explosion. 

August  30,   19 10,  at  Ancon  quarry,  4  killed. 

July  19,  191 1,  at  Ancon  quarry,  4  killed,  2  in- 
jured. 

January  10,  1909,  at  Paraiso,  2  killed,  10  injured. 

July  25,  1909,  on  Panama  Railroad,  4  killed,  9 
injured. 

May  22,  1908,  in  Chagres  division,  2  killed,  prema- 
ture explosion  of  twenty-six  tons,  caused  by  light- 
ning. 

Forty  deaths  from  dynamite  explosions  are  noted 
for  the  year  1908,  the  largest  number  for  any  one 
year  of  canal  construction,  and  this  does  not  take 
into  account  several  individual  fatalities.  Chief  En- 
gineer Goethals  issued  stringent  regulations  to  govern 
the  handling  of  the  dynamite,  but  it  was  in  such  com- 
mon use  that  the  employees  naturally  became  careless. 
An  instance  is  afforded  by  two  employees  who 
knocked  an  iron  pipe  against  a  railroad  track  to  dis- 
lodge some  dynamite.  They  were  angels  in  less  than 
two  seconds  after  the  first  blow.  The  worst  acci- 
dent, at  Bas  Obispo,  has  not  been  explained. 

Most  of  the  accidents  have  occurred  since  the  work- 
ing force  has  been  in  excess  of  20,000  men.  When 
the  number  killed   outside  the  line  of  duty  is  sub- 

15 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

tracted  from  the  total  deaths  by  violence,  it  will  be 
found  that  the  actual  building  of  the  canal  has  been 
attended  by  a  normal  percentage  of  such  fatalities 
— certainly  no  larger  than  in  any  private  construc- 
tion of  the  same  character  or  approximating  the  same 
magnitude.  The  largest  number  of  deaths  by  violence 
among  employees  in  one  year  was  in  1909,  when  178 
were  killed,  and  this  was  equaled  again  in  191 1.  The 
following  table  shows  the  number  of  American  em- 
ployees, the  total  death  rate,  and  the  relation  of 
deaths  from  disease  to  deaths  by  violence  from  1906 
to  191 1,  inclusive: 

Year  No.  of  Death  Rate  By  Violence 

Empl'y's  Per  1,000         Disease 

1906 3,264  8.14  5.36 

1907 5.000  8.14  5.36 

1908 5,126  8.19  3.70  4.49 

1909 5.300  5.56  3.23  2.ZZ 

1910 5,573         5-35        2.43        2.92 

191 1 6,163         5.14        2.82        2.2,2 

Col.  Gorgas  found,  in  the  early  years  of  canal 
work,  that  the  Americans  and  Europeans  were  three 
times  as  healthy  as  the  natives  of  the  tropics,  who, 
as  Chief  Engineer  Stevens  noted  in  1905,  "are  sup- 
posed to  be  immune  from  everything,  but  who,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  are  subject  to  almost  everything." 
This  somewhat  upsets  the  theory  that  northern  races 
cannot  live  readily  in  tropical  climates. 

Several  of  the  annual  reports  of  the  Sanitary  De- 
partment  have    noted   the   remarkably    few    diseases 

16 


LIFE    COST 

peculiar  to  men,  such  as  alcoholism,  etc.  Mr.  Tracy 
Robinson,  in  his  book  of  personal  reminiscences, 
"  Fifty  Years  at  Panama,"  speaks  authoritatively  on 
the  use  of  liquor  in  the  tropics  as  follows : 

*'  Many  foreigners  have  fallen  victims  to 
fear  rather  than  fever;  while  many  others 
have  wrought  their  own  destruction  by 
drink,  which  is  the  greatest  curse  of  man- 
kind in  all  lands,  but  more  especially  in  hot 
countries.  It  has  killed,  directly  and  indi- 
rectly, more  than  the  entire  list  of  diseases 
put  together;  for  it  induces  by  its  derange- 
ment of  the  vital  forces,  every  ill  to  which 
flesh  is  heir.  Candor  compels  me  to  state 
that  I  have  tried  both  abstinence  and  moder- 
ate indulgence;  and  when  it  is  said  that 
strong  drink  is  necessary  in  the  tropics  to 
tone  the  system  up.  or  for  any  good  purpose 
under  heaven,  I  say  emphatically,  it  is  not 
so!  It  is  absolutely  best  to  let  it  entirely 
alone.  My  fifty  years'  experience  gives  me 
authority  to  write  as  I  do." 

Allowance  must  be  made,  in  considering  the  favor- 
able health  showing  on  the  Isthmus,  to  the  fact 
that  the  employees  in  one  sense  are  picked  men. 
They  must  be  in  sound  condition  when  employed  and 
usually  in  the  prime  of  life.  Another  thing  that  has 
kept  the  death  rate  down  among  the  Americans  has 
been  the  practice  of  returning  to  the  United  States 
many  patients  who  apparently  had  not  long  to  live. 

17 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

Thus  their  deaths  were  not  a  charge  against  the  Canal 
Zone. 

It  cannot  be  assumed  that  all  the  deaths  from  dis- 
ease in  the  Canal  Zone  were  from  causes  that  origi- 
nated there.  The  diseases  peculiar  to  the  tropics  have 
not  claimed  as  many  victims  among  the  Americans  as 
the  diseases  peculiar  to  the  northern  climates.  But 
there  has  been  a  steady  improvement,  as  may  be 
noted  in  a  fall  in  the  death  rate  among  the  Americans, 
from  8.14  per  1,000  in  1907  to  5.14  per  1,000  in  191 1. 

An  incident  in  the  sanitary  government  of  the  Isth- 
mus was  an  Executive  Order  by  President  Taft,  ef- 
fective on  December  12.  191 1,  which  prohibited  the 
practice  of  any  system  of  therapeutics  or  healing  that 
the  Sanitary  Department,  the  allopathic  school,  should 
rule  against.  The  President,  upon  its  possible  appli- 
cation to  create  a  monopoly  of  healing  in  the  Canal 
Zone  being  pointed  out  to  him,  revoked  the  order  on 
January  i,  1912. 

Employees  are  not  permitted  to  remain  in  their 
homes  or  quarters  when  sick,  but  must  go  to  the 
Colon  or  Ancon  hospital,  unless  the  district  physi- 
cian expressly  rules  otherwise.  The  hospital  grounds 
at  Ancon  are  beautiful,  and  convalescent  patients  are 
sent  to  Taboga  Island,  ten  miles  out  in  Panama  Bay, 
for  final  treatment.  A  dairy  with  125  cows  supplies 
fresh  milk  to  the  Ancon  hospital. 

At  first  Col.  Gorgas  was  not  a  member  of  the  Isth- 
mian Canal  Commission.  But  the  extraordinary  abil- 
ity he  displayed  resulted  in  the  separation  of  the  Sani- 
tary Department  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Gov- 

18 


LIFE    COST 

ernor  of  the  Canal  Zone,  and  on  February  28,  1907, 
Col.  Gorgas  was  made  a  member  of  the  Commission, 
with  the  Department  of  Sanitation  having  equal  dig- 
nity with  other  grand  divisions  of  the  work.  He  is 
the  only  official  of  the  highest  rank  who  has  been  with 
the  canal  project  from  its  earliest  days  to  the  present. 

The  cost  of  the  sanitary  conquest  of  the  Isthmus, 
to  July  I,  191 2,  was  the  somewhat  impressive  total 
of  $15,000,000.  Here,  as  in  the  pay  and  treatment  of 
employees,  the  government  has  sought  results  without 
regard  to  the  expense.  For  the  remaining  days  of 
the  canal  the  cost  of  sanitation  will  be  approximately 
$2,500,000,  or  $17,500,000  in  all  by  January  i,  1914, 
which  amount  is  nearly  $3,000,000  less  than  the  cost 
estimated  for  the  department  in  1908. 

The  first  grand  lesson  from  the  life  cost  of  the 
Panama  Canal  is  that  the  tropics  no  longer  offer  in- 
superable obstacles  to  the  health  of  northern  races. 
For  all  South  and  Central  America  the  work  of  the 
Americans  in  Panama  teaches  the  imperative  neces- 
sity of  a  literal  belief  in  the  old  adage :  "  Cleanliness 
is  next  to  Godliness."  At  every  single  point  where 
disease  has  dominated  the  situation,  it  has  been  found 
that  filth  abounded.  Guayaquil,  in  Ecuador,  some- 
times is  quarantined  half  the  year,  and  it  is  a  signifi- 
cant fact  that  this  has  been  one  of  the  dirtiest  ports  in 
South  America.  Any  people  who  are  willing  to  live 
indecently  will  pay  the  penalty  in  a  high  death  rate. 

When  the  ordinary  cleanliness  to  which  the  Ameri- 
can, or  the  European,  is  accustomed  is  observed  in 
the  tropics,  and  if  intoxicants  are  not  permitted  to 

19 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

dominate  the  individual  life,  there  will  not  be  the 
slightest  difficulty  in  living  near  the  Equator.  The 
ultimate  crowding  of  North  America  will  force  pop- 
ulation into  Central  and  South  America,  and  among 
the  world  benefits  of  the  Panama  Canal  none  is  more 
flattering  to  the  Americans  than  just  this  lesson  that 
he  who  will  live  decently  may  live  healthfully. 


20 


CHAPTER    III 

THE   SPANISH    IN    PANAMA 

HISTORIANS  have  noted  that  certain  members 
of  the  vegetable  and  mineral  kingdoms  have 
played  a  vital  part  in  the  discovery  and  colonization 
of  the  Americas. 

Columbus,  the  master  spirit  of  his  age,  had  the 
noble,  imaginative  conception  of  the  earth's  rotundity 
which  he  wished  to  demonstrate  to  mankind,  but  his 
immediate  impulse  was  to  find  the  shortest  passage 
to  the  East  Indies,  where  the  spices  so  much  prized 
on  the  dining  tables  of  Europe  could  be  obtained  and 
brought  back  more  expeditiously  than  by  the  long  trip 
around  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 

To  the  North,  more  than  a  hundred  years  later, 
tobacco  was  the  main  product  that  held  the  English 
colonists  to  Virginia  in  the  face  of  hostile  savages 
and  exile  from  home.  Smoking  spread  over  Europe 
like  an  epidemic,  making  the  rewards  from  the  culti- 
vation of  the  weed  immediate  and  profitable  from  the 
start. 

The  members  of  the  mineral  kingdom  which  held 
the  venturesome  mariners  to  their  new  found  lands, 
despite  every  discouragement,  human  and  natural, 
were  gold  and  silver.  No  sooner  had  these  precious 
metals  crossed  the  European  vision  than  their  first 
love,  spices,  faded  completely  out  of  the  imagination. 

21 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

Thenceforth,  the  Spaniards  and  the  Portuguese  ran- 
sacked an  isthmus,  a  continent,  and  the  islands  of  the 
sea  with  frenzied  and  appalHng  barbarities  and  with 
splendid  success. 

Thus  spices,  tobacco,  gold,  and  silver  have  been 
the  unheroic  causes  of  epochal  movements  in  the 
human  family.  Columbus  kept  his  vision  above  the 
sordid  greed  for  gold  to  the  last.  On  the  fourth  at- 
tempt he  made  to  find  a  passage  to  the  East  Indies 
he  cruised  along  the  Isthmian  coast  from  September, 
1502,  to  January,  1503,  entering  and  naming  the  har- 
bor of  Porto  Bello  on  November  2,  1502,  and  visiting 
Nombre  de  Dios  on  November  9th,  in  what  is  now 
the  Republic  of  Panama. 

Columbus,  however,  was  not  the  discoverer  of  Pan- 
ama, as  a  Spaniard,  named  Rodrigo  de  Bastides,  had 
preceded  him  to  this  coast,  in  1501,  so  that  the  period 
of  the  Spanish  in  Panama  dates  from  that  year.  Ba- 
stides visited  Nombre  de  Dios,  where  eight  years  later 
the  first  Spanish  settlement  on  the  Isthmus  was 
planted,  in  1509,  as  a  base  for  the  search  for  gold. 

Vasco  Nunez  de  Balboa  had  been  with  Bastides 
on  his  trip  of  exploration  and  he  became  the  head 
of  the  new  colony  at  Panama.  It  had  been  desig- 
nated "  The  Castle  of  Gold  "  by  the  King  of  Spain 
because  of  the  plentiful  quantities  of  that  metal  found 
among  the  natives.  For  a  few  years  the  mountains 
with  their  dense  jungle  growth  stood  as  a  barrier  to 
explorations  farther  inland,  but  the  stories  of  the 
marvelous  wealth  of  the  inhabitants  on  the  other 
side,  told  to  Balboa  by  the  Indians,  so  excited  his 

22 


SPANISH 

cupidity  that,  in  15 13,  he  gathered  a  band  of  190  men 
and  started  across. 

When  they  approached  the  summit  of  a  mountain 
which,  the  'Indian  guide  said,  would  afford  a  view  of 
the  new  sea,  Balboa  ordered  his  men  to  halt  while 
he  alone  took  the  first  view.  There,  in  the  heart  of 
the  Isthmian  jungle,  four  hundred  years  ago,  with 
what  must  have  been  a  feeling  of  awe  even  to  his 
hardened  nature,  Balboa  discovered  the  Pacific,  on 
September  25,  15 13.  Calling  his  men  to  him,  they 
had  a  religious  ceremony,  claiming  all  they  surveyed 
as  the  dominions  of  His  Majesty,  the  King  of  Spain. 
Four  days  later,  after  traversing  the  distance  to  this 
sea  from  the  mountain,  he  waded  out  into  the  water 
and  reaffirmed  his  sovereign's  title. 

Gold  he  found  in  abundance,  and  pearls  of  fabu- 
lous size  and  value.  After  five  months'  absence,  he 
returned  to  Nombre  de  Dios  by  a  more  direct  course, 
and  spread  the  news  which  was  to  turn  Central  and 
South  America  into  a  slaughter  house,  through  the 
mad  traffic  that  debauched  Spain,  made  pirates  of 
England's  navigators,  and  reduced  the  original  popu- 
lation  to  wretched   slavery. 

Balboa  found  that  he  had  been  succeeded  as  Gov- 
ernor at  Nombre  de  Dios  by  a  soldier  named  Pedra- 
rias.  Between  them  a  hatred  sprang  up  which,  in 
1 517,  resulted  in  the  untimely  and  unjust  execution 
of  Balboa  on  trumped  up  charges.  Prior  to  this,  Bal- 
boa had  made  other  trips  to  the  Pacific,  carrying 
across  with  incredible  labor  the  parts  of  ships  which 
w^ere  rebuilt  in  the  Pacific.     In  191 1  the  Americans 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANA]\IA 

found  a  cannon  of  immense  weight  about  halfway 
across,  which  evidently  had  been  abandoned  by  Bal- 
boa, and  an  anchor  of  great  size  also  has  been  found. 

Pedrarias,  in  151 5,  had  sent  exploring  parties  to 
the  Pacific  side  to  select  a  site  for  a  settlement  on  that 
coast.  The  San  Francisco  Exposition,  therefore,  in 
1915,  will  be  exactly  four  hundred  years  after  this 
event.  It  was  not  until  15 19  that  the  settlement  was 
started,  and  the  founding  of  the  city  of  Panama  dates 
historically  from  that  year. 

With  the  founding  of  a  town  on  the  Pacific  side 
began  the  interoceanic  traffic  which  ever  since  has 
emphasized  the  need  of  easier  and  swifter  communi- 
cation between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific.  The  site  of 
the  city  was  about  twelve  miles  from  the  present  city 
of  Panama,  and  a  few  miles  inland.  At  a  huge  ex- 
pense of  labor  and  life  a  paved  road  was  constructed 
from  Nombre  de  Dios  to  Panama,  portions  of  which 
may  be  seen  in  the  Canal  Zone  to-day.  Another 
route  across  the  Isthmus  followed  the  Chagres  River 
as  far  as  it  was  navigable  to  a  point  near  the  Ameri- 
can town  of  Gorgona,  from  there  the  trip  being 
across  the  mountains  to  Panama. 

It  may  be  noted  that  Panama  was  founded  a  full 
one  hundred  years  before  the  landing  of  the  Pilgrims 
at  Plymouth.  Nombre  de  Dios  was  a  town  ninety- 
eight  years  before  the  first  English  settlement  in  North 
America,  at  Jamestown,  in  1607.  Saint  Augustine. 
Florida,  the  oldest  town  in  North  America,  was  not 
founded  until  forty-six  years  after  Panama.  Indeed, 
Panama  is  the  oldest  part  of  continental  America. 

24 


SPANISH 

Francisco  Pizarro,  a  pupil  of  the  Balboa  school, 
heard  tales  about  an  indescribably  rich  country  south 
of  Panama.  He  organized  an  expedition,  which  left 
Panama  in  1532,  and  effected  the  conquest  of  Peru, 
which  Prescott  has  immortalized  in  literature.  His- 
tory does  not  afford  a  more  daring,  a  more  barbarous, 
and  scarcely  a  more  richly  rewarded  conquest,  nor 
does  Europe  or  Mexico  present  a  more  interesting 
prehistoric  civilization  than  the  land  of  the  Incas. 

After  nearly  a  century  at  Nombre  de  Dios,  the 
Spanish,  in  the  year  1584,  found  Porto  Bello  a  health- 
ier site  for  a  settlement,  and  moved  bag  and  baggage 
to  that  incomparable  port.  In  leaving  Nombre  de 
Dios,  it  is  worth  recording  that  Sir  Francis  Drake, 
the  great  Englishman  who  had  "  singed  the  King  of 
Spain's  beard,"  who  had  plundered  the  Spanish  Main 
from  boyhood,  and  had  circumnavigated  the  globe, 
claiming  California  for  his  Queen,  died  on  board  ship 
and  was  buried  at  sea  off  Nombre  de  Dios  in  1596. 

Porto  Bello  at  once  became  the  depot  of  Spanish 
treasure,  accumulated  from  Peru  or  other  South  and 
Central  American  countries,  and  brought  across  the 
Isthmus  from  Panama  with  incredible  hardship. 
From  this  port  the  Spanish  galleons  ran  the  gauntlet 
of  English  pirates  to  Spain.  Drake  had  been  one  of 
the  most  intrepid  of  this  crew.  Henry  Morgan,  a 
century  later,  was  another.  The  English  allowed  the 
Spanish  to  perform  all  the  arduous  labor  and  fighting 
involved  in  acquiring  the  gold  and  silver,  then  hov- 
ered around  the  West  Indies  and  took  it  from  them, 
or  died  in  the  attempt. 

2^ 


THE  AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

In  1668,  Henry  Morgan  collected  a  motley  crew  of 
sea  vagabonds  with  the  object  of  capturing  Porto 
Bello.  The  operations  of  the  English  buccaneers  usu- 
ally were  plain  piracy,  but  they  justified  themselves 
in  their  own  minds  by  the  quarrelsome  state  of  the 
relations  between  England  and  Spain,  and  a  still 
deeper  motive  was  the  implacable  warfare  between 
Protestant  and  Catholic.  Morgan,  as  unprincipled  a 
soldier  as  ever  fought,  was  knighted  for  his  piracies 
in  Panama. 

Porto  Bello  was  captured  after  a  fight  not  sur- 
passed in  history  for  inhumanities.  The  treasure  they 
found  here  whetted  their  lust  for  gold,  with  the  re- 
sult that,  three  years  later,  a  still  bolder  enterprise, 
that  of  traversing  the  Isthmus  and  taking  Panama, 
was  planned.  In  1671  Morgan  started  up  the  Cha- 
gres  River  with  1,600  men,  and,  after  abandoning 
that  stream,  they  struck  out  overland  to  Panama. 
Nine  days  were  consumed  in  the  journey  with  hard- 
ships from  hunger  and  the  labor  of  penetrating  the 
jungle,  the  like  of  which  have  not  been  exceeded  by 
soldiers  anywhere. 

When  they  did  get  in  sight  of  Panama  they  were 
so  weak  that  a  more  resolute  foe  easily  could  have 
annihilated  the  army  of  invasion.  The  Spanish  and 
natives  kept  within  their  fortifications  and  their  first 
offensive  move  was  to  attempt  to  stampede  two  thou- 
sand bulls  upon  Morgan's  men,  who  promptly  quit 
fighting  to  slaughter  enough  of  the  animals  to  satisfy 
their  hunger.  Thus  what  mighthave  been  a  formidable 

2(i 


SPANISH 

defensive  act,  if  successfully  managed,  was  turned  to 
vital  advantage  by  the  enemy. 

A  desperate  defense  was  unavailing.  The  city  was 
captured,  but  found  to  be  barren  of  treasure,  as  the 
Spanish  had  loaded  a  ship  with  their  gold  and  silver 
before  the  attack  began,  and  the  ship  could  not  be 
found.  It  was  an  unwise  move,  because  the  infuriated 
pirates  proceeded  to  torture  the  people,  and  to  mur- 
der hundreds,  finally  burning  Panama  to  the  ground. 
To-day  tourists  go  out  to  see  a  tower  and  other  ruins 
of  the  famous  old  city  of  Panama. 

Panama  was  rebuilt  on  a  short  promontory  in  the 
Pacific,  and  although  captured  again  by  the  pirates 
in  1680  has  remained  on  the  new  site  to  this  time. 
Many  vicissitudes  attended  the  career  of  the  Span- 
iards for  the  following  century  and  a  half,  the  chief 
ruffle  on  their  calm  being  an  effort  by  William  Pater- 
son,  a  wealthy  Englishman,  to  found  a  colony  of 
Scotchmen  in  the  Darien  region  on  the  Atlantic  coast, 
east  of  Porto  Bello.  The  first  colony  of  1,200  came 
in  1698  and  perished  from  disease  or  fighting,  and 
a  second  company  of  1,300  followed  the  same  course, 
being  expelled  or  killed  by  the  Spanish,  so  that  not 
more  than  thirty  ever  returned  to  Scotland.  It  was 
a  lamentable  failure  of  English  colonizing  south  of 
the  American  colonies,  and  was  not  followed  by  other 
experiments  in  Panama. 

During  all  the  stirring  years  in  Panama  the  Span- 
ish had  swarmed  over  Mexico,  Central  America,  and 
South  America.  Yet,  early  in  the  nineteenth  century 
the    great    colonial    empire   began   crumbling   away. 

27 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

Province  after  province  revolted  from  Spain.  The 
explanation  is  that  the  Spanish  never  looked  on  Amer- 
ica as  anything  other  than  a  place  to  extract  gold 
and  silver.  This  attitude  enabled  them  to  secure  the 
most  wealth  in  the  shortest  time,  but  the  methods 
employed,  and  the  treatment  of  the  natives,  laid  the 
foundation  in  unstable  elements.  In  North  America 
regular  agricultural  and  commercial  pursuits  caused 
English  civilization  to  take  deep  root,  but,  in  justice 
to  Spain,  it  at  least  is  true  that  she  maintained  her 
authority  over  her  colonies  as  long  as  England  did 
over  hers. 

Panama,  in  1821,  caught  the  spirit  of  revolt,  and 
accomplished  her  freedom  from  Spain  in  a  bloodless 
revolution.  It  then  joined  the  Confederation  of  New 
Granada,  the  Colombia  of  to-day,  under  Simon  Boli- 
var, South  America's  great  soldier  and  statesman. 
Here  ended  the  career  of  the  Spanish  in  Panama. 

Easily  the  most  impressive  fact  in  all  the  Western 
Hemisphere  is  the  achievement  of  the  Spanish  in  dis- 
possessing a  whole  continent  of  its  original  tongues 
and  substituting  therefor  their  own  language.  W^ith 
the  exception  of  some  Portuguese  colonies,  the  lan- 
guage of  the  Castiles  is  the  language  from  the  Rio 
Grande  to  Patagonia.  The  customs  also  are  Spanish 
and  so  is  the  religion.  The  explanation  of  this  truly 
remarkable  fact  is  that  the  Spaniard  absolutely  re- 
fused to  adapt  himself  to  the  native  tongues,  cus- 
toms, or  religion,  forcing  them  to  conform  to  his. 
But  the  chief  credit  for  this  achievement  belongs  to 
the  missionaries  of  the  Catholic  Church,  men  no  less 

28 


SPANISH 

daring  than  the  conquerors  with  whom  they  went 
hand  in  hand,  planting  missions  and  churches  in  the 
jungle.  These  indomitable  priests  taught  the  native 
children  to  speak  Spanish,  and  in  the  course  of  cen- 
turies it  became  the  continental  language. 

What  will  be  the  future  of  English  in  Latin  Amer- 
ica ?  It  is  not  a  wild  prophecy  to  assert  that  in  another 
generation  Spanish  will  be  decadent  and  English 
everywhere  ascendent.  Already  the  higher  social  and 
business  circles  are  acquiring  English.  In  every  cen- 
ter of  population  it  is  making  rapid  headway,  though 
it  must  be  many  years  before  the  mass  of  the  peo- 
ple make  it  their  own.  The  South  American  youth 
is  not  dreaming  of  Europe,  but  of  the  giant  young 
republic  to  the  North.  He  wants  to  see  its  skyscrap- 
ers, its  dazzling  luxury  in  every  phase  of  life.  Its 
politics  fascinates  and  amazes  him.  It  seems  a  land 
literally  rolling  in  wealth,  the  land  of  opportunity  and 
the  land  where  he  may  learn  the  arts  with  which  to 
make  a  career  in  his  own  country.  The  Americans 
are  as  loath  to  adapt  themselves  to  Spanish  customs 
and  dialects  as  the  Spaniards  were  to  the  original. 
Every  year  Americans  find  it  less  difficult  to  get  about 
anywhere  in  Latin  America.  English  ultimately  will 
triumph  from  Alaska  to  Magellan  Straits,  and  the 
canal  will  speed  the  day. 


29 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE   PANAMA   RAILROAD 

KENTUCKY'S  great  statesman,  Henry  Clay,  as 
Secretary  of  State  in  1825  and  as  Senator  in 
1835,  ^^'^^  interested  farsightedly  in  plans  for  speed- 
ier communication  at  the  Isthmus  between  the  two 
oceans.  The  independence  of  Panama  from  Spain  by 
a  bloodless  revolution  in  182 1  had  placed  the  Isth- 
mus in  a  new  position  for  other  European  govern- 
ments, or  the  United  States,  to  negotiate  terms  for 
concessions.  The  American  people  were  jealous  of 
foreign  activities,  but  not  aggressively  active  them- 
selves in  concrete  efforts  toward  a  canal. 

De  Witt  Clinton,  prominently  connected  with  the 
Erie  Canal,  headed  a  company  that  sought  government 
aid  in  its  plans  for  a  canal  in  Central  America,  but 
though  Clay  encouraged  the  idea  nothing  definite  re- 
sulted. The  year  following,  or  in  1826,  Simon  Boli- 
var, South  America's  great  soldier  and  statesman, 
invited  the  United  States,  among  other  American  re- 
publics, to  an  international  conference  in  Panama 
with  the  object  of  forming  a  union  for  the  promotion 
and  defense  of  all  American  interests. 

While  nothing  significant  came  of  this  congress,  it 
is  noteworthy  as  the  first  attempt  to  form  what  is 
now  the  Pan-American  Union,  or  the  Bureau  of 
American  Republics,  at  Washington.    It  assembled  on 

30 


RAILROAD 

June  22,  1826,  but  the  United  States  representatives 
did  not  arrive  in  time  to  participate. 

Panama  had  become  a  part  of  the  confederation  of 
New  Granada  after  independence  from  Spain,  and 
thenceforth  Hved  the  regular  Hfe  of  a  turbulent  prov- 
ince of  what  to-day  is  known  as  Colombia.  All  the 
commerce  between  the  coasts  drifted  across  the  Isth- 
mus at  that  point.  Little  effort  had  been  made  to 
improve  the  passage,  so  that  swifter  and  easier  com- 
munication was  the  dream  of  every  seaman  or  trav- 
eler. 

Clay  introduced  a  resolution  in  the  Senate  in  1835 
authorizing  President  Jackson  to  appoint  a  commis- 
sioner to  investigate  the  feasibility  of  a  rail  or  water 
route  at  the  Isthmus.  Charles  Biddle  undertook  the 
mission  and  secured  a  concession  at  Bogota,  the  capi- 
tal of  New  Grenada,  but  he  died  before  making  a  re- 
port. President  Van  Buren  interested  himself  in  the 
project,  but  little  came  of  American  plans  for  the  next 
ten  years. 

The  ever  alert  French,  in  1847,  after  securing  a 
concession  to  build  a  railroad,  allowed  it  to  lapse.  It 
is  significant  that  this  French  failure  was  followed,  as 
in  the  case  of  trying  to  dig  a  canal,  by  a  successful  at- 
tempt by  the  Americans. 

Three  Americans,  William  H.  Aspinwall,  John  L. 
Stephens  and  Henry  Chauncey,  of  New  York,  taking 
advantage  of  the  opening  made  by  the  French  failure, 
obtained  a  concession  from  the  Bogota  government 
in  1849  for  building  a  railroad  across  the  Isthmus  at 
Panama,  with  the  important  provision  that  no  canal 

31 


THE    AMERICANS    IX    PANAMA 

could  be  constructed  there  without  the  company's  con- 
sent. 

Their  concession  was  for  a  period  of  forty-nine 
years  after  the  completion  of  the  railroad,  but  Colom- 
bia reserved  the  right,  twenty  years  after  its  comple- 
tion, to  purchase  the  road  for  $5,000,000.  The 
unprecedented  prosperity  of  the  road  immediately  upon 
the  beginning  of  its  operation  made  this  latter  pro- 
vision a  bad  stroke,  as  in  1875  Colombia  could  take 
it  over  at  the  fixed  valuation.  The  company  began  to 
seek  an  extension  of  the  life  of  the  concession,  with 
Colombia,  unfortunately  for  it,  holding  the  whip  hand. 

Negotiations  were  concluded  in  1867  whereby  a 
ninety-nine  year  concession  was  obtained,  but  the 
terms  were  very  hard.  A  cash  bonus  of  $1,000,000 
had  to  be  paid  to  Colombia,  with  an  annual  payment 
of  $250,000  and  the  company  agreed  to  extend  the 
railroad  out  into  the  Pacific  Ocean  to  some  islands 
where  deep  water  would  enable  large  ships  to  dock. 

Luckily  for  the  American  promoters,  the  discovery 
of  gold  in  California  in  1849  came  just  as  they  were 
seeking  to  float  their  company.  The  Isthmian  route  to 
California  at  once  became  heavily  traveled  and  the 
eyes  of  the  whole  world,  particularly  of  the  United 
States,  were  again  fastened  upon  Panama. 

Our  government  in  1846  had  concluded  a  treaty 
with  Colombia  which  provided  for  the  joint  construc- 
tion of  a  canal  in  Panama,  and  the  stimulated  interest 
in  the  Isthmian  route  in  1849  made  this  appear  a 
fortuitous  treaty,  because  it  excluded  any  European 
power  from  that  territory.     A  controversy  arose  be- 

32 


RAILROAD 

tween  the  United  States  and  England  over  the  Nica- 
raguan  canal  route,  culminating  in  a  treaty  between 
the  two  governments  known  as  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  of  1850.  This  treaty  provided  substantially  the 
same  as  the  Colombian  treaty  of  1846,  that  in  the 
event  of  the  construction  of  any  canal  in  Central  Amer- 
ica, Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  guaranteed  its 
neutrality  and  use  on  equal  terms  to  all  the  world. 

The  addition  of  the  territories  of  Oregon  and  Cali- 
fornia to  the  United  States  still  further  emphasized 
the  need  of  quick  communication  between  the  Atlantic 
and  Pacific.  The  Panama  Railroad,  therefore,  took 
hold  upon  the  popular  imagination. 

Aspinwall  and  his  associates  pushed  the  construc- 
tion of  the  road  under  James  L.  Baldwin,  an  Amer- 
ican civil  engineer  of  uncommon  ability.  Labor  of 
a  desirable  kind  was  not  obtainable.  Many  nation- 
alities were  tried,  with  a  tragic  failure  on  the  part  of 
the  Chinese,  who  seemed  unable  to  face  the  terrors 
of  the  jungle.  Hundreds  committed  suicide,  and  dis- 
ease and  accidents  claimed  other  hundreds.  The  life 
cost  of  the  Panama  Railroad  in  the  five  years  it  was 
building  has  been  estimated  at  6,000  persons. 

The  route  selected  started  at  an  island  near  the 
coast  on  the  Atlantic  side,  the  site  of  the  city  of  Colon, 
crossed  the  hills  into  the  valley  of  the  Chagres  River 
and  followed  that  valley  to  the  continental  divide,  over 
which  it  passed  with  a  maximum  elevation  of  263  feet 
above  sea-level,  and  thence  down  to  Panama  on  the 
Pacific  side.  Treacherous  swamps,  almost  impene- 
trable jungles,  and  formidable  streams  and  mountains 

33 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

necessitated  incredibly  hard  labor  and  continuous  work 
from  1850  to  January  28,  1855,  when  the  first  train 
reached  Panama  from  Colon.  The  line  was  forty- 
seven  miles  long,  built  of  Belgian  rails  and  on  a  gauge 
of  five  feet. 

The  standard  gauge  in  the  United  States  is  four 
feet  nine  and  a  half  inches,  so  that  all  locomotives  and 
cars  used  on  the  Panama  railroad  have  to  be  specially 
built  with  wheels  set  farther  apart.  When  it  comes  to 
disposing  of  surplus  equipment  after  the  canal  is  fin- 
ished, the  government  will  have  to  allow  for  the  cost 
of  modifying  the  rolling  stock  from  the  five-foot  to 
the  standard  gauge.  It  is  estimated  that  the  axles  on 
locomotives  may  be  shortened  at  an  average  cost  of 
$750  a  locomotive,  and  for  cars,  from  $27  to  $31  each. 

California  gold-seekers  used  the  railroad  as  far  ^s 
it  was  built  during  the  years  immediately  following 
1850  and  made  the  rest  of  the  trip  across  the  Isthmus 
by  muleback.  There  were  no  buccaneers  waiting  to 
relieve  them,  as  they  had  the  Spaniards,  of  their  treas- 
ure, but  bandits  and  outlaws  haunted  the  route  with 
almost  equal  success.  Thus  the  railroad  had  an  in- 
come from  the  start,  and  ten  years  after  completion 
it  was  known  as  the  best-paying  property  in  the 
world. 

The  total  cost  had  been  $7407,553,  or  about  $158,- 
000  a  mile.  Dividends  were  paid  every  year  from 
1853  to  1892,  and  from  1901  to  1903,  when  it  became 
United  States  property.  The  largest  year's  earnings 
was  in  1868  when  44  percentum  was  paid,  or  $4,337,- 
668.48  in  both  dividends  and  undivided  profits.    Total 

34 


RAILROAD 

earnings  from  1855  to  1898  were  $94,958,890.36; 
operating  expenses,  $57,036,234.46;  leaving  for  sur- 
plus and  dividends,  $37,922,655.  Rather  eloquent 
figures  as  to  the  Isthmian  freight  and  passenger  traffic ! 

The  great  prosperity  of  the  railroad  suffered  a 
serious  set-back  with  the  completion  of  the  California 
overland  railroad  in  1869.  Thenceforward  the  valu- 
able bullion  shipments  avoided  Panama  as  well  as  pas- 
senger and  freight  business.  The  company's  business 
shows  a  steady  decline  from  that  year,  and  some 
wooden-headed  management  contributed  to  the  mo- 
mentum. Still  it  was  a  valuable  property,  and  to  the 
French  a  very  expensive  property,  as  they  found  in 
188 1,  when  they  had  to  buy  the  railroad  in  order  to 
obtain  a  concession  to  build  a  canal. 

Colombia  turned  to  the  French,  after  negotiating 
fruitlessly  with  the  United  States  over  a  canal  con- 
cession, and  the  company  headed  by  M.  de  Lesseps 
was  granted  a  right  of  way  provided  the  railroad 
would  suspend  the  provision  in  its  concession  giving 
it  the  say-so  as  to  water  communication.  Freight 
rates  were  boosted  on  all  French  company  shipments 
until  in  desperation  they  bought  the  road  for  $18,094,- 
000,  in  1 88 1,  paying  considerably  more  than  it  was 
worth,  or  $250  a  share  for  sixty-eight  seventieths  of 
the  capital  stock. 

The  French  neglected  the  commercial  possibilities 
even  more  than  the  American  owners  had,  though 
dividends  were  earned  during  the  life  of  the  first  com- 
pany. When  the  United  States  bought  the  interests 
of  the  French  company,  in  1904,  the  Panama  Railroad 

35 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

was  one  of  the  properties  transferred.  It  was  sadly 
run  down,  but  under  the  Americans  it  was  made  over 
into  a  modernly  equipped  and  operated  system,  though 
subordinated  as  a  commercial  proposition  to  the  con- 
struction of  the  canal.  Chief  Engineer  Wallace  sug- 
gested that  it  be  double-tracked,  or  four-tracked,  and 
up-to-date  ocean  terminals  for  handling  a  great  freight 
business  be  built,  with  the  idea  of  supplying  cheap  and 
swift  transit  pending  the  completion  of  the  canal,  but 
this  view  was  abandoned  by  succeeding  engineers, 
until  in  19 12  the  Secretary  of  War  cut  down  the 
amount  of  commercial  business  the  road  should  handle 
so  that  canal  shipments  might  have  uninterrupted 
right  of  way. 

Doubtless  mahogany,  ebony  and  other  rare  hard 
w^oods  have  not  been  used  in  cutting  ties  for  other 
railroads,  but  the  Americans  have  dug  up  ties  of  those 
woods  that  had  been  in  the  ground  sixty  years  and 
still  were  in  good  condition.  The  quaint  hollowed  out 
Belgian  rails  had  to  be  replaced  with  heavy  American 
types.  Such  rolling  stock  as  was  used  by  the  Ameri- 
cans was  for  light  hauling. 

Passenger  rates  dropped  from  $25  a  one-way  ticket 
in  1855  to  $2.40  under  the  Americans  to-day.  The 
trip  from  Colon  to  Panama  is  two  hours  and  a  half 
and  the  coaches  are  painted  yellow  because  that  color 
best  stands  the  Isthmian  climate.  In  the  fiscal  year 
ended  June  30,  191 1,  the  Panama  Railroad  under 
American  control  earned  $2,398,177.88  from  freight 
and  $686,991  from  passenger  business.     The  number 

36 


RAILROAD 

of  passengers  carried  during  the  year  was  2,999,500, 
and  in  191 2  a  larger  traffic  was  recorded. 

The  plans  for  the  canal  as  adopted  by  the  Americans 
in  1906  played  havoc  with  the  right  of  way  of  the 
railroad,  so  in  June,  1907,  the  work  of  relocating  it 
back  among  the  hills  out  of  reach  of  Gatun  Lake  was 
begun.  After  five  years'  work,  or  as  long  as  it  re- 
quired to  build  the  original  line  in  1850- 185 5,  the  new 
line  was  opened  to  traffic  in  19 12.  The  full  line,  how- 
ever, was  used  only  for  freight  trains,  as  the  Canal 
Zone  towns  mostly  are  on  the  old  line,  along  the  Cule- 
bra  cut. 

This  twentieth  century  Panama  Railroad  has  cost 
$9,000,000,  as  compared  with  the  cost  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  road,  $7,000,000,  an  increase  of  $2,000,- 
000  after  a  lapse  of  sixty  years.  On  the  face  of  things 
the  performance  in  1850- 185 5  seems  more  creditable 
than  in  1907-19 12,  because  then  a  pathless  jungle  had 
to  be  conquered  when  the  Isthmus  was  a  death  trap; 
whereas  now  the  Americans  had  a  force  of  workers 
organized,  they  had  the  equipment  on  the  ground  with 
which  to  do  the  work  and  the  entire  resources  of  the 
canal  organization  as  to  quarters,  subsistence,  and 
medical  attention  were  within  easy  reach.  Not  con- 
sidering the  cost,  the  relocated  line  is  a  beautiful  piece 
of  engineering  work. 

The  dream  of  a  Pan-American  Railroad  has  been 
entertained  ever  since  steam  locomotion  came  into  use. 
When  several  gaps  are  filled  in,  there  will  be  railroad 
communication  through  Mexico,  Guatemala,  and  Nica- 
ragua to  Costa  Rica,  which  adjoins  Panama.     The 

37 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

Republic  of  Panama  has  been  planning  an  interior 
railroad  system  that  would  be  part  of  an  all-rail  route 
from  the  United  States  to  the  canal.  Before  many 
years  it  is  likely  that  a  bridge  will  span  the  canal  in 
a  railroad  system  that  reaches  from  Canada  through 
Panama  to  the  mainland  of  South  America,  thence 
down  the  West  Coast  to  Valparaiso. 

In  connection  w^ith  the  railroad,  the  government  has 
operated  a  steamship  line  to  New  York,  from  Colon, 
the  fleet  at  present  consisting  of  six  ships,  the  Ancon, 
Cristobal,  Panama,  Colon,  Advance,  and  Allianca. 
These  ships  have  transported  the  larger  part  of  canal 
supplies  from  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  Canal  employees 
get  passenger  rates  of  $20  or  $30  for  one-way  trips 
when  taking  vacations,  and  other  steamship  lines  grant 
smaller  reductions.  The  regular  rate  from  New  York 
is  $75.  It  is  the  only  line  to  Panama  that  flies  our 
flag. 


38 


CHAPTER   V 

THE    FRENCH    IN    PANAMA 

OPINIONS  as  to  the  advisability  of  an  Isthmian 
canal  ran  all  the  way  from  the  attitude  of 
Philip  II,  of  Spain,  that  it  would  be  impious  to  tamper 
with  natural  land  configurations  as  arranged  by  Provi- 
dence, to  the  bold  determination  of  the  French  to  do 
at  Panama  what  they  had  done  at  Suez. 

Ferdinand  de  Lesseps  and  his  Panama  career  vindi- 
cate strikingly  the  truth  of  the  adage  that  nothing 
succeeds  like  success.  The  French  Panama  Canal 
Company  was  floated  on  the  strength  of  his  achieve- 
ment in  cutting  a  sea-level  passage  from  the  Mediter- 
ranean to  the  Red  Sea,  thus  making  an  island  of 
Africa. 

When  he  turned  his  attention  to  Panama  as  a  new 
field  for  glory,  the  French  people  enthusiastically  ap- 
plauded his  audacity  and,  what  is  more  significant  and 
substantial,  invested,  first  and  last,  $265,000,000  in 
the  enterprise.  American  capital  entered  practically 
not  at  all  into  the  French  project,  and  not  a  great  deal 
of  outside  European  capital,  the  French  middle  and 
peasant  classes  being  the  principal  shareholders. 

There  had  been  talk  and  paper  negotiations  aplenty 
before  M.  de  Lesseps  became  active.  In  1838  a  French 
syndicate  sought  to  interest  their  government  in  the 
enterprise  but  the  plan  fell  through,  and  the  failure 

39 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

later  of  the  French  companies  to  build  the  canal  can- 
not be  censured  as  a  failure  of  the  French  government, 
which  never  financed  it  as  a  national  enterprise  as  has 
been  done  in  the  successful  American  attempt. 

President  Simon  Bolivar,  of  New  Grenada,  or 
Colombia,  in  1827,  had  ordered  a  study  made  of  the 
Isthmus  to  ascertain  facts  about  a  route  for  a  canal 
or  railroad.  Any  concession  that  might  be  granted 
must  come  from  his  government.  The  various  Ameri- 
can nibbles  at  the  idea  have  been  noted,  and  as  a  way 
cf  stirring  us  up  to  real  action,  Colombia  paid  as- 
siduous court  to  France.  Gen.  Stephen  Turr,  a  nati\e 
of  Hungary,  in  1876  obtained  a  concession,  in  as- 
sociation with  Lieut.  Lucien  N.  B.  Wyse,  who  figured 
prominently  in  all  the  later  French  operations.  Count 
de  Lesseps  was  interested  by  \\'yse  who,  in  1878,  re- 
vived the  concession  on  the  following  terms:  Its  life 
was  for  ninety-nine  years  after  the  completion  of  the 
canal,  allowing  two  years  to  organize  the  company  and 
twelve  years  in  which  to  dig  the  canal.  Colombia  was 
to  receive  $250,000  annually  after  the  seventy-sixth 
year  of  the  life  of  the  concession  and  it  expressly  was 
stipulated  that  though  the  French  company  might  sell 
to  other  private  companies,  it  could  not  sell  out  to  any 
government,  a  provision  which  played  a  vital  part  in 
the  transactions  leading  up  to  the  American  control 
in   1 904. 

The  French  were  theatrical  in  their  plans  for  launch- 
ing the  enterprise.  A  world  congress  of  engineers 
was  invited  to  assemble  in  Paris  in  May,  1879,  to  de- 
cide upon   the   type   and   cost  of   the  canal.      M.   de 

40 


FRENCH 

Lesseps  presided  and  guided  the  decision  to  a  sea- 
level  type,  the  same  as  at  Suez.  There  were  eleven 
Americans  in  the  assembly  but  this  was  the  extent 
of  American  interest.  It  was  at  this  congress  that 
the  first  suggestion  of  a  dam  at  Gatun  for  a  lock-type 
canal  was  made  by  Godin  de  Lepinay,  a  French  en- 
gineer. The  sea-level  advocates  advanced  the  plan  of 
digging  a  great  tunnel  for  ten  miles  through  the  Cor- 
dilleras and  so  divert  the  Chagres  River  into  the  Pa- 
cific Ocean  away  from  the  canal,  as  that  river  was  use- 
less in  a  sea-level  type. 

Under  the  stimulus  of  these  proceedings,  the  new 
company's  stock  was  over-subscribed  by  the  admiring 
countrymen  of  the  great  de  Lesseps,  the  first  issue  be- 
ing for  $6o,CM30,ooo.  M.  de  Lesseps  then  made  a 
spectacular  trip  to  Panama,  arriving  at  Colon  on  De- 
cember 30,  1879.  The  Panamans  and  foreign  colony 
received  him  with  wild  acclaim  as  the  forerunner  of 
a  golden  stream  of  money  about  to  enrich  their  coun- 
try, and  as  the  first  concrete  step  toward  realizing  the 
dream  of  four  centuries. 

The  first  blast  of  an  explosive  in  the  construction 
of  an  Isthmian  canal  was  set  off  by  one  of  the  young 
daughters  of  M.  de  Lesseps  at  Culebra  on  January  10, 
1880.  After  several  weeks  of  banqueting.  Count  de 
Lesseps  left  for  the  United  States  to  stir  the  imagina- 
tion of  the  Am.ericans  over  the  enterprise.  About  the 
only  result  was  to  attract  the  attention  of  some  con- 
tractors to  the  work,  notably  in  the  case  of  the  Slaven 
brothers  who,  previous  to  their  Panama  adventure, 
had  seen  no  experience  in  construction  work,  but  who 

41 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

did  the  most  creditable  work  on  the  project,  dredging 
thirteen  miles,  making  fortunes  for  themselves  and 
leaving  machines  which  the  Americans  repaired  and 
used  from  1904  onward. 

As  estimated  by  M.  de  Lesseps,  the  sea-level  canal 
was  to  cost  $131,600,000,  although  the  Paris  congress 
had  gone  higher  in  its  figures.  He  was,  of  course, 
sadly  mistaken  in  this  estimate  and  the  French  ulti- 
mately spent  twice  that  amount  before  throwing  up 
the  sponge.  Conditions  totally  were  different  from 
those  at  Suez.  There  the  sandy  dunes  rose  no  higher 
than  forty  feet  above  sea-level  at  any  point  and  ex- 
cavation work  comparatively  was  easy.  In  Panama  a 
mountainous  configuration  with  solid  rock  a  short 
depth  beneath  the  surface  had  to  be  faced,  with  tor- 
rential streams  to  be  controlled  and  diverted. 

Operations  went  ahead  rapidly  from  1880  onward, 
the  method  being  to  let  contracts  for  the  different 
phases  of  the  work.  The  canal  started  near  Colon,  in 
Limon  Bay,  and  was  to  follow  the  valley  of  the  Cha- 
gres  River  for  about  thirty  miles,  thence  through  the 
continental  divide  to  the  Pacific,  three  miles  west  of 
Panama,  about  where  the  present  canal  begins. 

By  1885,  however,  extravagance  and  graft  had 
emptied  the  company's  treasury.  The  contractors,  as 
a  rule,  did  little  and  exacted  much.  It  became  ap- 
parent, too,  that  a  sea-level  type  presented  stagger- 
ing difficulties.  M.  de  I.esseps  gave  his  consent  to  a 
change  in  plans  to  a  lock  type,  as  had  been  recom- 
mended by  the  engineer  Lcpinay,  but  the  dam  was 
to  be  at  Bohio,  instead  of  at  Gatun.     Bohio  is  seven- 

42 


FRENCH 

teen  miles  from  the  Caribbean,  while  Gatun  is  only- 
seven  miles  distant  from  that  sea. 

All  the  theatrical  methods  conceivable  were  em- 
ployed to  float  a  new  bond  issue  for  $160,000,000, 
but  the  public  had  grown  dubious  over  the  success  of 
the  enterprise.  The  amount  was  raised,  however, 
and  was  poured  into  the  project  with  more  millions 
until  1889  when,  after  $234,795,017  had  been  in- 
vested, the  company  became  bankrupt.  Of  this  vast 
amount,  $157,224,689  had  been  invested  on  the  Isth- 
mus, the  remainder  having  gone  to  organization  ex- 
penses, for  promotion,  and  overhead  expenses  gen- 
erally. For  engineering  and  construction,  $89,434,- 
225  had  been  spent;  for  machinery  and  materials, 
$29,722,856;  for  buildings,  hospitals,  etc.,  $15,397,- 
282.     Various  needs  and  graft  absorbed  the  rest. 

The  French  treated  their  w^hite  employees  with  ex- 
travagant generosity.  Living  accommodations  were 
on  a  scale  of  open-handed  liberality.  Little  was  done, 
beyond  building  hospitals,  to  conquer  the  bad  health 
conditions  of  the  Isthmus,  and,  while  the  French  left 
patterns  for  much  of  the  later  American  activities, 
the  sanitary  control  of  the  jungle  distinctively  is  an 
American  triumph.  The  death  rate  among  French 
employees  on  the  canal  was  from  two  to  three  times 
as  high  as  under  the  Americans. 

Older  natives  in  Panama  still  speak  of  the  period 
of  French  operations  as  the  "  temps  de  luxe."  M.  de 
Lesseps  was  charged  with  fraudulent  manipulation 
of  the  company's  affairs,  but  escaped  punishment  for 
his  alleged  wrongs.    There  was  graft  everywhere,  and 

43 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

when  the  Americans  invoiced  the  property  left  by 
the  French  they  found  stores  of  articles  that  had  been 
bought  in  quantities  absurdly  beyond  the  needs  of  the 
enterprise.  The  purchase  of  the  Panama  Railroad, 
while  at  a  high  figure,  was  the  only  investment  by  the 
French  that  approximated  sound  judgment. 

In  1890,  an  extension  of  ten  years  to  the  time  for 
completing  the  canal  was  granted  by  Colombia,  and 
subsequently  extensions  were  permitted  that  advanced 
the  life  of  the  concession  until  October  31,  1 910.  A 
new  Panama  Canal  Company  was  organized  in  1894 
with  a  capital  of  $13,000,000,  and  while  it  spent  this 
amount  and  more,  it  never  attained  the  momentum  of 
the  first  company.  The  maximum  force  under  the 
first  company  was  25,000  men  and  under  the  second 
regime  3,000. 

The  total  excavation  by  the  French  in  Panama  was 
78,000,000  yards,  of  which  the  first  company  took 
out  65,000,000  yards.  Between  Gold  Hill  and  Con- 
tractors Hill,  where  the  surface  at  the  center  line  of 
the  canal  was  312  feet  above  sea-level,  the  French 
dug  down  161  feet,  this  being  the  deepest  cut  they 
made.  It  is  here  that  the  work  they  did  was  useful 
to  the  American  plans  for  a  canal,  but  out  of  all  their 
work  only  29,908,000  yards  were  excavated  from  the 
present  American  route.  For  years  before  the  Ameri- 
cans came  the  French  did  just  enough  work  to  keep 
their  concession  alive. 

Summing  up,  the  efforts  of  the  French  in  Panama 
were  a  lamentable  failure,  but  it  probably  is  true  that 
a  private  company  of  any  nation  would  have  met  the 

44 


FRENCH 

same  fate.  The  riot  of  graft  that  attended  the  French 
effort  is  its  chief  blot,  just  as  the  honest  construction 
of  the  canal  by  the  American  government  is  its  chief 
honor.  Indisputably,  the  French  efforts  made  the 
American  effort  easier.  Much  that  they  did  stood 
as  landmarks  to  guide  our  way.  Much  that  they  failed 
to  do  emphasized  the  work  cut  out  for  us  before  suc- 
cess could  be  attained. 

The  mechanical  equipment  we  took  over  from  the 
French,  the  houses  and  hospitals,  and  especially  the 
engineering  records,  were  invaluable  from  the  start 
of  American  operations  and  much  still  is  in  use.  In 
191 2  there  were  112  French  locomotives,  seven  ladder 
dredges,  hundreds  of  dump  cars,  machine-shop  equip- 
ment, and  other  materials  in  profusion  actively  em- 
ployed in  canal  construction. 

An  effort  was  made  by  the  French  company  in  1898 
to  interest  the  United  States  government  in  the  en- 
terprise, provided  permission  could  be  secured  from 
Colombia,  but  this  failed,  and  the  plan  of  1903,  for 
turning  the  property  over  to  the  United  States,  was 
its  successor. 

To-day,  as  one  views  the  abandoned  French  equip- 
ment, overgrown  by  the  luxuriant  tropical  vegetation, 
he  is  reminded  of  the  retreat  from  Moscow.  The 
quaint  locomotives  and  machinery  lying  desolate  and 
rusting  away  suggest  the  batteries  that  Napoleon  left 
in  the  Russian  snows.  Indeed,  there  was  much  of  the 
same  exquisite  French  dash  about  the  two  enterprises 
that  ended  so  disastrously. 


45 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE   AMERICANS   IN    PANAMA 

FOREIGN  activities  in  Panama  were  watched, 
officially  and  unofficially,  by  the  Americans  with 
profound  interest,  and  with  a  desire  that  the  construc- 
tion of  a  canal  should  be  the  work  of  the  United 
States.  The  thought  of  communication  between  the 
oceans  being  in  European  hands  was  distasteful  to 
our  statesmen. 

The  Monroe  doctrine  seemed  broad  enough  to  shut 
out  foreign  governments,  but  not  private  corporations 
of  such  governments,  from  acquiring  the  territory 
through  which  to  dig  the  canal.  However  noisily 
the  Monroe  doctrine  might  be  flaunted  by  the  orators 
of  the  United  States,  our  international  position  in 
1850  did  not  give  it  anything  like  the  weight  that  has 
attached  to  it  ever  since  the  Spanish-American  War 
woke  Europe  to  our  strength. 

In  1852,  when  the  Panama  Railroad  was  being 
built,  a  captain  of  a  company  in  the  Fourth  Regiment 
of  Infantry,  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  crossed  the  Isthmus 
at  Panama,  on  his  way  to  the  new  California  post. 
There  were  1,800  men  in  the  command,  which  arrived 
at  Colon  on  July  i6th  of  that  year.  They  used  the 
new  railroad  as  far  as  it  had  been  constructed,  twenty! 
or  thirty  miles,  and  the  remainder  of  the  trip  was 
by   the   traditional   mule-back   system.      An   epidemic 

46  ^ 


AMERICANS 

of  cholera  broke  out,  costing  the  lives  of  80  men, 
and  the  general  hardships  of  the  transit  deeply  im- 
pressed Captain  Grant  with  the  need  of  a  better 
passage. 

Several  American  exploring  parties  had  been  on  the 
Isthmus,  and,  in  1854,  Lieut.  Arthur  Strain,  with 
twenty-seven  companions,  attempted  to  penetrate  the 
jungle.  They  got  lost,  and  after  ninety  days  of  liv- 
ing death  he  and  two  or  three  of  the  men  reached 
Panama.  Every  fact  that  was  secured  about  the 
geography  of  Panama  by  any  nation  cost  human 
life. 

President  Lincoln,  in  1863,  when  he  was  freeing 
the  negro  slaves,  cast  his  eyes  upon  the  Chiriqui  prov- 
ince of  Panama  as  a  suitable  place  for  colonizing  the 
negroes  of  the  South  after  the  Civil  War,  but  his 
untimely  death  prevented  the  opportunity  to  work  out 
this  idea. 

The  Senate,  in  1866,  asked  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
Welles  to  supply  it  with  information  as  to  the  feasi- 
bility of  a  canal  through  the  Darien  region  of  Pan- 
ama. Admiral  Charles  H.  Davis  a  year  later  re- 
ported adversely  to  this  route  which,  although  the 
narrowest  place  on  the  Isthmus,  had  a  mountain 
barrier  with  an  elevation  of  700  feet  to  make  a  sea- 
level  canal  an  impossible  undertaking. 

That  Captain  Grant,  who  had  crossed  the  Isthmus 
in  1852,  became  President  in  1869,  and  the  very  same 
year  he  directed  Gen.  Stephen  A.  Hurlbut  to  nego- 
tiate a  treaty  with  Colombia  for  a  Panama  canal. 
He  knew  from  experience  how  advantageous  it  would 

47 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

be  to  his  country.  Such  a  treaty  was  signed  at  Bogota 
on  January  26,  1870,  but  the  United  States  Senate 
did  not  ratify  it  and  the  Senate  of  Colombia  mu- 
tilated it.  Somehow  the  two  governments  did  not 
get  along  well  in  those  days. 

President  Grant  then  sent  Admiral  Ammen  to  Nica- 
ragua to  investigate  that  route,  more  in  a  pique  at 
Colombia  than  from  a  belief  in  its  availability.  Co- 
lombia returned  the  feeling  by  turning  to  the  French 
and  giving  Lieut.  Wyse  a  concession.  At  the  instance 
of  President  Grant  the  Panama  route  again  was  sur- 
veyed by  Commanders  E.  P.  Lull  and  T.  O.  Sel  fridge, 
at  the  Chagres  River  and  in  the  Darien  region,  in 
1875,  but  from  this  time  onward  the  French  had  the 
center  of  the  stage. 

Their  spread-eagle  operations  followed  by  a  col- 
lapse in  1889,  reorganization  in  1894,  and  half-hearted 
efforts  until  1898  ser\ed  rather  to  make  the  world 
and  the  Americans  think  that  a  canal  was  a  white 
elephant  proposition.  The  Spanish-American  War, 
however,  suddenly  brought  the  American  people  to  a 
realization  of  the  vital  necessity,  from  a  military  view- 
point alone,  of  an  interoceanic  canal. 

Day  by  day  as  the  battleship  Oregon  steamed 
around  Cape  Horn  this  lesson  was  impressed  upon  the 
people.  A  10,000-mile  journey  could  have  been  saved 
by  a  Panama  canal.  The  war  over,  and  peace  allow- 
ing the  country  and  the  government  to  consider  other 
things,  President  McKinley  reorganized  the  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission  which  he  had  appointed  in  1897 
with   the   following  personnel : 

48 


AMERICANS 

Admiral  John  G.  Walker,  Chairman, 

Samuel  Pasco, 

George  S.  Morison, 

Lieut. -Col.  Oswald  H.  Ernst,  U.  S.  A., 

Col.  p.  C.  Hains,  U.  S.  A., 

Lewis  M.  Haupt, 

Alfred  Noble, 

William  H,  Burr, 

Prof.  Emory  R.  Johnson. 

This  commission  was  appointed  in  March,  1899, 
with  instructions  to  investigate  all  Central  American 
routes.  The  French  canal  company  by  this  time  was 
in  a  situation  where  it  was  seeking  a  soft  place  to 
fall.  Hope  of  financing  the  project  by  private  capi- 
tal absolutely  was  dead  in  France.  Only  by  a  sale 
to  other  capitalists  or  to  some  government,  Colombia 
being  willing,  could  the  shareholders  hope  to  get  any- 
thing out  of  their  stupendous  investment.  And  it 
was  not  so  many  years  distant  before  their  conces- 
sion would  expire  and  their  property  revert  to  Co- 
lombia. 

William  Nelson  Cromwell,  a  New  York  lawyer,  was 
the  counsel  for  the  canal  company  and  the  Panama 
Railroad  Company.  He  was,  by  all  odds,  the  brain- 
iest man  connected  with  the  French  enterprise,  and 
the  task  of  guiding  the  company  to  a  solution  of  its 
troubles  devolved  upon  him.  Naturally  he  was 
elated  with  the  revival  of  interest  in  a  canal  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States,  and  he  was  indefatigable, 
in  many  accomplished  ways,  in  bringing  the  Panama 

49 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

route  to  the  notice  of  the  Commission.  P.  Bunau- 
Varilla,  a  Frenchman,  also  was  active  in  interesting 
Senator  Mark  Hanna,  and  other  official  and  private 
Americans,  in  the  French  project. 

The  Walker  Commission  unofficially  asked  the 
French  company  what  their  property  might  be  bought 
for,  and  when  quoted  a  price  of  $101,141,500,  prompt- 
ly decided  that  Nicaragua  looked  better.  The  report 
made  on  November  16,  1901,  by  the  Commission 
frankly  stated  that  the  Panama  route  was  preferable, 
but  the  price  asked  by  the  French  company  was  pro- 
hibitive. The  Commission  dropped  the  remark  that 
$40,000,000  was  about  what  the  French  holdings  were 
worth  to  the  United  States. 

The  astute  Mr.  Cromwell  probably  was  not  greatly 
disturbed  by  this  report,  but  the  shareholders  thought 
$40,000,000  looked  like  a  windfall  to  a  bankrupt  con- 
cern, even  if  it  had  invested  $265,000,000.  A  sixth 
loaf  decidedly  was  better  than  none  at  all.  They 
made  it  be  known  that  $40,000,000  would  strike  a 
trade.  It  has  not  been  admitted,  but  the  first  valu- 
ation by  Mr.  Cromwell  and  associates  doubtless  was 
a  "  feeler "  which  would  make  the  price  ultimately 
agreed  upon  look  like  a  bargain  for  the  United 
States. 

At  any  rate  they  fell  off  their  perch  in  a  hurry, 
and  when  they  had  agreed  to  the  Commission's  valu- 
ation, the  report  to  the  President  promptly  was  re- 
vised in  favor  of  the  Panama  route.  Admiral  Walker 
probably  played  his  own  little  game  in  first  recom- 
mending Nicaragua  to  send  a  chill  down  the  French 

50 


AMERICANS 

company's  spine.  On  the  outside  one  cannot  tell  how 
much  theatrical  play  both  sides  indulged,  but  it  is  not- 
a  bad  guess  to  believe  that  there  was  four-flushing  all 
around. 


51 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE   ROOSEVELT   IMPETUS 

THEODORE  ROOSEVELT,  upon  assuming 
the  office  of  President,  promised  to  carry  out 
the  poHcies  of  President  McKinley,  and,  so  far  as  the 
canal  poHcy  is  concerned,  he  succeeded  so  eminently 
that  a  deliberate  judgment,  formed  fromx  a  perspective 
view  of  the  whole  undertaking,  warrants  the  asser- 
tion that  his  energy,  decision,  and  sound  judgment 
made  an  interoceanic  canal  possible  in  this  generation. 

The  moment  his  dynamic  personality  got  behind  the 
idea  it  received  an  impetus,  and  he  bucked  the  line  of 
obstacles  that  arose  in  the  path  of  the  project  until 
he  retired  in  1909,  when  the  enterprise  was  advanced 
beyond  the  possibility  of  failure. 

It  was  to  President  Roosevelt  that  the  Walker  Com- 
mission reported  in  November,  1901.  His  first  mes- 
sage to  Congress  urged  immediate  action,  and,  after 
a  good  deal  of  wrangling  over  the  Hepburn  act  in 
favor  of  Nicaragua,  the  Spooner  act  was  passed  on 
June  28,  1902,  The  Nicaraguan  route  never  has  de- 
served the  attention  it  received,  for  the  natural  drift 
of  commerce  and  travel  had  gone  unerringly  for  four 
centuries  to  Panama,  like  a  flow  seeking  the  course 
of  least  resistance.  But  the  advocates  of  the  Nica- 
raguan route  created  such  opposition  as  to  call  forth 
from   the    President   the   exertion   of   the   strongest 

52 


ROOSEVELT 

pressure  to  compel  the  selection  of  the  Panama 
route. 

The  Spooner  act,  written  by  Senator  John  C. 
Spooner,  of  Wisconsin,  provided  for  an  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission  of  seven  members,  and  authorized 
the  Panama  route,  if  the  French  property  could  be 
bought  for  $40,000,000,  and  a  right  of  way  could 
be  obtained  from  Colombia.  In  the  event  such  con- 
ditions could  not  be  met,  it  authorized  the  Nicaraguan 
route,  and  seemed  to  lean  toward  a  lock-type  canal. 
An  immediate  appropriation  of  $10,000,000  was  made 
available  for  preliminary  expenses. 

President  Roosevelt  now  had  the  authority  he  de- 
sired for  going  ahead  with  the  project.  Secretary  of 
State  John  Hay  and  the  Minister  from  Colombia,  Jose 
V.  Concha,  immediately  began  corresponding  over  the 
granting  of  a  strip  of  territory  in  Panama  for  the 
prosecution  of  the  enterprise,  with  William  Nelson 
Cromwell  in  the  forefront  of  all  the  negotiations.  The 
sale  of  the  French  property  hinged  upon  securing  the 
consent  of  Colombia. 

A  study  of  Mr.  Cromwell  and  the  important  part 
he  played  throughout  the  whole  career  of  the  canaJ 
project  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  he  did  nothing 
more  blameworthy  than  President  Roosevelt  did,  while 
justice  requires  the  admission  that  he  gratuitously 
aided  the  government  in  a  number  of  important  par- 
ticulars. 

Minister  Concha,  with  Mr.  Cromwell's  aid,  drew 
up  a  treaty  which  was  presented  as  a  memorandum 
to  Secretary  Hay  on  April  18,  1902.    This  treaty,  as 

53 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

well  as  the  Herran  treaty  that  succeeded  it,  had  a 
number  of  impossible  provisions,  viewed  in  the  light 
of  our  canal  experience.  It  authorized  the  French 
company  to  sell  its  property  to  the  United  States  and 
authorized  the  United  States  to  build,  operate,  and 
protect  the  canal,  the  concession  to  run  for  one  hun- 
dred years,  and  be  renewable  at  the  discretion  of  the 
United  States.  A  commission,  jointly  appointed  by 
the  United  States  and  Colombia,  was  to  govern  the 
Canal  Zone  and  supervise  its  sanitation,  Colombia, 
however,  remaining  sovereign  over  the  territory.  One 
article  bound  the  United  States  to  a  declaration  that 
it  had  no  ideas  of  territorial  expansion  in  Central 
America;  the  United  States  was  to  build  waterworks 
and  sewers  and  pave  streets  in  Panama  and  Colon; 
the  United  States  guaranteed  the  sovereignty  of  Co- 
lombia and  all  its  territory  against  all  the  world; 
Colombia  retained  the  function  of  policing  the  Canal 
Zone,  but  in  the  event  of  its  failure  to  do  so,  the 
United  States  could  intervene  until  peace  was  re- 
stored, then  withdraw.  The  canal  was  to  be  finished 
fourteen  years  after  the  adoption  of  the  treaty  with  a 
possible  extension  of  twelve  years,  everything  to  re- 
vert to  Colombia  if  the  canal  was  not  begun  within 
five  years  and  completed  within  twenty-five  years. 
Colombia  renounced  the  $250,000  annually  paid  by 
the  Panama  Railroad,  but  was  to  receive  $7,000,000 
in  cash.  There  were  provisions  granting  the  right 
to  use  any  rivers  and  lands  necessary  for  the  canal, 
and  admitting  canal  supplies  free  of  duty,  giving  free 

54 


VliiiLtlinst  iihotii,    \V(ishi>i!il')>i,  J).  V. 

President  Roosevelt  ik  1903. 


ROOSEVELT 

passage  to  Colombian  warships,  and  insuring  the  neu- 
trahty  of  the  canal. 

Colombia  sent  a  new  Minister,  Thomas  Herran, 
in  1903,  who  negotiated  a  treaty  along  the  same  lines, 
except  that  Colombia  was  to  receive  $10,000,000  in- 
stead of  $7,000,000  for  the  Canal  Zone.  Had  the 
treaty  been  adopted,  it  is  a  safe  conclusion  to  draw 
that  interminable  and  exasperating  friction  would 
have  developed  between  the  two  countries,  for  even 
under  our  one-sided  treaty  with  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama, in  1904,  there  was  a  quarrel  over  sovereignty 
and  other  questions.  The  provision  giving  Colombia 
the  police  affairs  was  impossible.  Only  an  extended 
visit  to  the  Isthmus  can  give  an  adequate  idea  of  how 
essential  it  has  been  to  the  United  States  to  have  abso- 
lutely a  free  hand  in  the  Canal  Zone. 

President  Jose  M.  Marroquin,  of  Colombia,  in  this 
year,  1902,  asked  the  United  States  to  maintain  unin- 
terrupted passage  over  the  Panama  Railroad,  during 
a  serious  revolution  in  the  province,  and  promised  in 
return  to  give  the  United  States  a  treaty  for  a  Canal 
Zone.  As  a  result  of  American  intervention  and  good 
offices,  peace  was  patched  up  between  the  insurgents 
and  Colombia  on  November  21,  1902.  We  had  per- 
formed our  part  of  the  agreement,  and  now  looked 
to  Colombia  to  perform  its  part. 

President  Marroquin  was  in  good  faith,  but  fac- 
tional fighting  in  the  Congress  of  Colombia,  with  his 
enemies  in  the  ascendency,  showed  the  chances  of  a 
treaty  to  be  dubious.  The  American  Minister  deliv- 
ered a  warning  to  the  government  of  Colombia,  on 

55 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

June  13,  1903,  that  it  would  be  expected  to  live  up 
to  its  solemn  promise  of  1902.  The  influences  be- 
hind the  opposition  to  the  treaty  in  the  Colombian 
Senate  have  not  been  definitely  classified,  but  it  is 
more  than  a  supposition  that  certain  American  finan- 
cial interests,  which  opposed  any  canal,  took  a  hand 
to  the  extent  of  intimating  that  a  country  so  "  rotten 
rich  "  as  the  United  States  could  pay  more  than  $10,- 
000,000  for  a  Canal  Zone. 

But  there  is  another  factor  that  is  more  illuminat- 
ing. The  concession  of  the  French  company  would 
expire  in  19 10,*  and  by  waiting  seven  years  Colombia 
could  get  the  $40,000,000  the  United  States  was  will- 
ing to  pay  for  its  property.  There  was  one  bar  to 
this  in  the  concession  of  the  Panama  Railroad  which 
had  many  years  to  run,  and  which  gave  the  railroad 
the  right  to  decide  whether  a  canal  could  be  built 
across  the  Isthmus.  Still,  indisputably,  the  position 
of  Colombia  would  have  been  strengthened  immeas- 
urably by  the  lapsing  of  the  French  canal  concession, 
and  the  people  of  the  United  States  have  only  to  ask 
themselves  what  they  would  do  if  they  had  a  prop- 
erty which  in  seven  years  would  be  worth  $40,000,- 
000  more  than  it  was  to-day.  There  is  not  a  doubt 
that  popular  sentiment  would  say,  as  one  faction 
said  in  Colombia,  wait  for  the  enhancement  before 
selling. 

On  August  12,  1903,  the  Senate  of  Colombia  killed 
the  treaty  after  the  House  had  passed  it.     President 

*  Acknowledgment  for  this  and  other  facts  is  made  to  the  Canal 
Zone  Pilot,  edited  by  W.  C.  Haskins. 

56 


ROOSEVELT 

Marroquin  had  exerted  himself  to  the  utmost  to  save 
the  treaty,  doubtless  sensing  the  quality  of  the  man 
in  the  White  House,  but  to  no  avail,  and  another  way 
out  for  the  canal  project  was  already  taking  form. 


57 


CHAPTER    VIII 

TAKING   THE   CANAL   ZONE 

ANYONE  who  expected  Theodore  Roosevelt  to 
wait  patiently  and  untie  the  Gordian  knot  of 
diplomacy  that  held  the  canal  project  in  abeyance  sim- 
ply did  not  know  the  temperament  of  the  Chief  Ex- 
ecutive. 

His  inherited  administration  was  more  than  half 
gone.  If  he  desired  to  make  a  real  showing  before 
the  opening  of  the  battle  for  the  Presidency  in  1904, 
decisive  action  was  necessary.  The  course  of  Colom- 
bia indicated  clearly  to  him,  and  to  the  people  of 
Panama,  that  nothing  could  be  expected  in  the  imme- 
diate future  in  the  way  of  a  satisfactory  treaty,  and 
the  enemies  of  the  canal  in  that  country  seemed  to  be 
firmly  intrenched  in  the  Congress. 

Just  when  the  idea  of  a  revolution  as  a  means  of 
obtaining  what  diplomacy  had  failed  to  obtain,  origi- 
nated, and  who  originated  it,  are  not  matters  of  clear 
record,  but,  in  the  spring  of  1903.  threats  freely  were 
made  in  Panama  that  if  Colombia  did  not  grant  a 
treaty  to  the  United  States,  providing  for  a  canal,  the 
province  of  Panama  would  consider  that  its  interests 
had  not  been  conserved  by  Colombia,  and  might  pro- 
ceed to  act  for  itself. 

Panama's  relations  with  the  parent  government  at 
Bogota,  from  1821,  the  year  of  independence  from 

58 


REVOLUTION 

Spain,  to  1903,  the  year  of  independence  from  Co- 
lombia, had  been  characterized  by  intermittent  revo- 
lutions which  never  had  attained  a  decisive  and  final 
result. 

There  had  been  fifty-three  revolutions  in  fifty-seven 
years,  the  most  sanguinary  occurring  in  the  years 
1827,  1840,  i860,  1900,  and  1902.  But  any  advan- 
tages so  gained  by  Panama  had  been  lost  by  volun- 
tary or  involuntary  resumption  of  subordinate  rela- 
tions to  Colombia,  with  the  net  result  going  to  prove 
that  Panama,  unassisted,  never  could  hope  to  achieve 
independence  from  the  mother  country. 

The  United  States,  on  many  occasions,  had  inter- 
vened in  these  quarrels  between  Panama  and  Colom- 
bia, frequently  on  the  invitation  of  Colombia,  and 
always  to  maintain  the  neutrality  of  the  Panama  Rail- 
road, as  w^ell  as  to  preserve  general  American  prop- 
erty interests.  An  American  warship  was  a  familiar 
sight  in  Colon  or  Panama  harbors. 

These  interventions  were  based  on  our  treaty  with 
Colombia,  ratified  in  1846.  As  noted  before,  this 
treaty  provided  for  the  joint  sovereignty  of  Colom- 
bia and  the  United  States  over  any  canal  that  might 
be  built  in  Panama,  and  further  guaranteed  the  neu- 
trality of  the  Panama  Railroad.  By  this  treaty,  and 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  with  England,  over  any 
canal  that  might  be  built  in  Nicaragua,  the  United 
States  hoped  to  keep  foreign  governments  out  of 
Central  America  so  far  as  an  interoceanic  canal  was 
concerned. 

Colombia,  in  1902,  appealed  to  the  United  States 

59 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

under  its  treaty,  to  maintain  the  neutrality  of  the  Pan- 
ama Railroad,  during  the  most  important  revolution 
that  Panama  ever  had  attempted,  and  the  military 
intervention  by  the  United  States  in  that  year  largely 
enabled  Colombia  to  crush  the  revolution. 

It  is  important  to  note  that,  prior  to  1903.  the 
United  States  had  maintained  the  attitude  consistently 
that  any  action  it  took  in  Panama  was  in  fulfillment 
of  this  treaty  of  1846,  and  leaned  toward  the  gov- 
ernment of  Colombia  as  a  sovereign  power  engaged 
in  suppressing  the  fitful  insurrections  on  the  part  of 
Panama. 

By  maintaining  the  neutrality  of  the  railroad, 
through  the  use  of  Marines,  the  United  States  kept 
the  line  open,  and  so  enabled  Colombia  to  get  its 
troops  across  the  Isthmus  to  strike  down  the  revolu- 
tionists. Had  not  the  United  States  thus  assisted 
Colombia,  it  is  doubtful  if  she  could  have  retained 
sovereignty  over  Panama  without  the  exertion  of  con- 
siderably stronger  forces  than  were  employed. 

Colombia  had  promised,  in  consideration  of  the  in- 
tervention of  1902,  a  treaty  to  the  United  States  for 
a  right  of  way  for  a  canal  in  Panama.  Weeks  before 
this  treaty  was  killed,  on  August  12,  1903,  a  few  lead- 
ing business  and  professional  men  in  Panama  saw  the 
drift,  and  so  did  the  French  Panama  Canal  Company 
and  the  Panama  Railroad  Company.  The  Panamans 
wanted  the  prosperity  that  would  come  from  the 
money  the  United  States  would  invest  in  Panama,  and 
the  two  companies  wanted  to  sell  out  before  their 
concessions  should  expire,  and  at  a  price,  $40,000,000, 

60 


REVOLUTION 

which  the  United  States  had  agreed  upon,  and  which 
was  the  highest  offer  they  had  any  hope  of  receiving. 

Simultaneously  with  the  killing  of  the  treaty  by 
the  Colombian  Senate,  a  revolutionary  Junta  of 
wealthy  Panamans  and  resident  Americans  were  in 
New  York  and  Washington  broaching  their  plan  of  a 
revolution  and  separation  from  Colombia  as  a  way  for 
the  United  States  to  get  a  Canal  Zone,  They  au- 
thorized one  of  their  number,  Mr.  J.  Gabriel  Duque, 
owner  of  the  Panama  Lottery,  and  a  daily  newspaper, 
to  visit  Secretary  of  State  John  Hay  to  ascertain  the 
part  the  United  States  would  play  in  the  scheme. 

The  plan  proposed  was  that  Panama  should  pro- 
claim its  independence  from  Colombia  on  a  given  date, 
to  be  followed  by  the  recognition  of  its  independence 
by  the  United  States,  and  the  signing  of  a  treaty  with 
the  new  republic  which  would  give  our  government 
the  desired  right  of  way  for  a  canal.  Then  the  United 
States  could  buy  the  French  canal  interests  and  the 
Panama  Railroad  according  to  the  Spooner  act. 

Mr.  Duque  was  convinced  by  his  conference  with 
Secretary  Hay  that  the  United  States  was  in  a  mood 
to  try  any  plan  that  promised  an  early  solution  of  the 
problem  of  securing  a  Canal  Zone.  Secretary  Hay, 
of  course,  committed  nothing  to  paper,  and  talked  in 
a  negative  rather  than  a  positive  manner  about  the 
part  the  United  States  would  play  in  a  revolution,  but 
he  did  suggest  that  September  22d,  the  date  originally 
set  for  the  revolution,  was  perhaps  a  trifle  premature ; 
that  they  might  do  better  to  wait  a  few  weeks.  Sep- 
tember 22d  was  the  day  the  Congress  of  Colombia 

6i 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

had  intended  to  adjourn,  and  therefore  the  last  day 
that  this  body  might  reverse  its  action  and  ratify  the 
treaty.  The  Colombian  Congress  actually  did  not  ad- 
journ until  October  30th,  and  the  date  of  the  revolu- 
tion was  accordingly  advanced  to  November  4,  1903. 

The  Junta  went  back  to  Panama  to  make  their 
preparations.  Minister  Herran,  representing  Colom- 
bia at  Washington,  immediately  notified  his  govern- 
ment of  this  conference,  and  its  import,  and  urged 
that  the  garrison  at  Panama  be  strengthened.  Presi- 
dent Marroquin,  of  Colombia,  did  not  follow  this 
advice,  doubtless  hoping  for  a  change  of  sentiment  in 
his  country  that  would  ratify  the  treaty.  He  instead 
showed  his  friendliness  to  Panama  by  appointing  as 
its  Governor,  Don  Domingo  de  Obaldia,  a  known 
friend  of  the  treaty  and  of  the  province.  This  and 
other  actions  by  President  Marroquin  seemed  to  create 
favorable  conditions  for  the  success  of  the  revolution. 

About  four  hundred  Colombian  soldiers,  under  Gen. 
Iluertas,  constituted  the  garrison  of  Panama.  This 
commander  was  won  over  to  the  cause  of  the  revolu- 
tionary Junta,  thus  giving  them  a  clear  field  for  their 
prospective  operations,  provided  Colombia  did  not 
send  fresh  troops.  Colombia  could  send  reenforce- 
ments,  either  from  Cartagena,  on  the  Atlantic  side, 
or  from  Buenaventura,  on  the  Pacific  side.  But  Sep- 
tember and  nearly  all  of  October  passed  without  any 
such  action. 

In  the  latter  part  of  October,  two  gunboats  of 
Colombia,  in  the  harbor  of  Panama,  on  the  Pacific 
side,  asked  the  Panama  Railroad  to  supply  them  with 

62 


REVOLUTION 

coal  so  that  they  might  go  to  Buenaventura  for  troops 
to  add  to  the  Panama  garrison.  J.  R.  Shaler,  super- 
intendent of  the  railroad,  was  acting  with  the  Junta 
as  the  representative  of  the  French  interests  in  the 
revolutionary  scheme.  At  the  Junta's  suggestion,  he 
refused  to  supply  the  coal,  although  the  railroad  had 
followed  such  a  practice  from  time  immemorial.  He 
evaded  the  request  by  saying  that  the  coal  was  in 
Colon,  on  the  Atlantic  side.  This  action,  therefore, 
headed  off  the  arrival  of  troops  from  the  Pacific  port 
of  Colombia. 

All  that  remained  to  be  done,  to  create  perfect  con- 
ditions for  carrying  out  the  secession,  was  to  prevent 
the  arrival  of  Colombian  troops  from  the  Atlantic  side. 
This,  it  may  be  acknowledged,  was  the  most  vital  task 
of  the  whole  plan,  and  it  devolved  upon  the  United 
States.  The  understanding  the  Junta  had  with  our 
State  Department  was  that  the  United  States  would 
maintain  the  neutrality  of  the  Panama  Railroad,  con- 
struing neutrality,  in  this  instance,  to  mean  that  Colom- 
bian troops  could  not  pass  over  the  line. 

Such  a  construction  of  the  treaty  of  1846  was  un- 
precedented before  1903.  The  United  States  had  un- 
dertaken, in  effect,  to  prevent  the  passage  of  Colombian 
troops  over  a  railroad  which  it  had  chartered  and  the 
concession  of  which  expressly  provided  for  the  pas- 
sage of  Colombia's  troops  over  the  line  at  any  time. 
It  justified  this  unusual  action  on  the  argument  that 
it  was  thereby  maintaining  the  neutrality  of  the  rail- 
road as  provided  by  the  treaty. 

Our   State   Department  was  kept  advised   of  the 

63 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

movement  of  Colombian  troops,  so  that  when  two  ships 
left  Cartagena,  on  October  30th,  for  Colon,  the  gun- 
boat Nashville  simultaneously  received  orders  to  pro- 
ceed to  Colon,  arriving  there  on  November  2d.  The 
Colombian  troops,  numbering  about  five  hundred  men, 
arrived  on  November  3d.  Everyone  recognized  that 
the  crucial  moment  of  the  revolutionary  scheme  had 
arrived.. 

Commander  John  Hubbard,  of  the  Nashville,  had 
orders  to  keep  the  Panama  Railroad  open,  not  allow- 
ing either  Colombian  or  revolutionary  troops  to  be 
transported  over  it.  This  was  termed  maintaining 
the  neutrality  of  the  railroad.  It  should  be  noted, 
however,  that  when  this  order  was  issued  to  the  Nash- 
ville, no  revolution  had  started,  and,  outside  of  a  few 
Panaman  capitalists,  the  people  of  Panama  knew  noth- 
ing about  it  except  in  the  way  of  rumor.  The  Junta 
had  appointed  a  committee  to  "  let  the  people  know  of 
the  impending  event,"  but  as  the  people  were  not  nec- 
essary to  the  success  of  the  plan,  so  long  as  the  United 
States  did  its  part,  they  were  not  specially  considered 
or  consulted  by  the  Junta.  Hence,  the  order  to  prevent 
the  passage  of  revolutionary  troops  not  only  was  pre- 
mature, showing  the  thorough  knowledge  the  United 
States  had  of  the  revolutionary  plan,  but  it  was  like- 
wise superfluous.  Still,  we  hardly  could  have  kept  a 
straight  face  over  the  order  if  the  nonexistent  revolu- 
tionists had  not  been  included. 

Generals  Tovar  and  Amaya,  of  the  Colombian 
troops,  left  them  in  Colon  while  they  went  across  ahead 
to  take  command  of  the  Panama  garrison.     The  ar- 

64 


REVOLUTION 

rival  of  the  reenforcements  was  a  day  earlier  than  the 
date  set  for  the  revolution,  which  was  November  4th, 
so  the  Junta  had  to  advance  its  plans  a  day.  It 
hastily  was  decided  to  pull  off  the  event  on  November 

3d. 

As  a  first  step  in  this  decision,  the  two  generals 

were  arrested,  as  also  was  Governor  Obaldia.  The 
Panama  garrison  under  Gen.  Huertas  had  been  fixed 
weeks  before,  so  no  danger  lay  in  that  quarter.  An 
ordinary  street  mob  of  a  city  followed  the  lead  of  the 
Junta  in  these  actions.  One  of  the  Colombian  gun- 
boats in  the  harbor  of  Panama  fired  two  shots  over 
the  city,  one  of  which  by  chance  struck  a  nonbelliger- 
ent Chinaman,  who  had  the  honor  of  being  the  only 
victim  of  the  revolution.  The  land  fort  replied  and 
the  gunboat  precipitately  retired,  leaving  Panama  in 
the  hands  of  the  triumphant  Junta.  All  was  lovely  if 
the  United  States  should  perform  its  part  at  Colon. 

The  news  of  these  proceedings  in  Panama  did  not 
reach  Colon  until  the  next  morning,  November  4th. 
Col.  Torres,  who  had  been  left  in  command  of  the 
Colombian  troops  there,  immediately  demanded  a  train 
by  2  o'clock  that  afternoon,  a  refusal  to  grant  which, 
he  declared,  would  be  followed  by  the  death  of  every 
American  in  the  city.  Mr.  Shaler,  the  railroad  super- 
intendent, following  the  instructions  of  the  Junta,  and 
the  wishes  of  our  State  Department  and  the  French 
interests,  refused  the  transportation,  and  notified  Com- 
mander Hubbard,  of  the  Nashville,  of  his  decision. 

There  only  were  192  men  all  told  on  the  Nashville, 
while  the  Colombian  troops  numbered  500,  not  count- 

6s 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

ing  the  assistance  they  would  get  from  the  native  popu- 
lation, if  the  day  seemed  to  be  going  against  the  Amer- 
icans. The  employees  of  the  railroad,  with  42  men 
from  the  Nashville,  fortified  themselves  in  a  stone  rail- 
road shed,  while  the  women  and  children  were  placed 
on  steamers  in  the  harbor  for  safety.  The  Nashville 
drew^  up  close  to  assist  wMth  its  guns  in  the  defense. 

It  was  a  tense  situation  where  the  slightest  overt 
act  on  either  side  would  have  precipitated  a  great  loss 
of  life.  The  Colombians  outnumbered  the  marines 
ten  to  one,  but  when  2  o'clock  came,  they  had  thought 
better  of  their  threat,  and  asked  for  a  parley.  It  was 
agreed  that  both  sides  should  withdraw  from  Colon 
while  the  Colombians  sent  an  officer  to  Panama  for 
a  conference  with  the  imprisoned  generals.  A  special 
train  was  provided  for  the  emissary. 

The  next  day,  on  November  5th,  the  Dixie  arrived 
with  400  additional  marines.  It  became  apparent  to  the 
Colombians  that  the  full  power  of  the  United  States 
was  back  of  the  railroad  company's  refusal  to  transport 
them  to  Panama,  and  so  they  agreed  to  take  ship  again 
for  Colombia.  On  the  6th,  the  day  following  their 
departure,  the  Atlanta  arrived,  bringing  the  number 
of  marines  up  to  1,000.  The  Navy  Department  also 
sent  ships  to  the  city  of  Panama  on  the  Pacific  side,  but 
there  was  nothing  for  them  to  do  there. 

Fresh  orders  from  Washington  to  the  marines  were 
to  the  effect  that  Colombia  would  not  be  allowed  to 
settle  the  "  revolution  "  by  force.  That  lone  China- 
man had  been  buried,  so  that  it  would  have  taken  a 
microscope   to   find   the   revolution.      But  the   orders 

66 


REVOLUTION 

plainly  enough  showed  where  the  United  States  stood 
in  regard  to  the  secessionary  movement,  and  since 
by  force  was  the  only  way  Colombia  could  settle  the 
revolution,  the  orders  in  substance  meant  that  it  was 
the  United  States,  and  not  Panama,  that  Colombia 
would  have  to  fight  to  regain  sovereignty  over  her 
richest  province. 

The  Colombian  troops  on  November  4th  might  have 
wiped  out  the  American  defense  in  Colon,  swept  over 
to  Panama  and  crushed  the  Junta  and  street  mob  there, 
and  so  summarily  preserved  sovereignty  over  the  ter- 
ritory. And  had  it  done  all  this,  it  would  have  been 
squarely  within  its  rights  as  a  sovereign  nation.  But 
they  knew  that  such  a  triumph  would  be  transient. 
They  realized  it  would  bring  down  upon  Colombia  the 
whole  devastating  force  of  the  mighty  United  States, 
which  the  Spanish-American  War  so  recently  had 
shown  was  something  truly  to  be  feared.  Hence,  their 
withdrawal  was  prudent,  though  humiliating.  It  is 
superfluous,  of  course,  to  remark  that  the  United  States 
could  not  have  played  such  a  role  with  any  nation 
capable  of  defending  itself. 

Commander  Hubbard  had  no  illusions  about  the 
vital  part  the  United  States  played  in  making  the  revo- 
lution a  success.  He  stated,  in  the  following  para- 
graph of  his  cablegram  to  the  Navy  Department  on 
November  5th,  that  the  critical  time  was  when  the 
marines  stood  between  the  Colombian  troops  and  pas- 
sage to  the  seat  of  insurrection  at  Panama.     Said  he : 

"  I  am  positive  that  the  determined  attitude  of  our 
men,  their  coolness  and  evident  intention  of  standing 

67 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

their  ground,  had  a  most  salutary  and  decisive  effect  on 
the  immediate  situation  and  was  the  initial  step  in  the 
ultimate  abandoning  of  Colon  by  these  troops  and 
their  return  to  Cartagena  the  following  day." 

On  November  6th,  two  days  after  the  "  revolution," 
the  United  States  recognized  the  independence  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama.  This  was  two  days  before  the 
news  of  the  secession  reached  Bogota,  the  capital  of 
Colombia.  There  was  a  popular  demonstration  against 
the  United  States  in  that  city,  but  no  attempts  against 
American  life  or  property.  The  faction  which  had 
favored  the  treaty  recognized  that  the  United  States 
had  grown  tired  of  diplomatic  dilly-dallying.  The 
faction  antagonistic  to  the  treaty  realized  that  the 
United  States  had  stolen  second  base  in  the  canal  game. 
The  Colombian  government  offered  an  immediate 
treaty  if  the  United  States  would  permit  it  to  recover 
Panama,  but  President  Roosevelt  spurned  the  over- 
tures. 

Within  twelve  days  after  recognizing  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  new  republic,  the  United  States  had  se- 
cured a  treaty  which  ceded  to  it  a  Canal  Zone.  P. 
Bunau-Varilla,  of  the  French  Canal  Company,  was 
made  the  Minister  of  the  de  facto  Panama  government, 
to  negotiate  this  treaty  with  Secretary  Hay.  Thus 
the  United  States  was  assured  of  getting  all  that  it 
had  been  promised  by  the  Junta.  The  first  article  of 
the  treaty  signed  on  November  i8th,  at  Washington, 
stated  that  "  The  United  States  guarantees  and  zvill 
maintain  the  independence  of  the  Republic  of  Panama." 
Colombia  thereby  was  notified  that  Panama,  the  his- 

68 


REVOLUTION 

toric  transit  route  of  the  new  world,  was  lost  to  her 
sovereignty. 

Extreme  haste  in  signing  the  treaty  before  there 
was  a  regular  legislative  body  at  Panama  had  been 
necessary  because  President  Roosevelt  wished  to  get 
the  whole  affair  safely  accomplished  before  our  Con- 
gress should  open  on  December  7th.  The  Republic  of 
Panama  ratified  the  treaty  on  December  2d,  but  the 
American  Senate,  miffed  a  little  that  the  Executive 
should  take  such  important — and  to  many  question- 
able— action  without  its  knowledge  or  consent,  debated 
for  several  months,  then  finally  ratified  the  treaty  on 
February  2;^,  1904,  The  American  people  have  in 
this  whole  transaction  an  illuminating  example  of  the 
power  a  President  has  to  commit  the  United  States 
to  a  radical  policy  during  a  recess  of  Congress. 

President  Roosevelt  always  had  leaned  strongly  to- 
ward the  Panama  route  for  a  canal.  The  setting  up 
of  a  republic  there  had  the  effect  of  complying  with 
the  Spooner  act,  which  made  the  selection  of  the 
Panama  route  depend  upon  securing  a  right  of  way  at 
this  point.  He  made  the  point  to  Congress  in  his  mes- 
sage on  December  7th,  that  as  the  new  treaty  pro- 
vided this  right  of  way,  it  became  imperative  that 
Panama  be  chosen,  and  thus  the  revolution  was  used 
as  a  club  to  force  the  selection  of  Panama  over  Nica- 
ragua. 

The  advocates  of  the  Nicaragua  route  already  had 
been  urging  that  as  Colombia  refused  a  right  of  way  at 
Panama,  the  United  States  was  compelled  to  turn  to 
Nicaragua.    President  Roosevelt  did  not  believe  Nica- 

69 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

ragua  was  the  proper  place  for  a  canal,  and  his  judg- 
ment on  this  point,  in  the  light  of  later  years  as  well 
as  from  all  logical  considerations  of  trade  and  topog- 
raphy, was  eminently  sound.  His  consent  for  the 
United  States  to  go  the  length  it  did  in  securing  the 
Panama  route  was  prompted  by  his  desire  to  prevent 
the  nation  from  selecting  a  less  advantageous  route. 

It  has  been  charged  that  the  President  favored  Pana- 
ma so  that  the  American  financiers,  led  by  Mr.  Crom- 
well, who  were  interested  in  selling  the  French  prop- 
erty to  the  government,  could  get  the  $40,000,000  the 
sale  involved.  This  charge  is  not  justified  either  by 
the  character  of  President  Roosevelt  or  by  the  natural 
advantages  of  the  two  routes.  It  is  doubtful  if  the 
President  gave  any  thought  to  the  owners  of  the 
French  interests,  and  it  is  certain  that  such  ownership 
was  not  a  factor  in  determining  him  in  favor  of 
Panama. 

The  French  interests,  of  course,  had  staked  all  on 
the  success  of  the  revolution.  Had  it  failed,  Colombia 
would  have  forfeited  their  concessions  forthwith,  and 
Minister  Herran  had  notified  them  to  that  effect.  It 
is  clear  that  Mr.  Cromwell  and  associates  were  dead 
certain  that  the  United  States  never  intended  that  the 
revolution  should  fail.  Their  grasp  on  the  situation 
is  shown  by  the  naming  of  M.  Bunau-Varilla  to  nego- 
tiate the  treaty  with  the  United  States  for  Panama. 

With  $40,000,000  hanging  in  the  balance,  the 
French  interests  were  prepared  to  be  generous  in 
drawing  a  treaty.  It  is  to  be  doubted  if  a  more 
one-sided   treaty   ever   was   drawn.      Secretary    Hay, 

70 


REVOLUTION 

with  the  willing  consent  of  the  Junta,  gave  the 
United  States  all  the  latitude  we  would  have  had,  if, 
instead  of  taking  a  Canal  Zone,  we  had  taken  the 
whole  republic.  Panama  got  all  that  had  been  prom- 
ised to  Colombia,  including  a  cash  payment  of  $io,- 
000,000,  and  beginning  in  191 3,  an  annual  payment 
of  $250,000.  The  United  States  is  to  pay  for  any 
additional  lands  in  the  republic  that  may  be  needed 
for  the  canal  and  w^e  may  use  any  rivers  or  lakes  in  the 
republic  necessary  to  the  canal,  tw^o  provisions  broad 
enough  to  permit  the  conversion  of  the  whole  republic 
to  the  position  of  an  adjunct  to  the  canal.  The  cities 
of  Colon  and  Panama  w^ere  made  subject  to  American 
sanitary  measures,  and  if  Panama  cannot  preserve 
order,  the  United  States,  in  its  discretion,  may  intro- 
duce troops  for  that  purpose,  a  right  w^iich  substan- 
tially robs  the  republic  of  sovereignty.  The  United 
States  guarantees  the  neutrality  of  the  canal  but  re- 
served the  right  to  fortify  it. 

Nobody  in  the  Canal  Zone  makes  any  pretense  that 
the  United  States  was  disinterested  in  its  part  in  the 
revolution.  Most  of  the  canal  employees  wonder  why 
the  President  did  not  take  the  whole  republic.  Many 
confidently  expect  the  United  States  to  abolish  the 
government  there  sooner  or  later,  because  it  is  clear 
that  the  republic  cannot  stand  clear  of  American  sup- 
port. On  three  occasions  already  the  Americans  have 
prevented  the  disruption  of  the  republic.  In  1904, 
Gen.  Huertas,  w^ho  had  assisted  the  Junta,  became 
dissatisfied  with  his  rewards,  and  started  to  overturn 
the  administration  by  force.     The  marines  had  to  dis- 

71 


\ 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

arm  his  small  army.  In  1908  the  United  States  had 
to  interfere  to  insure  a  fair  election,  and  in  191 2  this 
writer  saw  the  presidential  campaign  reach  a  point 
where  the  marines  and  infantry  had  to  be  placed  at 
the  Panama  polls  to  prevent  rioting  and  fraud.  It 
was  obvious  that  if  the  United  States  had  not  been 
present  in  armed  force  the  usual  Central  American 
method  of  changing  administrations  by  a  revolution 
would  have  been  employed.  How  long  will  the  United 
^States  be  patient  with  such  conditions? 

President  Roosevelt  did  not  appear  in  the  revolu- 
tion preliminaries  because  his  part  later  on  required 
the  "  Oh,  this  is  so  sudden  "  tone,  in  recognizing  the 
independence  of  the  new  republic.  He  devoted  him- 
self assiduously  to  proving  that  the  United  States  had 
done  a  righteous  thing  in  that  act  and  had  closed  his 
message  with  the  high  profession  of  friendly  zeal  to 
the  effect  that  "  he  would  not  for  one  moment  discuss 
the  possibility  of  the  United  States  committing  an 
act  of  such  baseness  as  to  abandon  the  new  Republic 
of  Panama."  But  eight  years  later,  in  San  Francisco, 
he  threw  off  the  mask  thus  assumed  and  declared  : 
"  I  took  Panama  and  left  Congress  to  debate  the  mat- 
ter afterward." 

Did  President  Roosevelt  know  that  his  government 
deliberately  aided  and  abetted  a  province  of  a  sover- 
eign power,  with  which  the  United  States  had  a  solemn 
treaty,  to  secede  and  set  up  an  independent  govern- 
ment, so  that  the  United  States  might  get  territory  it 
otherwise  could  not  obtain? 

72 


REVOLUTION 

Dear  reader,  you  might  just  as  sanely  ask  a  Panaman 
if  he  thinks  it  will  be  wet  in  the  next  rainy  season! 

Was  there  anything,  big  or  little,  going  on  in  Theo- 
dore Roosevelt's  administration  with  which  he  was 
not  fairly  familiar?  Secretary  Hay  had  given  the  im- 
pression to  the  revolutionary  Junta  that  if  they  would 
go  through  the  trifling  act  of  raising  a  flag,  the  United 
States  would  do  the  rest.  When  Secretaries  of  State 
begin  assisting  revolutions  in  foreign  countries  with- 
out the  knowledge  and  consent  of  the  President,  it  will 
be  under  a  far  less  dominating  Executive  than  Theo- 
dore Roosevelt! 

With  the  ratification  of  the  treaty,  the  decks  at  last 
were  cleared  for  the  long-dreamed-of  project  of  build- 
ing a  canal.  The  people  of  the  United  States  frankly 
were  glad  that  such  progress  had  been  made,  but  they 
were  inclined  to  believe  that  it  would  not  be  well  to 
nose  too  deep  into  the  method  of  acquiring  the  terri- 
tory. They  knew  that  the  payment  of  $10,000,000  for 
the  Canal  Zone  paid  somebody  for  the  right  of  way, 
though  whether  the  rightful  owner  was  a  question  the 
administration  was  very  glad  to  let  remain  dormant. 
The  Saturday  Evening  Post,  speaking  editorially  in 
the  spring  of  1912,  doubtless  expressed  the  attitude 
of  many  Americans  when  it  said : 

"  It  seems  to  be  the  part  of  statesmanship  in 
this  dilemma  to  talk  loudly  about  the  benefits 
we  confer  upon  the  world's  commerce  by  dig- 
ging the  canal  and  to  regard  our  acquisition  of 
the  canal  a  closed  incident," 

7Z 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

Yet,  the  American  people  never  have  solved  any  is- 
sue in  which  a  moral  question  was  involved,  by  thus 
seeking  to  obscure  it.  The  true  facts  about  the  acquisi- 
tion of  the  Canal  Zone  only  came  out  by  dribs,  but 
events  seem  to  conspire  to  bring  the  whole  transaction 
to  light.  On  June  26,  1912,  Mr.  J.  Gabriel  Duque, 
who  had  been  a  leader  in  the  revolution,  got  into  a 
controversy  with  Mr.  Ricardo  Arias,  also  a  member 
of  the  1903  Junta,  and  over  his  own  signature  in  his 
paper.  The  Star  and  Herald,  published  at  Panama, 
made  the  following  admission : 

"  Mr.  Arias  should  know  that  I  have  friends 
in  Washington,  seeing  that  as  far  back  as  1903 
when  we  worked  together  for  Panama's  inde- 
pendence, I  was  in  confidential  treatment  with 
Secretary  Hay." 

Mr.  Tracy  Robinson,  author  of  a  book  on  Panama, 
was  another  leading  figure  in  the  revolution.  He  de- 
clines to  give  the  history  of  the  affair,  although  so  com- 
petent to  reveal  its  inward  processes,  but  tells  his 
readers  that  "  The  details  w'ould  afford  material  for 
a  wonder  story." 

Since  President  Roosevelt  has  candidly  confessed 
that  he  "  took  "  Panama,  there  is  no  reason  why  the 
main  actors  in  the  play  should  not  speak  out  and  the 
immediate  future  is  going  to  see  the  disclosure  of 
much  illuminating  material  about  this  "  wonder  story." 
The  American  people  have  had  a  vague  idea  of  what 
did  happen  at  Panama,  but  there  is  no  longer  any  ex- 
cuse for  a  pretense  of  virtuous  conduct  on  the  part  of 

74 


REVOLUTION 

the  United  States,  except  on  the  point  of  giving  the 
world  something  essential  to  its  convenience.  It  is 
hypocritical  to  profess  that  we  made  adequate  com- 
pensation when  we  paid  Panama  for  the  Canal  Zone. 
We  must  applaud  President  Roosevelt  for  taking  the 
Canal  Zone,  but  the  failure  to  make  reparation  to 
Colombia  is  a  conspicuous  piece  of  self-deception  and 
moral  obliquity.  We  raised  the  Maine,  however,  and 
we  will  yet  make  amends  to  Colombia. 


75 


N 


CHAPTER    IX 

THE   GEOGRAPHY   OF    PANAMA 

ATURE  quietly,  but  imperatively,  asked  the  en- 
gineers who  favored  a  sea-level  canal  at  Pan- 
ama :  Why  will  you  insist  upon  the  prodigious  disar- 
rangement of  natural  advantages  that  lie  here  awaiting 
the  utilization  of  a  lock  type? 

The  geography  of  the  Isthmus  is  adapted  peculiarly 
to  the  lock  type  of  canal.  Aside  from  the  obstacle 
to  a  sea-level  canal  that  existed  in  the  continental 
divide,  the  Chagres  River  followed  a  course  which, 
at  the  same  time,  would  have  been  a  baffling  problem 
in  a  sea-level  plan,  but  the  most  beneficent  arrange- 
ment for  a  lock-type  canal. 

The  territory  comprised  in  the  scope  of  this  book 
is  the  same  as  that  within  the  boundaries  of  the  Re- 
public of  Panama.  In  area,  it  is  about  32,000  square 
miles,  slightly  smaller  than  the  State  of  Indiana.  On 
the  Atlantic  side  it  is  379  miles  long,  and  on  the  Pa- 
cific side,  674  miles  by  the  coast  line.  The  popula- 
tion, native  and  foreign,  is  around  400,000  to-day, 
though  considerably  less  in  the  days  of  exploration 
and  conquest. 

Our  treaty  with  the  Republic  of  Panama  ceded  us 
a  strip  of  territory  ten  miles  wide,  from  deep  water 
in  the  Atlantic  to  deep  water  in  the  Pacific.  This 
territory,  officially  designated  the  Canal  Zone,  is  de- 

76 


GEOGRAPHY 

termined  by  a  line  drawn  five  miles  from  each  side  of 
the  center  line  of  the  route  of  the  canal.  Thus,  the 
Canal  Zone  is  not  bounded  by  straight  lines  from 
ocean  to  ocean,  but  curves  as  the  channel  of  the  canal 
curves.  The  area  of  the  Canal  Zone  is  448  square 
miles,  of  which  73  square  miles  are  privately  owned, 
but  may  be  bought  in  the  discretion  of  the  United 
States.  While  within  the  limits  of  the  Canal  Zone, 
the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon,  at  the  terminals,  re- 
main under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama. 

Some  confusion  is  caused  by  the  fact  that  the  Isth- 
mus of  Panama  runs  nearly  East  and  West,  instead 
of  North  and  South,  as  might  be  imagined,  at  the 
point  where  the  canal  traverses  it.  Panama  city  is 
almost  due  south  of  Buffalo,  and  is  southeast  of  Colon, 
the  Atlantic  terminal.  The  canal  route,  therefore, 
runs  in  a  southeastern  direction  from  the  Atlantic  to 
the  Pacific,  and,  to  the  astonishment  of  the  tourist, 
the  sun  rises  in  the  Pacific  and  sets  in  the  Atlantic. 

W^e  are  not  building  our  canal  at  the  narrowest 
point  on  the  Isthmus.  This  point  is  found  at  the 
Gulf  of  San  Bias,  60  miles  east  of  Colon,  where  the 
Istliimis  is  onlx3P.^milea  wide,  whereas,  at  Panama, 
it  is  47  miles  wide.  Because  the  mountain  barrier  at 
San  Bias  has  an  elevation  of  700  feet  above  sea-level, 
no  serious  thought  of  a  canal  there  ever  was  enter- 
tained long.  The  absence  of  rivers  makes  the  sea- 
level  type  the  only  kind  of  canal  that  could  have  been 
attempted  at  San  Bias,  involving  a  staggering  task 
of  excavation.     Besides,  it  was  in  the  complete  grasp 

17 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

of  the  jungle,  while  at  Panama  there  was  a  beaten 
path,  from  ocean  to  ocean,  four  centuries  old. 

The  Chagres  River  (pronounced  Shag-gress) 
originates  in  the  San  Bias  Mountains,  and  drains  a 
basin  of  1,320  square  miles.  After  running  parallel 
with  the  coast  line,  nearly  midway  between  the  oceans, 
it  turns  sharply  at  right  angles  and  empties  into  the 
Caribbean  Sea,  a  few  miles  west  of  Colon.  The 
point  where  the  Chagres  makes  this  turn  is  within 
the  Canal  Zone,  and  about  30  miles  from  the  Carib- 
bean, running  through  the  Canal  Zone  for  that  dis- 
tance. From  the  Caribbean  Sea  to  Bohio,  about  sev- 
enteen miles,  the  bed  of  the  river  is  only  slightly  above 
sea-level,  and  from  Bohio  to  about  the  entrance  of 
the  Culebra  cut,  it  rises  to  48  feet  above  sea-level. 

Engineers  were  divided  on  the  utility  of  this  natural 
geographical  situation.  Those  who  favored  the  lock- 
type  canal  believed  that  the  Chagres  River  could  be 
dammed  up  so  as  to  form  the  longest  part  of  the  canal, 
and  thus  save  a  vast  amount  of  excavation  that  would 
be  required  in  a  sea-level  type.  While  not  denying 
the  saving  in  excavation  in  a  lock  type,  the  engineers 
who  favored  a  sea-level  canal  believed  that  the  fixed 
limitations  of  the  lock  type  made  it  inadvisable,  when 
the  expansion  in  the  size  of  ships  was  considered. 
Their  plan  was  to  divert  the  Chagres  and  tributary 
rivers,  of  which  there  are  26  in  the  Canal  Zone,  by 
digging  new  channels  for  them,  and  so  get  them  out 
of  the  way  of  the  canal. 

The  French,  in  1880,  had  started  out  on  that  the- 
ory.   They  thought  of  digging  a  great  tunnel  through 

78 


GEOGRAPHY 

the  mountains  to  divert  the  Chagres  River  into  the 
Pacific  Ocean.  This  tunnel  would  have  been  lo  miles 
long  and,  needless  to  say,  a  rather  visionary  under- 
taking. Five  years  after  they  began  operations  they 
abandoned  the  sea-level  plan  and  adopted  the  lock-type 
canal.  But  their  dam  across  the  Chagres  River  was 
to  be  at  Bohio,  seventeen  miles  inland  from  the  Carib- 
bean, while  the  American  engineers  advised  a  dam  at 
Gatun,  only  seven  miles  inland. 

At  Gatun,  the  natural  formation  of  the  mountains 
permitted  the  Chagres  River  to  escape  into  the  Carib- 
bean Sea  through  a  gap  less  than  two  miles  wide.  The 
lock-type  advocates  said  this  gap  could  be  filled  in 
and  so  create  a  basin  to  be  filled  by  the  stagnated  water 
of  the  Chagres  River.  The  idea  was  to  build  a  dam 
high  enough  to  back  the  accumulated  river  water 
toward  the  Pacific  for  a  distance  of  32  miles,  and  at 
an  average  depth,  in  the  canal  channel,  of  45  feet 
throughout.  Another  dam  would  prevent  the  lake  so 
formed  from  spilling  down  the  Pacific  slope.  Thus, 
all  but  15  miles  of  the  canal  would  be  made  by  an 
inland,  artificial  lake,  164  square  miles  in  extent. 

But  even  in  a  lock  type  there  would  have  to  be  an 
impressive  amount  of  excavation.  Not  only  would 
the  sea-level  channels  approaching  this  lake  on  either 
side  of  the  Isthmus  have  to  be  dredged,  but  the  moun- 
tain barrier,  running  lengthwise  with  the  Isthmus, 
would  have  to  be  pierced  with  a  channel  so  as  to  per- 
mit the  waters  of  the  Gatun  lake  to  reach  the  point 
on  the  Pacific  side  where  the  locks  would  afford  the 
descent  to  the  ocean.    As  the  surface  of  the  lake  was 

79 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

proposed  to  be  85  feet  above  sea-level,  the  bottom 
of  the  channel  through  the  mountains  would  have  to 
be  45  feet  lower  than  the  surface  elevation,  or  at  40 
feet  above  sea-level. 

The  area  to  be  excavated  in  this  lake  channel,  ^2 
miles  long,  was  from  Gatun  to  Obispo,  following  the 
Chagres  River  in  general,  and  requiring  only  about 
12,000,000  cubic  yards  to  be  removed,  in  2^  miles. 
Then  the  mountains  began,  45  feet  above  sea-level, 
and  reached  their  highest  point,  in  the  center  line  of 
the  canal,  at  Gold  Hill,  312  feet  above  sea-level,  thence 
sloping  toward  the  Pacific,  to  the  proposed  lock  site 
at  Pedro  Miguel,  a  distance  of  9  miles.  The  average 
depth  of  the  cut  would  be  120  feet  throughout  the  9 
miles,  and  the  deepest  point  of  excavation  at  Gold 
Hill  would  require  going  down  272  feet. 

The  Culebra  cut,  as  this  channel  through  the  moun- 
tains was  called,  was  to  be  200  feet  wide.  In  1880, 
the  French  had  begun  work  there,  and  they  removed 
18,646,000  cubic  yards  that  were  useful  to  the  Amer- 
icans. Their  machinery  was  used  the  first  year  of  our 
occupation. 

At  Gatun,  on  the  Atlantic  side  of  the  proposed 
lake,  there  would  be  locks  to  lift  ships  to  the  lake, 
and  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  La  Boca,  on  the  Pacific  side 
the  locks  would  lower  the  ships  to  sea-level  again. 
The  Cocoli  and  other  rivers  could  be  used  to  form  a 
second  small  lake  between  the  Pedro  Miguel  and  La 
Boca  locks.  The  total  excavation  for  the  sea-level 
channels  and  the  Culebra  cut  was  estimated  around 
100.000,000  cubic  yards. 

80 


GEOGRAPHY 

Opposed  to  these  considerations  in  favor  of  a  lock 
type  were  the  arguments  advanced  in  behalf  of  a  sea- 
level  canal.  The  popular  mind  could  see  ships  steam- 
ing or  sailing  uninterruptedly  from  ocean  to  ocean 
through  a  dugout  channel  that  would  not  grow  too 
small  for  the  largest  ships  that  time  might  develop, 
and  the  engineers  who  advised  such  a  canal  asserted 
that  the  difference  in  time  and  cost  of  building  the 
two  types  was  not  materially  in  favor  of  the  lock  type. 
Time  has  developed  that  such  a  belief  was  widely 
erroneous. 

The  Americans  came  to  the  Canal  Zone  in  1904 
with  the  question  of  the  kind  of  canal  to  be  built  un- 
settled. They  were  to  be  there  more  than  two  years 
before  the  violently  discussed  issue  was  to  be  settled. 
It  was  like  starting  in  to  build  a  house  without  any 
definite  plan  in  mind.  Meanwhile,  however,  it  was 
recognized  that  there  was  a  vast  amount  of  pioneer 
and  preparatory  work  to  be  accomplished  that  would 
absorb  the  activities  of  the  organization  pending  the 
solution  of  this  problem. 

What  kind  of  a  country,  as  to  temperature,  rain- 
fall, vegetable  and  animal  life,  and  health  fulness,  had 
we  secured?  As  to  the  first  characteristic,  Panama  is 
only  9  degrees  from  the  Equator.  But  it  is  far  from 
being  as  hot  as  that  proximity  might  suggest. 
Throughout  the  year  the  temperature  averages  about 
85  degrees.  The  highest  recorded  temperature  in  the 
Canal  Zone  is  only  97  degrees.  At  night  the  atmos- 
phere falls  sharply  until,  usually,  light  covering  is 
required  on  beds,  and  the  hot,  sweltering  nights  of 

81 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

American  cities  in  the  summer  are  unknown.  Palm 
Beach,  Florida,  in  the  winter,  is  not  a  more  desirable 
resort  than  Panama. 

The  northern  mind,  too,  considerably  has  overesti- 
mated the  effects  of  the  rainy  season  at  Panama. 
During  January,  February,  March,  and  April  there 
is  practically  no  rainfall.  By  the  ist  of  May  light 
showers  occur  daily,  or  every  few  days,  and  through 
June,  with  an  occasional  gusher.  From  then,  on  to 
December,  the  rains  become  more  frequent  and  heav- 
ier, and  have  a  way  of  coming  up  about  the  same 
time  every  day,  sometimes  in  the  afternoons,  some- 
times in  the  mornings.  Between  showers  the  sun  is 
radiant.  Construction  operations  have  to  be  sus- 
pended during  the  violent  downpours,  and  the  canal 
employees  call  any  rain  that  occurs  in  the  noon  hours, 
or  after  work,  "  a  government  rain." 

On  the  Atlantic  side  the  rainfall  averages  between 
130  and  140  inches  annually;  on  the  Pacific  side  from 
60  to  70  inches.  At  times  it  rains  so  furiously  that 
it  appears  to  be  one  continuous  sheet  of  water  fall- 
ing. For  one  hour  the  record  fall  is  5.86  inches;  for 
one  day,  at  Porto  Bello,  10.06  inches;  in  three  min- 
utes 2.46  inches  fell  at  the  same  place;  and  at  Pan- 
ama on  May  12,  191 2,  6  inches  fell  in  two  hours. 
The  years  1906  and  1909  were  the  wettest  since  the 
American  occupation  and  1912  the  dryest. 

This  heavy  precipitation  makes  the  rivers  of  Pan- 
ama torrential  streams.  The  Chagres  River  has  risen 
25  feet  in  twenty-four  hours.  During  every  rainy 
season  the  records  left  by  the  French  and  kept  by  the 

82 


GEOGRAPHY 

Americans  since  their  occupation  show  that  this  river 
discharges  enough  water  to  fill  the  proposed  Gatun 
Lake  one  and  a  half  times.  It  is  not  expected  that  any 
lack  of  water  for  the  lock-type  canal  ever  will  be  ex- 
perienced. 

Except  for  the  beaten  paths  and  cleared  spaces  con- 
stantly maintained  the  jungle  is  king  in  Panama.  One 
season's  growth  will  cover  an  abandoned  clearing  with 
the  luxuriant  tropical  vegetation.  When  the  Amer- 
icans entered  the  Canal  Zone,  most  of  the  French 
machinery  and  even  whole  towns  were  covered  by  the 
jungle. 

There  are  the  usual  tropical  fruits,  bananas,  cocoa- 
nuts,  alligator  pears,  papayas,  mangoes,  and  other  less 
well-known  varieties.  The  vegetation  includes  the 
royal  poinciana,  palm,  and  other  stately  trees.  The 
rare  orchid  is  at  home  on  the  Isthmus,  about  seventy- 
five  varieties  being  found,  a  dozen  of  which  are  of 
the  most  beautiful  kinds.  A  dry  season  of  four 
months  does  not  parch  the  growth,  but  the  rainy  sea- 
son gives  it  the  most  brilliant  green  coloring. 

None  of  the  big  animal  life  of  Africa  is  found  any- 
where in  South  America,  and  Panama  has  even  less 
dangerous  species  than  the  mainland.  The  tarantula, 
coral  snake,  tiger  cats,  deer,  and  other  larger,  though 
not  so  dangerous,  animals  are  found,  and  alligators 
abound  in  the  rivers  and  bays,  as  well  as  sharks.  The 
insect  life  is  wonderfully  varied,  the  birds  are  in  in- 
finite variety  and  most  beautiful,  while  wild  flowers 
of  dazzling  colors  are  in  profusion.    The  Canal  Zone» 

83 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

where  occupied  in  the  canal  operations,  long  since  was 
freed  of  dangerous  animal  life. 

Distinct,  but  inconsequential,  earthquake  shocks 
have  been  felt  in  Panama  for  centuries.  The  San 
Francisco  earthquake,  in  1906,  was  not  recorded  on 
the  Canal  Zone  seismograph.  In  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury a  violent  shock  occurred,  but  none  in  the  eight- 
eenth and  nineteenth  centuries,  nor  has  any  been  re- 
corded in  the  twentieth  century,  although  in  Costa 
Rica,  the  republic  adjoining  Panama,  a  severe  shock, 
in  1 9 10,  caused  considerable  loss  of  life  and  property. 
So  far  as  past  performance  can  indicate,  the  canal 
should  not  suffer  from  earthquakes. 

The  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans  are  on  the  same 
level,  but  the  tide  on  the  Pacific  side  has  a  maximum 
lift  of  21  feet,  while  on  the  Atlantic  side  the  maxi- 
mum lift  is  only  2^  feet.  Allowance  for  this  varia- 
tion was  made  by  providing  a  deeper  channel  for  the 
canal  on  the  Pacific  side,  so  that  the  passage  of  ships 
will  not  be  affected  by  the  tides.  The  shape  of  the 
Bay  of  Panama  causes  the  high  tide  on  the  Pacific 
side. 

As  there  is  not  a  favorable  geographical  arrange- 
ment at  either  end  of  the  canal,  in  the  way  of  har- 
bors, the  defects  have  been  supplied  by  breakwaters. 
At  the  Atlantic  entrance  a  breakwater  more  than  two 
miles  long  runs  from  Toro  Point  to  shield  ships  lying 
in  the  entrance  from  the  violent  Northers  that  occa- 
sionally sweep  the  coast.  Another  breakwater  a  half 
mile  long,  running  out  from  the  Colon  waterfront, 
will  protect  shipping  in  that  harbor  from  storms  on 

84 


GEOGRAPHY 

the  east.  At  the  Pacific  entrance  storms  are  not  dan- 
gerous, but  the  currents  deposited  silt  in  the  channel 
in  such  quantities  as  to  make  a  breakwater  advisable, 
and  this  one  runs  from  the  mainland  to  Naos  Island, 
three  miles  out  in  the  bay,  and  connects  with  the  forti- 
fications. It  was  built  from  material  excavated  in  the 
Culebra  cut,  w^hereas  the  Atlantic  breakwaters  were 
built  largely  of  rock  quarried  at  Porto  Bello. 

Panama  and  Colon  are  cities  of  great  interest  to 
the  tourist.  The  former  has  about  50,000  population 
and  the  latter  20,000.  Panama  is  the  capital  of  the 
republic,  has  a  handsome  national  theater  and  insti- 
tute, a  street  car  system  is  in  course  of  construction, 
and  a  number  of  old  cathedrals  are  interesting  sights. 
The  canal  employees  travel  for  half  fare  on  the  rail- 
road and  are  often  in  evidence  in  the  quaint  little 
victoria  carriages  that  handle  the  street  traffic,  at  ten 
cents  a  ride,  in  the  two  cities. 

Mardi  Gras  comes  in  February  in  the  city  of  Pan- 
ama, and  is  a  vivid  exhibition  of  the  Spanish  tem- 
perament at  play.  For  four  days  the  natives  abandon 
themselves  to  the  festivities  and  business  reaches  a 
standstill.  A  queen  is  elected  by  popular  vote  and  re- 
ceives the  homage  of  all  the  Panaman  officials,  as  well 
as  the  higher  American  dignitaries.  The  parade  of 
floats  and  carriages  is  a  dazzling  presentation  of  the 
Spanish  fancy  expressed  in  dress  and  decorations. 


85 


CHAPTER    X 

GETTING   UNDER   WAY 

^*  T II  THAT  this  nation  will  insist  upon  is  that 
V  V  results  be  achieved,"  wrote  President 
Roosevelt  in  his  order  creating  the  first  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission  that  he  appointed,  on  March  8, 
1904;  and  that  remained  the  keynote  of  his  attitude 
toward  the  canal.  The  country  was  thoroughly  con- 
vinced of  the  inefficiency  of  any  government-built  en- 
terprise, so,  after  complying  with  the  Spooner  act  in 
naming  a  representative  from  the  navy  and  the  army, 
on  the  Commission,  he  announced  its  full  personnel  as 
follows : 

Admiral  John   G.   Walker,   U.  S.  N.,   Chairman, 

Maj.-Gen.   George  W.   Davis,   U.  S.  A., 

William  Barclay  Parsons, 

William  H.  Burr, 

Benjamin  M.  Harrod, 

Carl  Ewald  Grunsky, 

Frank  J.  Hecker. 

This  Commission  held  its  first  meeting  in  Washing- 
ton on  March  22d,  when  preparations  were  made  for 
a  visit  to  the  Isthmus,  which  they  reached  on  April 
5th.  After  three  weeks  of  investigations  they  decided 
that  such  engineering  records  as  the  French  left  must 
be  supplemented  by  fresh  explorations  and  surveys; 

86 


UNDER    WAY 

that  the  sanitation  of  the  Canal  Zone,  and  the  cities 
of  Colon  and  Panama,  was  of  the  first  importance; 
and  that  a  period  of  preparation  generally  must  pre- 
cede effective  construction  operations.  Surgeon-Col. 
W.  C.  Gorgas  accompanied  the  Commission  on  this 
trip  and  made  the  preliminary  plans  for  cleaning  up 
the  Isthmus  which,  when  worked  out,  were  to  make 
him  famous.  The  Commission  returned  to  the  United 
States  on  April  29th. 

At  a  meeting  between  representatives  of  the  United 
States  and  the  French  Canal  Company,  in  Paris,  on 
April  1 6th,  the  sale  of  the  company's  property,  for 
$40,000,000  was  signed,  and  was  ratified  by  the  share- 
holders in  the  company  on  April  23d.  This  ended  the 
labors  of  Mr.  William  Nelson  Cromwell,  except  that 
he  tried,  unsuccessfully,  to  get  an  additional  payment 
for  the  work  done  on  the  canal,  from  the  time  the 
$40,000,000  was  agreed  upon  as  a  price,  in  1902,  until 
the  Americans  formally  took  over  the  property,  in 
1904. 

President  Roosevelt  was  subjected  to  wide  criticism 
for  this  deal,  but  of  all  his  actions  in  connection  with 
the  canal  it  was  one  of  the  wisest.  Without  regard 
to  who  got  the  money  it  indisputably  is  true,  to  any- 
one who  has  visited  the  canal,  that  the  United  States 
got  a  dollar  in  value  for  every  dollar  it  paid  the 
French  company.  As  late  as  191 1  Col.  Goethals  ap- 
pointed a  committee  headed  by  J.  B.  Bishop,  secretary 
of  the  Commission,  to  invoice  the  French  purchase, 
and  they  reported  the  value  of  French  excavation 
useful  to  the  American  plan  of  canal,  the  mechanical 

87 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

equipment,  buildings,  and  engineering  records,  to  be 
$42,799,826,  or  nearly  $3,000,000  more  than  was  paid. 
At  the  same  time  it  was  a  good  sale  for  the  French 
company  because  the  United  States  was  the  only 
prospective  buyer. 

The  item  of  largest  value  to  the  United  States,  as 
estimated  in  the  report,  was  the  excavation  of  29,908,- 
000  cubic  yards,  valued  at  $25,389,240.  This  mainly 
was  in  the  Culebra  cut.  Next  in  importance  was  the 
Panama  Railroad  and  subsidiary  trackage  in  the  Canal 
Zone,  and  the  remainder  was  for  quarters,  hospitals, 
storehouses,  machine  shops,  canal  equipment,  item- 
ized in  part  as  follows : 

Three  2,000-ton  steamers  of  the  Panama  Railroad 
Steamship  Line;  30,000  acres  of  land  comprising 
practically  all  the  real  estate  in  the  city  of  Colon  and 
a  valuable  part  of  the  city  of  Panama;  625,000  acres 
of  land  with  the  canal  concession;  2,265  buildings  of 
all  descriptions;  212  Belgian  locomotives;  34  Ameri- 
can locomotives;  barges,  yawls,  launches,  dredges, 
cranes,  drills,  dump  cars,  and  vast  quantities  of  steel 
rails,  machinery  parts,  pumps,  steam  winches,  and 
other  equipment  in  profusion. 

Much  of  the  mechanical  equipment  and  whole  vil- 
lages of  houses  used  by  the  French  employees  were 
covered  with  a  dense  growth  of  jungle  after  years  of 
idleness,  but  the  machinery  had  been  oiled  and  painted 
carefully  before  abandonment,  and  so  was  preserved 
in  good  condition  when  the  Americans  came.  Had 
not  the  French  buildings  been  available  and  capable 
of  being  speedily  repaired  for  use,  the  early  Ameri- 


UNDER    WAY 

can  employees  would  have  suffered  more  hardships 
than  they  did.  Of  these  buildings,  the  Americans  re- 
paired and  used  1,536,  their  value  being  estimated 
at  $1,879,203.80. 

Construction  work  was  carried  on  the  first  year 
of  American  occupation  largely  with  old  French  equip- 
ment. The  closing  days  of  the  canal  find  a  consid- 
erable amount  of  it  still  in  use.  A  great  deal  of  light 
work  by  locomotives  was  done  by  the  Belgian  engines 
that  the  heavy  American  types  could  not  handle  eco- 
nomically. That  part  of  the  equipment  which  could 
not  be  utilized  was  used  as  ballast  on  the  Panama 
Steamship  liners  to  the  extent  of  27,000  tons,  and 
sold  as  scrap  on  the  New  York  market,  and  in  191 1 
the  Chicago  House  Wrecking  Company  bid  in  the 
remainder  for  the  lump  sum  of  $215,000. 

In  the  sale,  the  United  States  received  68,888  shares 
of  the  capital  stock  of  the  Panama  Railroad  Company, 
and  later  bought  from  individuals  1,112  shares  for 
$157,118.24,  giving  the  government  complete  control; 
and  while  the  railroad  has  been  operated  separately 
from  the  Commission,  it  has  been  officered  by  mem- 
bers of  the  Commission  or  its  employees,  and  in  all 
points  made  subordinate  to  canal  construction. 

The  value  of  the  French  engineering  records  and 
surveys,  and  especially  of  the  records  kept  of  the  flow 
of  the  Chagres  River,  is  incalculable  because  they 
could  not  be  duplicated.  It  was  on  French  records  that 
the  estimate  of  the  amount  of  water  to  expect  from 
the  Isthmian  rivers  for  use  in  the  Gatun  Lake  was 
based. 

89 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

Congress,  on  April  28,  1904,  appropriated  the 
$10,000,000  which  had  been  promised  in  the  treaty 
to  the  Republic  of  Panama  for  the  Canal  Zone.  This, 
with  the  consummation  of  the  sale  by  the  French 
company,  cleared  the  title  to  the  Canal  Zone,  and  at 
7.30  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  May  4th,  Lieut.  Mark 
Brooke,  of  the  United  States  Army,  formally  took 
over  the  property  and  the  territory  in  the  name  of  his 
government. 

The  day  following.  President  Roosevelt  announced 
the  appointment  of  John  F.  Wallace,  general  manager 
of  the  Illinois  Central  Railroad,  as  Chief  Engineer  of 
the  Panama  Canal,  effective  on  June  ist.  He  had 
acknowledged  the  national  disbelief  in  governmental 
efficiency  by  going  into  private  industrial  life  for  a 
canal  builder.  Mr.  Wallace's  salary  was  to  be  $25,- 
000  annually,  and  the  country  recognized  the  selection 
as  a  good  one. 

Upon  their  return  to  the  United  States,  the  Com- 
mission began  organizing  surveying  and  engineering 
parties  for  pioneer  work  in  the  Canal  Zone.  The  first 
ship  to  arrive  with  such  a  party  was  on  May  17th,  the 
party  having  at  its  head  Maj.-Gen.  Davis,  of  the  Com- 
mission, and  including  Col.  W.  C.  Gorgas,  chief  sani- 
tary officer,  and  George  R.  Shanton,  who  personally 
was  selected  by  President  Roosevelt  to  head  the  police 
of  the  Canal  Zone. 

Maj.-Gen.  Davis  was  in  charge  pending  the  arrival 
of  Mr.  Wallace,  who  reached  Colon  on  June  24th. 
The  President  designated  Maj.-Gen.  Davis  as  Gover- 
nor of  the  Canal  Zone,  on  June  8th,  and  for  the  first 

90 


UNDER    WAY 

two  months  he  had  his  residence  on  Culebra  Hill,  then 
in  Panama.  Operations  were  continued  just  as  the 
French  left  them,  until  Mr.  Wallace's  arrival  definitely- 
marked  the  beginning  of  real  construction. 


91 


CHAPTER    XI 

THE    CANAL    UNDER    WALLACE 

ANXIETY  to  dig  dirt,  the  usual  American  desire 
to  get  things  done  right  off,  was  the  dominat- 
ing idea  in  1904.  So,  while  Mr.  Wallace  kept  up  the 
surveying  which  would  aid  in  determining  the  center 
line  of  the  canal,  as  well  as  the  choice  of  a  type,  he 
also  pushed  excavation  operations  in  the  Culebra  cut, 
rehabilitating  old  French  excavators  and  increasing  the 
working  force. 

He  had  found  746  men  at  work  with  hand  tools  in 
the  Culebra  cut.  His  first  inspection  convinced  him 
that  the  French  machinery  should  be  abandoned  as  fast 
as  modern  American  equipment  could  be  secured,  and 
he  expressed  the  opinion  that  two  years  would  be  re- 
quired for  preparations.  At  that  time  the  main  track 
and  sidings  of  the  Panama  Railroad  totaled  78.82 
miles,  while  the  trackage  left  by  the  French  in  the 
cut  and  elsewhere  was  176.2  miles.  The  immediate 
substitution  of  heavy  American  rails  for  the  Belgian 
type,  and  the  double-tracking  of  the  main  line,  were 
among  Mr.  Wallace's  first  decisions.  Rolling  stock 
and  locomotives  were  ancient  in  design,  and  in  a  bad 
state  of  repair,  but  he  rescued  from  the  jungle  and 
overhauled  58  locomotives  and  980  dump  cars. 

It  required  stout  hearts  not  to  quail  before  the  Isth- 
mus of  1904.    Not  only  the  traditional  unhealth fulness, 

92 


WALLACE 

but  the  wretched  condition  of  the  railroad,  after  fifty 
years  of  noncompetition,  the  long  distance  from  the 
base  of  supplies,  the  miserable  living  accommodations 
in  Colon  and  Panama,  where  there  were  no  sewers,  no 
water  and  unpaved  streets,  into  which  was  thrown  all 
refuse  and  garbage;  and  the  vexatious  red  tape  that 
surrounded  all  government  enterprises,  made  a  situa- 
tion that  weaklings  no  sooner  touched  than  they  re- 
turned precipitately  to  the  United  States. 

But,  however  staggering  the  obstacles  were,  the 
American  people  had  set  themselves  the  task  of  suc- 
ceeding where  the  French  had  failed,  to  do  it  at  any 
cost  and  in  spite  of  all  opposition,  be  that  opposition 
in  the  form  of  disease,  red  tape,  hardship  or  any  other 
limitation. 

To  take  care  of  the  increasing  number  of  workers, 
that  every  ship  was  bringing  to  the  Canal  Zone,  was 
the  most  pressing  problem.  The  interest  of  the  whole 
world  had  been  stimulated  by  the  rejuvenation  of  the 
canal  project  by  the  Americans,  with  the  result  that 
restless  spirits  everywhere  began  bending  their  steps 
toward  Panama.  Men  of  excellent  character  in  the 
United  States  also  came,  attracted  by  the  pay  and  the 
romantic  nature  of  the  undertaking. 

The  houses  left  by  the  French  were  inhabited  by 
natives  or  buried  in  the  jungle  growth.  They  neces- 
sarily were  run  down  but  could  be  made  habitable  once 
the  carpenters  and  lumber  to  do  the  work  were  at  hand. 
These,  however,  like  everything  else,  were  two  thou- 
sand miles  away  with  a  spider  web  of  red  tape  over 
them  that  paralyzed  speedy  movement.     In  his  year 

93 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

of  service  Mr.  Wallace  repaired  357  of  these  houses 
and  built  forty-eight  new  ones,  still  leaving  the  problem 
of  housing  employees  unsolved.  During  that  time 
more  than  9,000  workers  came  to  the  Canal  Zone,  but 
the  migration  back  to  the  United  States,  or  adjacent 
islands  and  countries,  was  heavy. 

Col.  Gorgas  had  urged  the  prompt  sanitation  of 
Colon  and  Panama,  and  early  in  the  American  occupa- 
tion the  construction  of  sewers,  waterworks,  and  paved 
streets  was  begun.  The  Americans  advanced  the 
money  for  these  improvements  on  a  plan  of  taxes  that 
at  the  end  of  fifty  years  from  their  completion  will  re- 
pay the  United  States  and  turn  them  over  to  the  re- 
spective cities. 

One  of  the  dredges  left  by  the  Slaven  brothers  was 
found  to  be,  after  twenty  years,  in  excellent  condition 
and  was  put  to  work  in  Colon  harbor.  The  twenty 
miles  of  track  in  the  Culebra  cut  occasioned  derail- 
ments and  wrecks  with  exasperating  frequency  until 
relaid  with  heavier  rails,  and  this  mileage  was  in- 
creased by  an  addition  of  fifteen  miles  during  the  first 
year.  Machine  shops  existed  at  Colon,  Matachin,  and 
Gorgona  where,  when  the  jungle  had  been  cut  away, 
facilities  were  found  for  repairing  machinery  and  roll- 
ing stock. 

Mr.  Wallace  made  his  headquarters  in  Panama  in  a 
building  that  formerly  had  been  occupied  by  the 
French  Director-General.  It  is  now  the  American 
Legation.  The  disbursing  officer,  sanitary  officer,  en- 
gineering parties,  and  clerical  forces  were  centered  in 
Panama,  but  a  site  for  an  American  administrative 

94 


WALLACE 

town  was  selected  at  the  foot  of  Ancon  hill  just  out- 
side of  Panama. 

French  towns  at  Culebra,  Empire,  and  Gorgona  were 
rehabilitated  and  systems  of  sewers  and  waterworks 
begun.  There  were  settlements  at  Matachin,  Bas 
Obispo,  and  Colon.  Accommodations  were  of  the 
crudest  description.  Powder  boxes  served  for  Morris 
chairs,  furniture  was  scanty  and  of  ancient  design, 
tropical  insects  made  life  a  misery,  servants  were  worse 
than  indifferent,  there  were  no  baths,  no  running  water 
in  the  houses,  and  that  which  was  used  sometimes  was 
caught  from  roofs  on  which  the  buzzards  roosted,  the 
native  foods  had  to  be  eaten,  and  ice  was  a  luxury  that 
only  occasionally  could  be  obtained  from  the  railroad 
ice  factory  at  Colon. 

Each  ship  that  brought  workers  to  the  Canal  Zone 
invariably  carried  the  same  or  others  back.  Yet  a  per- 
centage stuck  and  accepted  the  undesirable  conditions 
gracefully.  A  few  had  vision  enough  to  see  that  our 
great  government  would  rectify  everything  if  only 
given  time.  Others  realized  that  the  canal  never  would 
be  built  if  the  workers  expected  soft  conditions  right  at 
the  start  and  they  accepted  their  sacrifices  of  comfort 
as  a  national  necessity. 

To  add  to  the  difficulties  of  the  early  days,  maga- 
zine, newspaper,  and  other  critics  exploited  the  im- 
perfections of  the  employee's  environment  from  a 
hypercritical  standpoint,  whereas  the  government  was 
bending  its  energies  to  the  utmost  to  bring  conditions 
to  par.  ]\Iany  of  these  critics  were  inspired  by  a 
preference  for  the  Nicaraguan  route,  others  simply 

95 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

were  anti-Roosevelt  and  lambasted  anything  he  cham- 
pioned, while  still  others  were  the  hirelings  of  spe- 
cial interests  that  opposed  any  canal.  These  critics 
reached  the  climax  of  absurdity  when  complaint  was 
made  that  men  living  only  nine  degrees  from  the  Equa- 
tor ought  to  have  hot  water  baths.  There  was  no  let- 
up until  the  canal  was  so  far  advanced  that  it  stood  as 
a  self-evident  refutation  of  their  dismal  prophecies. 

Every  defect  they  pointed  out  had  been  noted  long 
ago  by  the  officials  and  was  remedied  in  time  more 
handsomely  than  any  private  contractor  would  have 
matched.  The  Americans  were  not  attempting  a  pink 
tea  performance  in  Panama  and  the  torrents  of  abuse 
tliat  were  heaped  upon  the  administration  constitute 
the  most  disgraceful  feature  of  the  entire  project. 

Mr.  Wallace  came  from  a  highly  organized  railroad 
system  to  an  absolutely  unorganized  enterprise  two 
thousand  miles  from  the  base  of  supplies.  Govern- 
ment red  tape  to  such  a  man  was  exasperating  to  the 
last  degree.  It  was  necessary  for  the  government  to 
advertise  for  bids,  and  this  constituted  the  principal 
delay  in  securing  orders,  but  barring  that  procedure,  it 
has  not  been  shown  that  a  private  contractor  could 
have  placed  machinery  and  supplies  on  the  ground 
with  much  greater  celerity  than  the  government. 

The  over-riding  idea  was  to  make  a  showing.  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  himself  had  set  the  pace  for  quick  re- 
sults. Congressmen  who  were  expected  to  vote  for 
canal  appropriations  frequently  could  not  be  impressed 
that  the  project  was  worth  while  if  the  dirt  was  not 
flying.     Mr.  Wallace  therefore  concentrated  energies 

96 


WALLACE 

on  excavation  work  that  more  profitably  could  have 
been  spent  on  preparations.  He  got  out  741,644  yards 
in  his  year,  a  creditable  showing  with  the  equipment 
at  hand.  The  first  steam  shovel  was  installed  on  No- 
vember II,  1904,  and  was  No.  loi,  of  the  70-ton 
class.  It  is  still  in  use  in  the  canal.  On  December  2, 
1904,  the  second  steam  shovel  was  erected,  No.  201,  of 
the  95-ton  class.  By  June,  1905,  there  were  nine  steam 
shovels  at  work,  and  the  last  French  excavator  was 
abandoned  on  June  16,  1905,  the  day  Mr.  Wallace  left 
the  Canal  Zone  as  Chief  Engineer. 

All  engines,  cars,  steam  shovels,  and  other  large 
equipment  had  to  be  brought  to  the  Isthmus  "  knocked 
down."  The  cost  of  putting  together  a  locomotive  of 
the  large  type  was  $820  and  for  erecting  a  steam 
shovel  of  the  95-ton  class,  the  cost  in  the  Canal  Zone 
shops,  is  $770.  This  work,  with  the  repair  work  and 
original  steel  and  iron  construction  work,  required 
boilermakers,  mechanics,  blacksmiths,  and  machine 
shop  workers  of  all  kinds.  Recruiting  offices  were 
opened  in  the  principal  American  cities  to  engage  them 
and  sometimes  conditions  in  the  Canal  Zone  were  pic- 
tured a  little  rosier  than  the  facts  warranted. 

As  Secretary  of  War,  William  Howard  Taft  had  the 
immediate  direction  of  Panama  canal  affairs.  Every 
time  he  touched  the  project  he  manifested  the  high 
order  of  ability  that  made  him  so  admirably  equipped 
for  the  presidency  later  on,  although  the  average  canal 
employee  will  not  agree  with  this  opinion,  because  the 
Secretary  actually  acted  as  if  the  Republic  of  Panama 
was  a  sovereign  power,  entitled  to  consideration  and 

97 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

concessions  in  its  complaints  against  the  Commission. 
The  canal  employees  were  coddled  by  President  Roose- 
velt and,  besides,  have  no  surplus  of  brotherly  feeling 
at  all  for  the  Panamans,  so  that  Secretary  Taft's  con- 
siderate treatment  of  them  to  many  appeared  a  par- 
tiality at  the  expense  of  the  canal  employees. 

Almost  coincidental  with  the  beginning  of  American 
operations,  Panama  began  to  feel  how  absolutely  sover- 
eign it  had  made  the  Americans  right  in  the  heart  of 
the  republic.  The  Canal  Zone  was  being  managed 
with  complete  independence  from  the  republic,  as  much 
so  as  the  Republic  of  Costa  Rica  to  the  north. 

Gov.  Davis  had  corresponded  at  length  with  the  of- 
ficials of  Panama,  over  the  question  of  sovereignty, 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts,  the  issues  of  the  tariff, 
postage,  customs,  and  currency,  until  it  was  deemed 
advisable  for  Secretary  Taft  in  person  to  visit  the 
Isthmus  to  arrange  a  working  agreement  on  these  dif- 
ferences. 

Secretary  Taft  arrived  on  November  27,  1904,  and 
remained  until  December  7th.  He  was  assisted,  in  the 
conferences  that  were  held  in  Panama,  by  William 
Nelson  Cromwell,  whose  intimate  knowledge  of  all 
Panama  affairs  made  him  a  valuable  adviser.  On  the 
question  of  sovereignty,  which  seemed  to  be  especially 
delicate  to  the  Republic,  the  treaty  was  peculiar  in  that 
it  did  not  cede  the  Canal  Zone  finally  to  the  United 
States,  but  gave  the  Americans  all  the  powers  they 
would  exercise  "  if  they  were  sovereign." 

Panama  contended  that  final  sovereignty  was  vested 
in  it,  and  Secretary  Taft,  being  after  the  substance 

98 


WALLACE 

rather  than  the  form,  did  not  quibble  over  this  dis- 
tinction without  a  difference,  but  later  expressed  the 
opinion  that  Panama  sovereignty  over  the  Canal  Zone 
was  a  "  barren  ideality."  Certainly  it  has  proved  so 
to  be.    The  issue  passed  off  in  talk. 

An  agreement  was  reached  on  the  currency  ques- 
tion whereby  the  United  States  would  accept  the  money 
of  Panama  atone  half  the  valueof  American  currency, 
that  is,  the  peso,  worth  intrinsically  only  forty  cents, 
would  be  exchanged  with  United  States  money  at  fifty 
cents,  although  it  was  in  size  and  face  value  the  same 
as  our  dollar.  The  same  system  was  in  vogue  in  the 
Philippines.  To  meet  the  needs  of  the  canal  pay- 
master, the  circulation  of  pesos  was  increased  from 
3,000,000  to  4,000,000.  Out  of  this  grew  the  custom 
in  the  Canal  Zone  of  referring  to  United  States  cur- 
rency as  "  gold  "  and  to  Panama  currency  as  "  silver," 
and  in  the  stores  articles  are  priced  in  both  currencies. 
The  physical  advantage  of  a  high-value  currency  is 
demonstrated  on  the  Isthmus,  because  the  weight  and 
size  of  the  Panama  silver  money  makes  it  cumbersome. 

Stamps  were  selling  in  the  Canal  Zone  for  slightly 
less  than  in  the  post  offices  of  the  republic,  with  the 
result  that  the  republic  was  losing  revenue.  Secretary 
Taft  settled  this  just  complaint  by  arranging  for  the 
Canal  Zone  to  buy  its  stamps  from  the  republic  for 
sixty  per  centum  of  their  value,  the  forty  per  centum 
remaining  to  be  the  profit  of  the  Canal  Zone  offices. 
The  stamps  are  surcharged  "  Canal  Zone,"  which  is 
the  official  geographical  designation  of  the  territory 
through  which  the  canal  runs. 

99 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

On  June  24,  1904,  President  Roosevelt  had  made 
the  Dingley  tariff  applicable  to  the  Canal  Zone.  This 
\vorked  badly  and  Secretary  Taft  agreed  to  have  the 
order  revoked,  so  that  the  Canal  Zone  ever  since  has 
enjoyed  the  freest  of  free  trade.  All  other  issues  were 
cleared  up  without  the  United  States  yielding  any  free- 
dom of  action  as  to  importing  materials,  executing 
justice,  operating  ship  terminals  and  supplying  canal 
employees  with  the  necessaries  of  life  through  com- 
missaries and  hotels. 

While  Secretary  Taft  and  Chief  Engineer  Wallace 
were  working  in  their  spheres,  Gov.  Davis  was  in- 
stituting the  various  departments  of  civil  government 
which  to-day  are  noted  with  admiration  by  the  tourist. 
Chief  of  Police  Shanton  was  engaged  in  ridding  the 
Canal  Zone  of  its  bad  men  and  bringing  a  population 
long  without  any  restraint  under  the  control  of  regula- 
tions that  the  Americans  considered  essential  to  orderly 
existence.  So  far  as  practicable,  the  laws  to  which 
the  natives  were  accustomed,  which  had  been  handed 
down  the  centuries  by  the  Spaniards,  were  adopted 
in  taxing  lands  and  other  property,  but  the  court 
procedure  was  American  with  the  exception  of  the 
jury  system.     The  judges  acted  as  juries. 

From  the  first  Mr.  Wallace  had  kept  close  tab  on 
the  cost  of  excavating  dirt  in  the  Culebra  cut.  The 
type  to  be  chosen  being  still  an  unknown  factor,  he 
was  in  some  measure  working  in  the  dark,  except  that 
the  material  removed  would  be  useful  for  any  type, 
provided  the  dumps  were  selected  so  as  not  to  later 
get  in  the  way  of  any  route  chosen.     In  19 12,  the 

100 


Vopyriyht  hy  Harris  d-  Ewing. 

President  Taft. 


WALLACE 

Americans  had  to  remove  a  French  dump  near  Cu- 
lebra  to  prevent  its  shpping  down  into  the  cut.  He 
finally  announced  a  unit  cost  of  50  cents  a  cubic  yard 
for  either  a  sea-level  or  lock-type  canal. 

Messrs.  Parsons  and  Burr,  the  engineering  com- 
mittee of  the  Commission,  after  a  personal  inspection 
of  the  Canal  Zone,  and  taking  Mr.  Wallace's  esti- 
mate, recommended  a  sea-level  type  of  canal.  It  was 
to  cost,  exclusive  of  improvements  in  Colon  and  Pan- 
ama, and  civil  government  in  the  Canal  Zone,  $230,- 
500.000.  Mr.  Wallace  had  caused  surveys  to  be  made 
for  a  lock  type  of  canal,  and  he  estimated  the  cost  of 
such  a  canal,  with  a  summit  level  of  60  feet  eleva- 
tion, to  be  $178,013,406;  with  a  summit  level  at  30 
feet  elevation,  the  cost  would  be  $194,213,406. 

All  three  estimates  missed  the  real  cost  of  the  re- 
spective types  widely.  Mr.  Wallace's  estimate  of  50 
cents  a  yard  for  excavation  was  far  too  low.  As  a 
matter  of  record,  the  cost  reached  82  cents  under 
Chief  Engineer  Stevens,  rose  to  91  cents  under  Chief 
Engineer  Goethals,  and  only  once  fell  below  the  50- 
cent  estimate,  in  March,  191 1,  when  it  fell  to  47  cents 
a  yard.  The  average  for  the  period  from  1904  to 
191 1  was  88  cents.  The  mistake  was  made  because 
solid  rock  underlay  the  surface,  necessitating  contin- 
uous blasting  before  it  could  be  handled  by  the  steam 
shovels,  while  the  working  day,  which  had  been  ten 
hours  under  Mr.  Wallace,  was  cut  to  eight  hours 
under  Messrs.  Stevens  and  Goethals,  and  wages  rose 
sharply  as  well. 

Persistent  and  vigorous  complaints  from  Mr.  Wal- 

lOI 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

lace,  about  the  hindrances  of  governmental  methods 
of  doing  business,  found  a  receptive  ear  in  President 
Roosevelt.  The  Executive  was  just  as  eager  to  make 
the  dirt  fly  as  Mr.  Wallace,  and  readily  agreed  that 
a  Commission  of  seven  members  was  an  awkward 
and  ill-working  management  for  the  peculiar  condi- 
tions of  the  job  at  Panama.  Accordingly  drastic  ac- 
tion was  decreed. 

Secretary  Taft,  on  March  29,  1905,  asked  the  en- 
tire Commission  to  resign.  His  explanation  exoner- 
ated the  members  of  any  blameworthy  administration, 
but  indicated  that  the  Commission  had  been  found  an 
unwieldy  body.  Mr.  Wallace  was  in  Washington, 
and  the  President  and  Secretary  Taft  followed  his 
suggestions  almost  to  the  letter,  including  the  one  that 
the  Chief  Engineer  be  made  a  member  of  the  Com- 
mission. 

On  April  i,  1905,  the  second  Isthmian  Canal  Com- 
mission to  be  appointed  by  President  Roosevelt  was 
announced.  Heading  it  was  a  new  figure  in  canal 
affairs,  Theodore  P.  Shonts,  who  played  a  decisive 
part  in  the  enterprise  for  the  ensuing  two  years.  The 
personnel  of  the  new  Commission  was: 

Theodore  P.  Shonts,  Chairman, 

Charles  E.  Magoon,  Governor  of  the  Canal  Zone, 

John  F.  Wallace,  Chief  Engineer, 

Mordecai  T.  Endicott, 

Peter  C.  Hains, 

Oswald  H.  Ernst, 

Benjamin  M.  Harrod. 

102 


WALLACE 

There  was  the  same  number  of  Commissioners,  but 
the  first  three  were  named  an  Executive  Committee 
which  virtually  should  exercise  the  powers  of  the  en- 
tire body.  Thus  power  was  taken  from  seven  and 
concentrated  in  three  members.  Mr.  Shonts  was  to 
be  in  charge  of  the  Washington  office  and  Messrs. 
Wallace  and  Magoon  on  the  Isthmus. 

Again  following  ]\Ir.  Wallace's  suggestion,  the 
directory  of  the  Panama  Railroad  was  reorganized, 
the  United  States  on  April  15,  1905,  for  the  first 
time  electing  the  members.  Mr.  Shonts  w^as  made 
president  and  Mr.  Wallace,  vice-president  and  gen- 
eral manager.  This  would  further  concentrate  con- 
trol in  the  Chief  Engineer  over  a  vital  factor  in  canal 
construction. 

These  changes  and  other  matters  kept  Mr.  Wallace 
in  Washington  from  March  29th  to  May  24th,  about 
two  months.  The  employees  in  the  Canal  Zone  natu- 
rally caught  something  of  the  spirit  of  unrest  which 
attended  the  reorganization  of  the  Commission,  and, 
of  course,  the  hostile  press  was  playing  up  everything 
that  could  embarrass  the  administration  and  damn 
the  project.  Then  the  yellow- fever  epidemic  broke 
out  in  April,  1905,  to  add  a  terrible* phase  to  life  on 
the  Isthmus. 

Having  secured  every  change  he  desired,  Mr.  Wal- 
lace left  Washington  with  expressions  of  cordial  ap- 
preciation to  the  President  and  his  Secretary.  He 
arrived  at  Colon  on  June  2d,  and  the  White  House 
believed  that  a  crisis  in  the  career  of  the  project  had 

103 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

been  passed   successfully.     They  looked   forward  to 
smooth  sailing  with  every  confidence. 

Their  surprise  and  chagrin,  therefore,  was  immeas- 
urable when  ]\Ir.  Wallace  cabled  Secretary  Taft,  on 
June  8th,  asking  that  he  be  recalled  to  Washington 
for  a  conference.  He  intimated  that  the  conference 
might  result  in  his  resignation  as  Chief  Engineer. 
After  a  disheartened  interview  with  the  President, 
Secretary  Taft  cabled  him  to  return.  At  the  same 
time  he  cabled  Gov.  Magoon  for  a  confidential  view 
of  Mr.  Wallace's  conduct.  Gov.  Magoon  expressed 
the  opinion  that  Mr.  Wallace  was  quitting  for  a  bet- 
ter salary,  the  yellow-fever  epidemic  was  raging,  the 
wife  of  ]\Ir.  Wallace's  secretary  had  died  from  the 
disease,  and  Mr.  Wallace  believed  that  he  had  had  an 
attack  of  it. 

Without  intimating  that  he  was  leaving  for  good, 
Mr,  Wallace  quietly  packed  up  or  sold  off  his  house- 
hold furniture  and  sailed  from  Colon  on  June  i6th. 
The  employees  scented  some  important  movements 
and  the  subordinate  officials  felt  restrained  from  de- 
cisive action,  although  Mr.  Wallace  left  authority  to 
that  effect  with  the  engineer  next  in  rank  to  him. 

Gov.  Magoon  cabled  that  the  working  force,  al- 
ready shaken  by  the  yellow- fever  epidemic,  were  fur- 
ther demoralized  by  the  belief  that  the  Chief  Engi- 
neer was  seeking  a  softer  berth.  Every  ship  that 
left  Panama  at  that  time  was  carrying  capacity  pas- 
senger lists,  and  only  the  limited  number  of  vessels 
prevented  a  wholesale  exodus.  It  was  truly  a  time 
that  tried  men's  souls. 

104 


WALLACE 

President  Roosevelt  and  Secretary  Taft  then  de- 
cided upon  a  drastic  course  toward  Mr.  Wallace,  as 
a  means  of  reviving  the  morale  of  the  canal  workers, 
and  also  of  bringing  the  American  people  sharply  to 
a  realization  that  the  canal  project  was  in  peril, 
through  a  display  of  weakness  in  the  face  of  danger, 
that  would  make  our  experiment  in  Panama  an  inter- 
national disgrace. 

Secretary  Taft,  with  William  Nelson  Cromwell, 
met  Mr.  Wallace  at  the  Manhattan  Hotel  in  New 
York  on  June  25th.  Secretary  Taft  listened  to  his 
reason  for  resigning,  which  in  the  main  was  that  he 
had  under  consideration  a  position  that  would  carry 
with  it  a  remuneration  of  approximately  $65,000  a 
year.  One  of  the  peculiar  conditions  of  the  new  em- 
ployment was  that  under  no  circumstances  was  he  to 
return  to  the  Isthmus,  but  that  he  would  gladly  re- 
main a  member  of  the  Commission  resident  in  the 
United  States.  He  made  some  side  criticisms  to  the 
effect  that  Col.  Gorgas  was  incapable  of  handling  the 
yellow-fever  epidemic,  that  government  red  tape  was 
distracting,  and  conditions  generally  were  such  as  to 
make  the  new  employment  look  attractive. 

Secretary  Taft  did  not  conceal  his  disappointment 
in  Mr.  Wallace's  course.  He  began  by  reviewing  how 
the  government  had  taken  him  from  a  position  pay- 
ing $15,000  a  year  to  make  him  Chief  Engineer  of 
the  canal  at  $25,000  a  year;  how  that  the  formidable 
obstacles  to  be  met,  the  supreme  necessity  of  a  canal 
to  the  nation,  made  it  a  patriotic  work  for  any  Amer- 

105 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

ican  and  an  honor  to  be  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
greatest  enterprise  of  the  age. 

"  For  mere  lucre,"  Mr.  Taft  continued,  "  you 
change  your  position  overnight  without  thought  of 
the  embarrassing  position  in  which  you  place  your 
government  by  this  action." 

Secretary  Taft  then  reviewed  how  the  Commission 
had  just  been  reorganized  to  meet  Mr.  Wallace's 
wishes,  and  every  change  had  been  approved  by  the 
Chief  Engineer.  He  closed  by  demanding  the  imme- 
diate resignation  of  Mr.  Wallace.  This  came  the 
next  day,  and  was  made  public  on  June  28th,  with 
Secretary  Taft's  hot  rebuke,  which,  in  the  Canal  Zone, 
had  a  most  salutary  effect.  It  put  an  entirely  new 
complexion  on  their  work  to  be  told  that  the  nation 
expected  every  man  to  do  his  duty,  that  they  were 
not  down  there  for  the  money  they  could  make,  nor 
were  they  expected  to  leave  because  of  the  hardships 
they  would  meet,  but  that  the  object  of  their  exile 
was  to  give  the  nation  something  vital  to  its  welfare. 
The  desertions  began  to  diminish  at  once,  and  the 
announcement  on  June  30th,  that  John  F.  Stevens,  a 
Hill  man,  had  been  appointed  Chief  Engineer,  fur- 
ther strengthened  the  morale  of  the  canal  organiza- 
tion. 

Theodore  Roosevelt  never  appeared  to  better  ad- 
vantage as  a  supremely  able  executive  than  during  this 
crisis  in  the  history  of  the  canal.  Before  his  enemies, 
and  the  canal's  enemies,  could  shout  their  glee  at  the 
demoralization  of  the  enterprise,  he  had  closed  the 
breach  with  the  selection  of  another  great  Chief  En- 

106 


WALLACE 

gineer.  Even  if  the  situation  had  been  brought  about 
by  interests  with  sinister  designs,  it  could  not  have 
been  met  with  a  more  magnificent  courage,  and  the 
canal  project  was  strengthened  by  the  ordeal. 


107 


CHAPTER    XII 

THE    CANAL    UNDER    STEVENS 

ANOTHER  notable  figure  in  the  railroad  world 
had  been  chosen  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Pan- 
ama Canal.  John  F.  Stevens  in  1903  was  general 
manager  of  the  Great  Northern  Railroad  Company, 
and  of  his  selection  as  Chief  Engineer,  James  J.  Hill 
said  that  if  the  whole  country  had  been  ransacked  no 
better  man  could  be  found. 

Mr.  Stevens  was  about  to  start  to  the  Philippine 
Islands  to  superintend  the  construction  of  government 
railroads,  when  drafted  for  the  canal.  It  is  not  pos- 
sible to  estimate  the  mischief  that  might  have  resulted 
if  the  selection  of  a  successor  to  Mr.  Wallace  had 
been  long  delayed.  His  salary  was  to  be  $30,000  an- 
nually, or  $5,000  more  than  that  paid  to  Mr.  Wallace. 
He  was  facing  a  situation  in  Panama  that  justified 
the  figure. 

The  long  continued  "  knocking  "  of  the  canal  proj- 
ect was  having  its  effect.  Not  only  were  the  men 
on  the  ground  difficult  to  retain,  but  new  ones  would 
not  come  unless  for  exceptional  considerations.  The 
yellow- fever  epidemic  was  still  uncontrolled.  An  in- 
voice of  the  situation  as  left  by  Mr.  Wallace  showed 
that  considerable  pioneer  work  had  been  done,  but  the 
housing,  feeding,  and  general  preparations  for  the 
comfort  of  employees  were  unsolved  problems. 

108 


STEVENS 

Mr.  Stevens  arrived  at  Colon  on  July  27,  1905.  As 
a  railroad  man  his  eye  first  was  attracted  by  the  con- 
gestion of  freight  on  the  wharves  and  the  self-evident 
fact  that  the  Panama  Railroad  was  in  a  near  state  of 
collapse.  Freight  was  piled  up  in  the  streets  in  pro- 
digious quantities  and  was  moving  over  the  railroad 
at  a  snail's  pace.  His  first  report  hit  off  the  situation 
in  one  sarcastic  sentence : 

"  About  the  only  claim  for  good  work  heard  made 
was  that  there  had  been  no  collisions  for  some  time. 
A  collision  has  its  good  points  as  well  as  its  bad  ones 
— it  indicates  there  is  something  moving  on  the  rail- 
road." 

As  for  the  railroad  tracks  in  the  Culebra  cut,  he 
said  they  were  "  lines,  which  by  the  utmost  stretch  of 
the  imagination  could  not  be  termed  railroad  tracks." 
Mr,  Wallace  had  found  the  Panama  Railroad,  after 
half  a  century  without  competition,  far  behind  the 
times  in  equipment,  and  practically  no  discipline  or 
efficiency  existed  among  the  employees.  When  j\Ir. 
Stevens  took  charge  there  was  an  improved  situation, 
but  the  long  absence  in  Washington  of  Chief  Engineer 
Wallace,  and  his  sudden  departure,  had  caused  the  rail- 
road to  begin  a  retrograde  movement. 

For  31  miles  the  main  line  of  the  railroad  had  been 
retracked  with  American  rails  and  the  work  of  double- 
tracking  it  was  just  getting  under  way.  The  princi- 
pal shops  were  at  Matachin,  with  a  capacity  of  over- 
hauling five  locomotives  and  150  dump  cars  a  month. 
The  canal  employees  soon  saw  the  caliber  of  man  at 
their  head  by  the  way  Mr.  Stevens  straightened  out 

109 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

the  railroad  tangle,  for  the  freight  began  to  move,  lax 
methods  were  rooted  out  of  the  system,  and  the  sem- 
blance of  an  efficient  organization,  operating  along 
modern  lines,  appeared. 

The  Commission  visited  the  Isthmus  in  July  and 
August  and  with  Mr.  Stevens  reached  the  conclusion 
that  construction  work  should  be  reduced  to  a  mini- 
mum, even  to  turning  away  employees,  and  all  ener- 
gies bent  to  building  up  a  system  of  feeding  and 
housing  the  men  and  their  families.  Preparatory 
work  was  given  the  right  of  way  over  construction, 
which  accounts  for  the  comparatively  little  excavation 
done  under  the  Stevens  regime.  The  general  verdict 
was  that  the  ground  work  done  by  Mr.  Wallace  was 
good,  in  spite  of  disorganized  conditions,  and  that  no 
insuperable  obstacles  stood  in  the  way  of  building  the 
canal.  Delays  in  filling  requisitions  undoubtedly  ac- 
counted for  the  lack  of  some  of  the  equipment  and 
supplies. 

Mr.  Wallace  had  left  the  following  organization 
worked  out  on  paper,  with  the  explanation  that  large 
salaries  had  not  attracted  competent  heads  of  depart- 
ments, so  that  Mr.  Stevens  found  many  important 
positions  unfilled : 

The  Department  of  Engineering  and  Construction 
was  divided  into  five  divisions,  running  from  the  At- 
lantic to  the  Pacific  and  known  as  the  Colon,  Cha- 
gres,  Gamboa,  Culebra,  and  La  Boca  Divisions. 

Bureau  of  Personnel,  Transportation  and  Quarters. 
Bureau  of  Supplies. 

no 


STEVENS 

Bureau  of  Waterworks,  Sewers,  and  Roads. 
Bureau  of  Machinery  and  Equipment. 
Bureau  of  Architecture  and  Equipment. 
Bureau  of  Meteorology  and  Hydraulics. 
Bureau  of  Mapmaking  and  Printing. 
Bureau  of  Communication. 

There  were  8,312  men  in  the  department  of  engi- 
neering and  construction,  and  other  employees  brought 
the  total  to  9,500,  not  including  the  Panama  Rail- 
road. Municipal  improvements  in  Colon  and  Panama, 
and  certain  Canal  Zone  towns,  were  well  under  way. 
Effective  progress  had  been  made  in  the  work  of 
surveying  the  canal  route,  in  making  borings  for  lock 
sites,  and  in  other  engineering  preliminaries.  As 
noted,  741,644  yards  had  been  excavated  and  nine 
steam  shovels  were  at  work.  The  357  renovated 
French  buildings  and  48  new  structures  housed  the 
employees,  except  those  who  provided  shelter  for 
themselves  in  Colon  and  Panama.  There  were  no 
commissary  and  hotels. 

On  December  i,  1905,  the  Commission  made  its  an- 
nual report  to  the  President,  containing  Mr.  Stevens' 
first  review  of  the  canal.  Both  he  and  the  Commis- 
sion pleaded  for  "  a  thorough  business  administra- 
tion, unhampered  by  any  tendency  to  technicalities, 
into  which  our  public  works  sometimes  drift."  Like 
Mr.  Wallace,  Mr.  Stevens  found  government  red  tape 
galling.  Civil  service  and  the  eight-hour  day  were 
just  as  obnoxious,  the  Commission  urging  that  "  it  is 
a  mistake  to  handicap  the  construction  of  the  Panama 

III 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

Canal  with  any  laws  save  those  of  police  and  sanita- 
tion." 

An  Executive  Order  had  made  the  Civil  Service 
cover  the  Canal  Zone  on  November  15,  1904,  but 
both  Mr.  Wallace  and  Mr.  Stevens  protested  so  ear- 
nestly against  the  restrictions  of  this  order  that  on 
January  12,  1906,  President  Roosevelt  removed  all 
employees,  except  clerks,  from  the  scope  of  the  act, 
thus  allowing  Mr.  Stevens  to  employ  anyone  he  saw 
fit  on  any  terms  he  chose.  The  eight-hour  day  re- 
striction likewise  was  lifted,  but  agitation  in  the 
United  States  caused  the  President  later  to  reimpose 
both  limitations,  with  whatever  increase  in  time  and 
cost  of  constructing  the  canal  they  might  involve. 

The  Americans  had  been  in  Panama  more  than  a 
year,  and  still  the  type  of  canal  to  be  built  was  unde- 
cided. Mr.  Wallace's  service  had  terminated  and  a 
full  year  of  Mr.  Stevens'  administration  before  the 
choice  was  made.  In  the  meantime,  Mr.  Stevens  rap- 
idly was  rounding  into  shape  an  organization  of 
workers,  getting  suitable  quarters  erected  for  the  em- 
ployees who  were  coming  in  large  numbers,  organiz- 
ing the  commissary  and  hotel  systems,  securing  me- 
chanical equipment,  and  bringing  the  transportation 
facilities  to  a  satisfactory  standard.  Gov.  Magoon 
simultaneously  was  organizing  a  civil  government 
along  the  lines  blazed  by  Gov.  Davis.  Police,  courts, 
schools,  fire  departments,  post  offices,  recreation  club- 
houses, churches,  in  short,  duplicating  on  a  scale  suit- 
able to  the  Canal  Zone  the  civilization  of  the  United 
States. 

112 


STEVENS 

By  June,  1906,  the  end  of  his  first  year  as  Chief 
Engineer,  Mr.  Stevens  had  made  a  remarkable  show- 
ing in  every  phase  of  the  work.  There  were  39  steam 
shovels  at  work  as  against  9  in  1905;  the  working 
force  had  increased  to  23,901,  of  whom  3,264  were 
Americans.  But,  as  showing  how  closely  his  efforts 
were  concentrated  on  preparatory  work,  the  total  ex- 
cavation for  the  year  was  only  1,499,562  yards,  the 
highest  figures  for  one  month  being  in  March,  1906, 
when  239,178  yards  were  removed. 

Col.  Gorgas  and  his  sanitary  department  got  on 
top  of  the  yellow- fever  epidemic  in  September,  1905, 
and  in  general  so  dominated  the  hitherto  unhealthful 
Isthmus,  that  even  the  hostile  press  began  to  show  a 
change  in  heart  on  this  score,  with  the  result  that  the 
immigration  of  workers  largely  increased.  Recruit- 
ing agencies  already  had  been  opened  in  the  West 
Indies,  Europe,  and  the  principal  American  cities. 
More  than  12,000  men  were  imported  in  1906  on  con- 
tract with  the  Commission.  The  common  labor  was 
estimated  by  Mr.  Stevens  to  be  about  33  per  cent  as 
efficient  as  similar  American  labor.  It  was  not  until 
1906  that  the  wives  and  families  of  the  Americans  be- 
gan coming  to  the  Canal  Zone  in  considerable  num- 
bers, although  there  had  been  a  heroic  band  of  them 
throughout  the  trying  days  before  the  tropical  terrors 
had  been  conquered. 

Early  in  his  connection  with  the  canal,  Mr.  Stevens 
discovered  that  practically  all  the  material  in  the  Cu- 
lebra  cut  would  have  to  be  blasted  before  it  could  be 
handled  by  the  steam  shovels.     "  The  problem  of  Cu- 

113 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

lebra  cut,"  he  wrote  in  the  first  annual  report,  "  is 
one  of  transportation  (including  disposal)  pure  and 
simple."  He  had  to  be  careful  in  selecting  dumps  so 
as  to  insure  that  they  would  not  become  an  obstruc- 
tion to  any  type  of  canal  or  route  that  might  be  se- 
lected. "  As  the  gift  of  prophecy  is  withheld  from  us 
in  these  latter  days,  all  we  can  do  now  is  to  make  such 
arrangements  as  may  look  proper  as  far  ahead  as  we 
can  see,"  he  wrote  in  his  report  of  1905  on  the  unset- 
tled question  of  a  sea-level  or  lock-type  canal. 

The  high  wages  and  salaries  for  which  the  Canal 
Zone  is  noted  originated  under  Mr.  Stevens.  So  bad 
a  name  had  been  given  the  Isthmus  in  the  past  that 
extra  inducements  had  to  be  made  to  attract  workers, 
free  quarters,  pay  from  30^  to  60'^  higher  than  in  the 
United  States,  and  a  rate  of  $20  from  New  York  to 
Colon  on  steamers  operated  by  the  government,  with 
other  perquisites,  being  some  of  the  advertised  attrac- 
tions. Besides,  in  the  latter  part  of  Mr.  Stevens' 
regime,  the  United  States  was  enjoying  unexampled 
prosperity,  the  palmy  days  before  the  panic  of  1907. 
Mechanics  and  all  kinds  of  workers  could  obtain  em- 
ployment at  home  at  high  wages  and  would  not  come 
to  Panama  unless  for  the  unusual  inducements 
enumerated,  and,  in  addition,  vacations  with  full  pay, 
sick  leave  on  pay,  and  cheap  food  and  other  neces- 
saries. 

The  Battle  of  the  Levels 

Although  the  French  had  abandoned  the  idea  of  a 
sea-level  canal  in  favor  of  a  lock  type,  there  still  was 

114 


<Tni(<liii.'<l    iilintn.    Wash  i  ii'i  Inn  .    I>.   <\ 

John  F.  Stevens. 


STEVENS 

a  good  deal  of  life  in  the  idea  among  the  American 
people.  For  one  thing,  a  sea-level  canal  was  so  much 
more  easily  grasped  by  the  popular  mind,  and  then 
all  engineers  concede  that  it  is  the  ideal  canal  where 
it  is  practicable.  In  Panama,  the  division  of  opinion 
arose  over  this  point  of  practicability. 

A  sea-level  canal  aptly  has  been  described  as  "  a 
wide  and  deep  passage  navigable  at  all  times,  day  or 
night,  at  all  seasons  and  in  all  weathers,  by  all  sorts 
and  sizes  of  vessels."  The  lock  type  involves  opera- 
tions not  readily  portrayed  to  the  lay  mind,  but  emi- 
nently simple  when  seen  in  practical  use.  Popular 
opinion,  and  the  daily  and  periodical  press,  divided 
and  fought  bitterly  from  the  time  the  Canal  Zone  was 
taken  until  it  finally  was  decided  by  Congress,  and 
even  then  the  sea-level  advocates  kept  up  an  anvil 
chorus  against  the  lock  type. 

The  Walker  Commission  of  1901  had  estimated  the 
cost  of  a  sea-level  canal  at  $145,000,000.  The 
Spooner  act  authorized  $135,000,000  for  any  type  that 
might  be  chosen,  but  leaned  toward  the  lock  type. 
The  Commission  of  1905  recommended  a  sea-level 
type  to  cost  $230,500,000.  Mr.  Wallace  later  esti- 
mated the  cost  at  sea-level  at  $300,000,000,  exclusive 
of  the  $50,000,000  paid  for  the  Canal  Zone  and 
French  property. 

That  these  American  estimates  should  come,  in  the 
main,  under  the  amount  actually  spent  by  the  French, 
who  little  more  than  scraped  the  surface,  shows,  for 
one  thing,  that  the  Americans  believed  there  had  been 
gross  extravagance  and  inefficiency  in  the  French  oper- 

115 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

ations,  and  for  another  thing,  that  the  Americans  had 
no  adequate  grasp  upon  the  task  they  were  undertak- 
ing. This  same  insufficiency  of  estimates  continued 
until  1908,  when  Col.  Goethals  faced  the  situation 
frankly  and  announced  the  cost  for  a  lock  type  to  be 
$375,000,000,  which  was  far  ahead  of  the  highest 
estimate  for  a  sea-level  canal.  In  1909,  Col.  Goethals 
said  a  sea-level  canal  would  cost  $563,000,000  and 
take  six  years  longer  to  build  than  a  lock  canal,  which 
was  before  the  slides  in  the  Culebra  cut  became  so 
formidable  and  a  sea-level  canal  had  been  shown  there- 
by to  be  all  but  impossible.  It  is  probable  that  a  sea- 
level  canal  would  cost  around  a  billion  dollars,  and 
take  from  ten  to  twenty  years  longer  to  build,  if  engi- 
neers should  now  decide  it  practicable. 

President  Roosevelt  took  a  characteristic  step  to 
end  the  dispute.  On  June  24,  1905,  a  few  days  be- 
fore the  appointment  of  Mr.  Stevens  as  Chief  Engi- 
neer, he  named  the  following  International  Board  of 
Advisory  Engineers  to  recommend  a  type  of  canal : 

Ma  J. -Gen.  George  W.  Davis,  U.  S.  A.,  Chairman, 
Capt.  John  C.  Oakes,  U.  S.  A.,  Corps  of  Engineers, 

Secretary, 
Brig.-Gen.  Henry  L.  Abbott,  U.  S.  A.,  retired, 
Adolph     Guerard,     Inspector-General     of     Public 

Works,  France, 
Edouard  M.  Quellenec,  Consulting  Engineer,  Suez 

Canal, 
Henry    Hunter,    Engineer   of    Manchester    Canal, 

England, 

116 


STEVENS 

Herr  Eugene  Tincauser,  Engineer  on  Kiel  Canal, 

Germany, 
J.  W.  Welcker,  Engineer  Dyke  System,  Holland, 
IsHAM  Randolph,  Chief  Engineer,  Chicago  Drainage 

Canal, 
Frederick  P.  Stearns,  Hydraulic  Engineer,  Boston, 
William  H.  Burr,  Consulting  Engineer,  New  York, 
Joseph  Ripley,   Chief  Engineer,   Sault   Ste.   ]\Iarie 

Canal, 
Alfred   Noble,   Chief  of   Pennsylvania   R.   R.   Im- 
provements, N.  Y.  C, 
William  B.  Parsons,  Chief  Engineer,  Subway  Sys- 
tem, New  York. 

Out  of  this  number,  five  were  foreigners  and  the 
remainder  Americans.  The  Board  visited  the  Isth- 
mus in  October,  1905,  and  reported  to  the  President 
on  January  10,  1906.  The  majority,  composed  of 
eight  engineers,  and  comprising  all  of  the  foreigners, 
recommended  a  sea-level  canal.  Messrs.  Davis,  Burr, 
and  Parsons  were  the  three  Americans  who  signed 
the  majority  report.  The  minority  of  five  Americans 
recommended  a  lock-type  canal  with  a  lake  at  85  feet 
above  sea-level  formed  by  a  dam  across  the  Chagres 
River  at  Gatun.  They  estimated  the  excavation  at 
103.795,000  cubic  yards,  and  the  cost,  exclusive  of 
sanitation  and  civil  government,  at  $139,705,200. 
Nine  years,  or  until  191 5,  was  the  time  estimated  for 
completing  the  canal.  There  were  to  be  three  locks 
in  flight  at  Gatun,  each  95  by  900  feet  usable  dimen- 
sions,  and   on   the   Pacific  side,   one   lock   at   Pedro 

117 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

Miguel,  and  two  at  La  Boca,  at  the  entrance,  the  dis- 
tance between  Pedro  Miguel  and  La  Boca,  8  miles, 
to  be  a  second  artificial  lake.  The  Culebra  cut  was  to 
be  200  feet  wide  for  5  miles  and  300  feet  wide  for  4 
miles. 

Chief  Engineer  Stevens  and  all  but  one  member 
of  the  Commission  concurred  in  the  minority  report. 
Secretary  Taft's  visits  to  the  Isthmus  had  converted 
him  to  the  lock  type,  and  President  Roosevelt  con- 
sistently had  favored  it. 

The  situation  was  one  where  the  choice  would  be 
decided  by  the  weight  the  President  should  throw  to 
either  report.  To  reject  the  majority  report  favoring 
a  sea-level  canal,  and  to  advocate  the  minority  report 
for  a  lock-type  canal,  was  a  responsibility  of  unusual 
magnitude  for  an  Executive  who  professed  to  have 
no  technical  engineering  knowledge.  Yet  President 
Roosevelt  made  the  momentous  decision  without  hesi- 
tation, sending  a  strong  message  recommending  the 
minority  report.  It  was,  perhaps,  the  greatest  crisis 
in  the  history  of  the  project,  and  the  American  peo- 
ple have  to  thank  his  sound  judgment  in  preventing  a 
sea-level  experiment  that,  undoubtedly,  in  the  light  of 
recent  years,  would  have  exhausted  the  patience  and 
maybe  the  finances  of  the  nation. 

Congress  debated  the  issue  until  June  21st,  when 
the  Senate  by  the  close  vote  of  36  to  31  decided  for 
a  lock  type,  and  on  June  28th,  the  House  concurred, 
the  bill  becoming  law  on  June  29,  1906.  The  sea- 
level  advocates  were  beaten,  but  they  watched  opera- 
tions sullenly  and   flared  up  into  hot  criticism   fre- 

118 


STEVENS 

quently,  with  dismal  prophecies  of  the  impending- 
collapse  of  the  lock  canal. 

Of  the  three  Chief  Engineers  who  have  directed 
the  construction  of  the  canal,  Mr.  Wallace  alone  fa- 
vored the  sea-level  plan.  He  uniformly  opposed  a 
dam  at  Gatun,  expressing  the  opinion  that  there  was 
not  a  foundation  at  that  point  for  so  heavy  a  struc- 
ture, nor  did  he  believe  from  his  investigations  that 
the  earth  there  would  support  the  great  locks  contem- 
plated in  the  minority  report.  Any  type  of  canal,  he 
reasoned,  which  would  require  years  to  repair  a  break 
was  inadvisable,  and  even  a  lock  type  should  be  con- 
vertible to  a  sea-level  canal,  if  such  action  should 
appear  desirable.  Messrs.  Stevens  and  Goethals  were 
equally  unwavering  in  their  advocacy  of  a  lock  canal. 

Two  years  and  two  months  had  passed  from  the 
time  the  Americans  came  to  Panama,  in  May,  1904, 
to  July  I,  1906,  before  this  decision  was  made,  and 
at  last  the  Commission  knew  what  plan  of  canal  was 
to  be  followed.  In  September,  1906,  Mr.  Stevens 
started  the  excavations  in  the  sites  for  the  Gatun 
locks,  the  Pedro  Miguel  lock,  and  the  Gatun  Dam 
Spillway.  Surveys  were  begun  for  relocating  the  Pan- 
ama Railroad  w^hich,  for  a  considerable  distance, 
would  be  swallowed  up  by  the  completed  canal.  The 
fifteen  months'  preparatory  work  was  beginning  to 
tell  in  the  increased  excavations  in  the  Culebra  cut  as 
the  organization  was  getting  its  stride.  Commissaries, 
W'hich  sold  everything  the  canal  employee  needed, 
were  in  operation  in  the  principal  towns,  the  hotels 
for  the  bachelors  were  well  organized,  Cjuarters  had 

119 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

been  erected  until  all  were  housed,  though  at  times 
rather  crowded,  machinery,  supplies,  and  equipment 
were  on  hand,  or  ordered,  to  the  extent  of  80  per  cent 
of  what  would  be  needed  to  complete  the  canal,  health 
conditions  were  admirable,  and  the  whole  situation 
was  shaping  for  the  real  work  of  building  the  canal. 

President  Roosevelt  paid  the  Canal  Zone  a  visit  in 
November,  1906.  It  was  a  trip  of  exploration  for 
him,  and  the  way  he  ignored  the  formal  plans  for  his 
entertainment  delighted  the  employees.  Subordinate 
officials  were  rather  anxious  that  he  should  inspect 
just  the  things  they  had  spick  and  span  for  him  to  in- 
spect, but  from  the  time  he  landed  at  Colon,  where 
he  jumped  on  a  horse  instead  of  into  a  waiting  car- 
riage and  rode  down  the  unpaved  side  streets,  noting 
the  mud  and  unfinished  improvements,  until  he  ate 
in  the  line  hotels  with  the  dirt-covered  employees, 
inspected  the  kitchens  and  quarters,  and  had  nosed  in 
and  out  of  every  part  of  the  canal,  he  led  them  a 
merry  chase.  The  enthusiasm  for  the  "  daddy  "  of 
the  project  was  boundless,  and  the  shortcomings  he 
noted  resulted  in  better  conditions  of  employment  for 
the  men. 

One  evidence  of  the  growing  luxury  of  living  con- 
ditions in  the  Canal  Zone  was  the  installation  on  Jan- 
uary I,  1907,  of  electric  lights  in  the  quarters  of  the 
married  and  bachelor  employees  at  Empire  and  Cu- 
lebra.  Other  towns  soon  were  furnished  with  elec- 
tricity. The  first  public  school  had  been  opened  a 
year  before  this  event,  or  on  January  2,  1906.  Gov. 
Magoon,  on  September  25,  1906,  had  been  transferred 

120 


STEVENS 

to  Cuba  by  the  President,  occasioning  the  first  break 
in  the  Shonts  Commission.  The  summer  and  fall  of 
1906  and  the  winter  of  1907  saw  another  great  con- 
troversy raging  around  the  canal,  which,  like  the  bat- 
tle of  the  levels,  was  to  be  decided  arbitrarily  by 
President  Roosevelt. 

The  Contract  Plan 

Chairman  Shonts  long  had  entertained  the  opinion 
that  the  canal  should  be  constructed  by  private  con- 
tractors. He  pressed  the  plan  so  vigorously,  and  the 
popular  opinion  of  the  inefficiency  of  the  government 
was  so  strong,  that  the  President  authorized  Secretary 
Taft  to  ask  for  bids  on  October  9,  1906. 

By  this  time  conditions  had  so  improved  in  the 
Canal  Zone  that  the  employees  viewed  the  assumption 
of  control  by  contractors  as  likely  to  militate  against 
their  interests.  Mr.  Stevens  was  making  admirable 
headway,  both  in  the  creation  of  an  effective  organi- 
zation and  the  physical  equipment  to  do  the  actual 
work  of  construction.  He  had  little  enough  patience 
with  governmental  methods,  but  on  the  point  of  secur- 
ing competent  workers,  which  Mr.  Shonts  seemed  to 
think  the  government  could  not  do  so  speedily  and 
well  as  a  contractor,  Mr.  Stevens  said  in  his  report 
of  1905:  "The  very  liberal  and  wise  policy  which 
the  Commission  is  carrying  out  in  its  care  of  its  em- 
ployees and  in  its  treatment  of  them  in  every  way 
must,  after  patient  and  careful  selection,  result  in  a 
personnel  entirely  capable  of  producing  good  results." 

The  plan  Mr.  Shonts  advanced  for  turning  the  job 
121 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

over  to  a  private  contractor,  left  in  the  hands  of  the 
government  the  last  word  on  every  vital  question 
that  might  arise.  Viewed  to-day,  the  terms  of  the 
invitation  for  bids  seem  to  have  been  drawn  with  so 
much  rigidity  as  completely  to  have  robbed  any  con- 
tractor of  the  very  flexibility  of  action  which  appeared 
to  be  the  main  drawback  of  a  government  enterprise. 
The  government  was  to  decide  upon  the  cost  and 
plans  and  the  contractor  was  to  receive  a  percentage 
of  that  amount  for  his  services.  Civil  government  and 
sanitation  were  to  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  gov- 
ernment. 

It  is  safe  to  assume  that  had  the  plan  been  adopted, 
it  would  have  broken  down  in  less  than  three  months, 
because  the  contractor  either  would  have  settled  to  the 
mere  foremanship  of  the  job,  with  the  government 
engineers  the  court  of  last  resort  on  all  issues,  or 
he  would  have  asserted  an  independence  of  judgment 
and  action  which  the  terms  of  the  contract  did  not 
permit.  Either  result  would  have  been  disastrous  to 
the  canal  project. 

Those  who  favored  the  contract  plan  had  some  con- 
siderations which  were  potent  with  them,  but  which 
they  did  not  shout  from  the  housetops.  They  knew 
that  the  terms  of  the  contract  on  which  bids  were 
invited  practically  reduced  the  contractor  to  the  posi- 
tion of  superintendent,  but  by  nominally  placing  the 
work  in  his  hands  they  would  get  the  private  contrac- 
tor's freedom  of  action  as  to  hours  of  work,  standard 
of  wages,  fitness  of  employees,  and  cheapness  of  mar- 
kets  for  materials.     In  other  words,  so  long  as  the 

122 


STEVENS 

government  itself  built  the  canal,  the  eight-hour  day, 
civil-service  regulations,  and  the  whole  web  of  official 
procedure  that  enveloped  the  undertaking,  would  be 
operative.  The  contract  plan  offered  a  neat  way  of 
sidestepping  these  cumbersome  conditions  of  doing 
business. 

Mr.  Wallace  heartily  favored  the  contract  plan,  ex- 
pressing his  belief  in  "  the  utter  impossibility  of  the 
United  States  Government  carrying  on  a  constructive 
enterprise  in  a  common  sense,  businesslike  manner." 
Whatever  his  attitude  at  first,  toward  the  last  Mr. 
Stevens  opposed  the  contract  plan,  as  he  believed  that 
the  work  he  had  done  in  the  Canal  Zone  was  efficient, 
and  if  a  little  relaxation  in  red  tape  was  indulged,  the 
canal  could  be  built  more  advantageously  by  the  Gov- 
ernment. 

Bids  for  constructing  the  canal  by  private  contract 
were  opened  at  Washington  on  January  12,  1907,  and 
rejected  on  the  ground  that  they  failed  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  the  government.  The  Oliver-Bangs 
syndicate  was  nearest  in  its  bid  to  the  specifications. 
The  real  reason  for  rejecting  the  bids  was  that  both 
the  country  and  the  administration  had  undergone  a 
change  of  heart  as  to  the  wisdom  of  the  contract  plan. 

Another  epoch  in  the  life  of  the  canal  project  was 
marked  by  the  President's  action  in  definitely  commit- 
ting the  enterprise  to  direct  government  supervision. 
Chairman  Shonts  resigned,  effective  March  4,  1907. 
An  executive  order  then  consolidated  the  offices  of 
Chairman  and  Chief  Engineer  in  Mr.  Stevens.  On 
March  i6th  the  remainder  of  the  Commission,  except 

123 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

Col.  Gorgas,  resigned,  to  be  followed  on  April  1st  by 
the  resignation  of  Chief  Engineer  Stevens.  His  res- 
ignation came  like  a  sickening  accident  to  the  canal 
employees.  "  The  Chief,"  as  he  was  called  familiarly, 
had  established  himself  firmly  in  their  minds  and 
hearts  as  a  thoroughly  competent  engineer  and  just 
administrator.  No  official  explanation  of  the  motive 
for  his  quitting  had  been  made,  but  the  general  un- 
derstanding is  that  he  opposed  the  assignment  of  gov- 
ernment engineers  to  the  Commission  as  likely  to 
create  friction  w^ith  civilian  engineers  and  partly  to 
a  stiff  communication  he  sent  the  President  on  the 
limitations  of  red  tape  and  governmental  methods  gen- 
erally. His  departure  was  featured  by  a  remarkable 
demonstration  at  Colon,  when  he  was  presented  with 
a  gold  watch,  a  diamond  ring,  and  a  silver  service  by 
the  employees,  who  did  not  restrain  their  emotion  at 
his  loss. 

Mr.  Stevens  was  not  soured  by  the  termination  of 
his  services  as  Chief  Engineer.  His  faith  in  the  ulti- 
mate success  of  the  project  has  remained  unshaken, 
and  in  the  Engineering  Netvs  of  December  31,  1908, 
a  year  and  three  quarters  after  his  resignation,  he 
wrote  that  the  public  criticism  of  the  locks  and  dams 
was  erroneous,  and  advised  that  Col.  Goethals  be 
backed  up  in  his  admirable  efforts.  The  greatest 
tribute  to  his  work  as  Chief  Engineer  is  found  in  the 
fact  that  the  organization  of  employees  was  so  thor- 
ough and  the  foundational  work  so  well  done  that  the 
enterprise  was  not  harmed  by  a  change  in  managing 
directors. 

124 


CHAPTER    XIII 

THE    CANAL   UNDER   GOETHALS 

PRESIDENT  ROOSEVELT  had  at  last  found 
public  sentiment  educated  to  the  point  where  the 
canal  could  be  put  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  gov- 
ernment engineers,  following  the  untimely  resigna- 
tion of  Mr.  Wallace,  the  belief  that  private  interests 
were  seeking  to  grab  the  project,  and  the  loss  of  Mr. 
Stevens.  It  had  taken  three  years  to  reach  this  atti- 
tude. The  personnel  of  the  third  Commission  he  ap- 
pointed, on  April  i,  1907,  was  as  follows: 

Lieut. -Col.  George  W.   Goethals,   Chairman  and 

Chief  Engineer, 
Maj.  D.  D.  Gaillard,  U.  S.  A., 
Maj.  William  L.  Sibert,  U.  S.  A., 
Mr.  H.  H.  Rousseau,  U.  S.  N., 
Col.  W.  C.  Gorgas,  U.  S.  A.,  Medical  Corps, 
Mr.  J.  C.  S.  Blackburn, 
Mr.  Jackson  Smith, 
Mr.  Joseph  Bucklin  Bishop,  Secretary. 

The  President  also  took  advantage  of  the  reorgan- 
ization of  the  Commission  to  further  consolidate 
power  in  the  Chairman.  Not  only  was  Col.  Goethals 
made  Chairman  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission, 
and  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Panama  Canal,  but  the 
executive  power  in  the  Canal  Zone,   formerly  exer- 

125 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

cised  by  the  Governor,  was  vested  in  him,  as  well  as 
the  Presidency  of  the  Panama  Railroad  Company, 
thus  making  every  official  and  employee,  and  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Commission,  subordinate  to  him. 

In  former  years  the  Governor  had  exercised  exten- 
sive and  supreme  powers  within  his  sphere,  ranking 
higher  than  the  Chief  Engineer.  Where  the  Chair- 
man, Chief  Engineer,  and  Governor  had  rival  powers, 
friction  was  sure  to  develop,  and  did  so  develop. 
Under  the  new  order  the  Governor  was  reduced  to 
the  title  of  Head  of  the  Department  of  Civil  Admin- 
istration, reporting  to  the  Chairman,  as  did  the  Chief 
Sanitary  Officer  and  Division  Engineers.  Thus  the 
former  concentration  of  the  power  of  a  Commission 
of  seven  members  into  an  Executive  Committee  of 
three,  was  still  further  concentrated  into  one  man 
and  so  gave  Col.  Goethals  the  absolute  authority  he 
ever  since  has  exercised  in  the  Canal  Zone,  acknowl- 
edging only  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  President 
as  his  superiors. 

Mr.  Jackson  Smith's  appointment  to  the  Commis- 
sion is  the  only  instance  of  a  civilian  coming  to  the 
Canal  Zone  as  an  employee  and  attaining  to  the  posi- 
tion of  Commissioner.  He  had  shown  such  remark- 
able ability  as  the  head  of  the  Bureau  of  Labor,  Quar- 
ters, and  Subsistence,  in  recruiting  workers,  housing 
them  and  supplying  them  with  food,  that  his  services 
were  recognized  by  elevation  to  the  Commission.  Mr. 
Blackburn,  of  Kentucky,  was  the  head  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Civil  Administration,  and  Mr.  Bishop  was  to 
edit  a  weekly  Canal  Record,  the  official  Commission 

126 


GOETHALS 

publication,  the  first  issue  of  which  appeared  on  Sep- 
tember 4,  1907^  and  every  Wednesday  since.  Five 
of  the  new  Commissioners  and  the  Secretary  have 
been  on  the  job  continuously  from  that  day  to  this, 
the  changes  coming  in  the  other  two  members  on  Sep- 
tember 14,  1908,  when  Mr.  Smith  resigned  and  was 
succeeded  by  Lieut.-Col.  H.  F.  Hodges,  and  Mr. 
Blackburn  being  succeeded  by  Mr.  Maurice  H. 
Thatcher,  on  April  12,  1910. 

Col.  Goethals  appreciated  the  feeling  the  employees 
had  over  the  prospect  of  army  engineers  for  directors 
of  the  enterprise,  and  in  his  first  speech  in  the  Canal 
Zone  dispelled  the  idea  of  militarism  in  the  canal  man- 
agement. He  promised  a  fair  hearing  to  every  man 
with  a  grievance,  the  manner  in  which  he  carried  out 
this  promise  being  one  of  the  distinctively  great  qual- 
ities he  later  revealed  as  an  administrator.  Few  per- 
sons in  the  Canal  Zone  had  heard  of  Col.  Goethals 
before  his  appointment  as  Chief  Engineer.  He  had  vis- 
ited the  Isthmus  in  1905  to  study  it  with  a  view  of 
recommending  plans  for  fortifications,  but  the  em- 
ployees who  had  been  with  the  job  then  scarcely  w^ere 
impressed  by  his  presence.  Yet,  his  previous  experi- 
ence had  qualified  him  ideally  for  the  important  work 
now^  in  hand.  He  had  been  building  locks  and  dams, 
had  been  Chief  of  Engineers  in  the  Spanish-Amer- 
ican War,  w-as  a  graduate  of  and  had  taught  in  West 
Point,  and  had  seen  other  construction  experience  that 
made  him  at  home  in  any  kind  of  work  the  canal 
should  require.  Messrs.  Stevens  and  Wallace  lacked 
his  knowledge  of  lock  building,  and  they  lacked  the 

127 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

military  point  of  view  which  was  to  become  essential 
in  directing  the  fortification  work,  and  the  general 
policy  of  treating  the  Canal  Zone  as  a  military  reser- 
vation, even  though  the  project  is  neutral  and  open  to 
the  nations  of  the  world. 

Looking  back  from  this  perspective  of  years  it 
seems  fortuitous  that  the  canal  has  had  the  impress 
of  both  civilian  and  army  engineers.  When  Mr. 
Stevens  left,  the  enterprise  was  ready  for  just  the 
treatment  it  has  received  under  Col.  Goethals,  which 
is,  that  we  are  not  investing  $375,000,000  as  a  mere 
adjunct  to  commerce,  but  as  a  means  of  national  de- 
fense vitally  necessary.  The  military  coloring  Col. 
Goethals  has  given  the  canal  will  not  impair  its  util- 
ity in  the  world's  trade,  yet  it  will  keep  it  ready  for 
the  emergencies  of  war  in  a  manner  that  the  civilian 
view  point  hardly  could  have  been  expected  to  pro- 
duce. 

Contrast,  for  a  moment,  the  situation  as  faced  by 
Col.  Goethals  with  that  faced  by  Mr.  Stevens  in  1905. 
In  1907,  fire  was  under  the  boiler  and  steam  was  up. 
When  Mr.  Stevens  relinquished  the  throttle,  the  army 
of  workers  had  begun  to  come  close  to  the  million 
mark  in  monthly  excavations  in  the  Culebra  cut. 
There  were  6;^  steam  shovels  at  work  on  the  canal; 
100  French  and  184  American  locomotives,  and  2.700 
cars  of  all  kinds  were  in  use ;  the  Panama  Railroad 
had  been  double-tracked  throughout,  and  the  mileage 
in  the  Culebra  cut  and  elsewhere  brought  up  to  106- 
.78  miles;  r8  Lidgerwood  unloaders,  13  bank  spread- 
ers, 33  unloading  plows,  3  track  shifters  and  7  pile 

128 


GOETHALS 

drivers  were  in  service ;  the  machine  shops  at  Gorgona 
and  Empire  were  equipped  for  any  kind  of  repair 
work  or  original  construction. 

There  were  approximately  30,000  employees,  and 
the  recruiting  agencies  in  Europe,  the  West  Indies, 
and  the  United  States  constantly  were  sending  addi- 
tions. Quarters  for  employees,  office  buildings,  and 
all  other  structures  consisted  of  2,009  buildings  of 
American  design,  and  1,536  remodeled  French  build- 
ings. The  commissary  for  supplying  food,  clothing, 
and  general  merchandise  to  employees  was  organized 
and  had  branches  in  seven  Canal  Zone  towns.  There 
were  fifteen  hotels  in  operation  for  bachelor  employees 
and  four  recreation  clubhouses  had  been  constructed, 
beside  church  and  lodge  buildings.  Twenty-four  pub- 
lic schools  afforded  educational  facilities  to  the  Canal 
Zone  children.  The  police  system,  the  courts,  post 
offices,  and  fire  departments  were  thoroughly  organ- 
ized. In  short,  the  preparatory  stage  of  the  canal  had 
passed  and  the  constructive  stage  had  begun. 

As  compared  with  the  total  excavation  required  for 
the  completed  canal,  in  round  numbers  221,000,000 
yards,  the  record  made  by  Mr.  Stevens,  in  removing 
from  the  Culebra  cut  during  the  twenty-one  months 
he  was  Chief  Engineer,  5,073,098  yards,  is  not  signifi- 
cant. The  construction  of  the  canal  distinctly  is  the 
work  of  the  Goethals  administration ;  still,  the  prepar- 
atory work  had  to  be  done  because,  as  Col.  Goethals 
himself  states: 

"  It  was  only  after  these  various  yet  necessary  ad- 
juncts had  been  provided  and  the   forces   for  their 

129 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

operation  were  organized  that  the  principal  work  in 
hand — the  building  of  the  canal — could  be  pushed 
forward  with  any  hope  of  success,  and  too  much 
praise  cannot  be  given  those  who  conceived  and  es- 
tablished them  in  a  working  condition." 

Necessarily,  all  the  basic  work  accomplished  under 
Wallace  and  Stevens  is  lost  sight  of  in  view  of  the 
magnificent  superstructure  erected  under  Col.  Goeth- 
als.  The  modern  sightseer  has  nothing  to  remind 
him  of  the  wretched  conditions  of  the  first  two  years, 
the  battle  with  disease,  the  arduous  labor  of  creating 
in  the  jungle  a  duplicate  American  civilization,  the 
tantalizing  struggle  with  government  red  tape  before 
a  stick  of  timber,  a  pound  of  iron,  a  shipment  of  food, 
or  an  efficient  workman  could  be  secured. 

The  first  vivid  impression  to-day  upon  the  tourist 
viewing  the  colossal  locks  and  the  artificial  canyon 
called  the  Culebra  cut,  the  beautiful  towns,  and  the 
whole  paraphernalia  of  a  well-ordered  civil  govern- 
ment is  similar  to  that  experienced  upon  the  first 
sight  of  Niagara  Falls,  with  this  exception :  The  Pan- 
ama Canal  is  the  work  of  man,  and  the  responsibility 
for  it  may  be  fixed.  An  outburst  of  praise  is  the 
spontaneous  result,  and  Col.  Goethals,  being  the  vis- 
ible head  of  the  project,  naturally  bears  the  brunt  of 
this  admiration.  Yet,  excluding  the  construction 
w^ork,  all  the  collective  activities,  such  as  feeding  and 
housing  and  providing  for  the  needs  of  the  army  of 
employees,  as  well  as  the  whole  civil  government,  was 
the  work  of  the  Stevens  and  Wallace  administrations. 

130 


Copyright  hy  Harris  d  Eiring. 

Col.  George  W.  Goethals. 


GOETHALS 

Col.  Goethals  simply  has  enlarged  the  organizations 
they  left. 

Perhaps  the  chief  reason  that  Col.  Goethals  so  gen- 
erally is  accepted  as  the  sole  genius  of  the  canal  is 
found  in  the  fact  that  he  stuck  to  the  job  which  two 
others  had  abandoned.  Justice,  however,  is  not 
wholly  served  by  this  consideration.  A  simile  may 
be  found  in  the  task  of  breaking  a  broncho.  The  canal 
job  threw  both  Wallace  and  Stevens  and  then  Goeth- 
als stuck  in  the  saddle.  But  the  energy  that  the 
broncho  spent  to  dismount  the  first  two  riders  so 
weakened  him  that  by  the  time  the  third  was  in  the 
saddle  he  was  conquerable.  The  third  rider  may  have 
been  no  better  than  the  two  who  were  thrown,  and 
their  efforts  undoubtedly  paved  the  way  for  his  suc- 
cess. 

Col.  Goethals  deserves  the  admiration  that  his  serv- 
ice on  the  canal  has  evoked,  but  the  generality  of 
writers,  looking  at  what  exists  to-day  and  heedless 
of  the  beginnings  of  the  task,  lose  their  perspective 
and  commonly  fall  into  the  error  of  ignoring  the  very 
remarkable  and  wholly  vital  preparatory  work  under 
John  F.  Stevens.  This  writer  believes  that  if  Col. 
Goethals  had  been  selected  in  1904,  there  only  would 
have  been  one  Chief  Engineer  of  the  canal,  barring 
his  death,  so  eminent  are  the  abilities  of  the  army 
engineer,  but  candor  requires  the  statement  that  he 
assumed  control  at  a  time  when  conditions  were  soft 
as  compared  with  the  early  stages  of  the  project. 

President  Roosevelt  had  selected  in  Messrs.  Gail- 
lard,  Sibert,  Rousseau,  and  later,  Hodges,  engineers 

131 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

of  exceptional  ability,  who,  with  S.  B.  Williamson, 
picked  by  Col.  Goethals,  demonstrated  capacities  which 
in  a  large  measure  account  for  the  splendid  progress 
of  the  Goethals  administration.  Any  one  of  them 
would  have  been  available  for  the  highest  position  in 
the  organization. 

It  would  be  erroneous  to  assume  that  Col.  Goethals 
had  nothing  to  do  but  sit  back  and  watch  the  signals 
on  the  main  line  of  canal  construction,  as  indicated  by 
his  predecessors.  The  decks,  indeed,  had  been  cleared 
for  action  and  the  blue-prints  nicely  finished  and 
tied  with  ribbon,  but  the  real  struggle  was  just  begin- 
ning. He  had  the  tools  for  the  job  placed  in  his 
hands,  but  their  skillful  use  devolved  entirely  upon 
him.  Besides,  changes  were  made  in  the  original  plans 
and  unanticipated  problems  arose,  which  made  Col. 
Goethals'  direction  of  the  enterprise  in  the  highest 
degree  complex  and  exceptional. 

The  first  annual  report  of  the  Commission,  to  be 
written  as  of  June  30th,  the  end  of  the  government's 
fiscal  year,  was  issued  by  Col.  Goethals  in  1907,  three 
months  after  Mr.  Stevens  resigned.  The  President 
had  asked  Col.  Goethals  to  report  on  the  contract  plan 
after  an  inspection  of  the  canal,  and  this  masterly 
argument  against  turning  it  over  to  private  contractors 
is  the  report's  most  notable  feature,  aside  from  its 
unusual  comprehensiveness.  Incidentally,  the  argu- 
ment is  a  high  tribute  to  the  work  of  Mr.  Stevens. 

Col.  Goethals  pointed  out  that  the  canal  required 
special  equipment  which  would  be  useless  to  a  con- 
tractor after  its  completion,  and  therefore  could  be 

132 


GOETHALS 

bought  just  as  cheaply  by  the  government;  that  the 
government  had  had  more  experience  in  lock  build- 
ing than  any  contractor,  and  had  had  sufficient  ex- 
perience in  dredging  and  excavating  to  insure  econ- 
omy. When  the  profits  a  contractor  would  make 
were  deducted,  the  government  could  equal  his  effi- 
ciency. He  pointed  to  the  Congressional  Library  at 
Washington  as  an  example  of  work  done  satisfactor- 
ily by  the  government.  No  contractor  had  an  organ- 
ization that  could  cover  all  phases  of  the  canal,  and 
the  government  already  had  as  good  an  organization 
as  any  contractor  could  get.  The  French  had  tried  the 
contract  system,  antagonizing  labor  thereby,  and  Italy 
already  had  served  notice  that  its  citizens  could  not 
work  in  the  Canal  Zone  if  the  government  abandoned 
the  job.  Finally,  endless  friction  between  government 
inspectors  and  the  contractor  would  result,  and  on  the 
side  of  civil  government  and  sanitation  the  contractor 
could  not  possibly  equal  the  efficiency  of  the  govern- 
ment. 

Taking  a  survey  of  the  conditions  when  he  took 
charge.  Col.  Goethals  found  that  80  per  cent  of  the 
plant  for  finishing  the  canal  was  on  the  ground  or  or- 
dered. The  preliminary  work  for  relocating  the  Pan- 
ama Railroad  had  been  done,  and  actual  construction 
of  the  new  line  was  begun  in  June,  1907,  shortly  after 
his  arrival.  Excavations  in  the  lock  sites  were  un- 
completed, and  it  was  two  years  later,  in  1909.  be- 
fore any  concrete  was  laid.  In  April,  the  month  he 
arrived,  nearly  900,000  yards  were  removed  from  the 
Culebra  cut,  the  best  month's  work  to  that  date.    By 

133 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

December,  1907,  the  million  mark  for  the  Cut  was 
passed  and  never  has  been  lowered  except  for  one 
month,  May,  1908.  Dredging  in  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  entrances  of  the  canal  had  gone  ahead  stead- 
ily, though  not  extensively,  the  amount  removed  in  the 
Atlantic  entrance  being  1,732,712  yards,  and  in  the 
Pacific  entrance,  1,956,895  yards,  from  1904  to  April 
I,  1907.  Less  than  6,000,000  yards  had  been  removed 
from  the  Culebra  cut  by  both  Wallace  and  Stevens. 

In  August,  four  months  after  Col.  Goethals  ar- 
rived, the  organization  in  the  department  of  construc- 
tion and  engineering  had  developed  such  a  momentum 
that  it  was  necessary  to  ask  authority  from  the  Presi- 
dent to  exceed  the  regular  appropriation  by  $8,000,- 
000  for  the  fiscal  year  to  end  in  June,  1908.  This  is 
additional  evidence  of  the  efficiency  of  the  prepara- 
tory work  under  Mr.  Stevens. 

The  fall  of  1907  and  the  month  of  October  pre- 
sented a  new  problem  in  the  canal  construction  which 
ever  since  has  been  one  of  the  most  formidable  and 
uncertain  factors  in  the  project.  A  slide  began  at 
Cucaracha  on  the  east  side  of  the  Cut  near  the  town 
of  Culebra  and  suddenly  filled  the  Cut,  closing  it  for 
transportation.  In  1884,  the  French  had  noted  this 
earth  movement,  and  during  Col.  Goethals'  first  years 
on  the  canal  it  involved  an  area  of  forty-seven  acres. 
Before  dirt  trains  could  move  through  the  Cut,  steam 
shovels  had  to  work  night  and  day  for  several  weeks, 
and  from  that  time  onward  the  slides  have  been  the 
bugbear  of  the  organization,  not  because  they  were 
insuperable,  but  from  the  extra  work  they  involved 

134 


GOETHALS 

and  the  possibility  that  they  might  delay  the  comple- 
tion of  the  project.  In  the  closing  days  the  slides  are 
still  the  unknown  factor. 

Right  then  it  was  realized  that  the  canal  involved 
more  excavation  than  the  minority  of  the  Board  of 
Advisory  Engineers  had  estimated.  Several  impor- 
tant changes  in  the  plans  for  the  canal  came  within 
the  first  eighteen  months  of  the  Goethals  adminis- 
tration to  make  the  job  far  more  stupendous  than 
contemplated  in  the  plans  of  1906.  Col.  Goethals  rec- 
ommended, and  President  Roosevelt  approved  on  De- 
cember 20,  1907,  a  change  in  the  location  of  two  of 
the  Pacific  locks.  The  revised  plans  changed  two 
locks  from  La  Boca,  on  the  Pacific  coast,  to  Mira- 
flores,  about  seven  miles  inland,  which  not  only  would 
make  them  safe  from  bombardment,  but  was  a  more 
practicable  engineering  plan.  A  mile  and  a  half  far- 
ther inland  were  the  Pedro  Miguel  locks,  which  would 
raise  ships  the  final  height  to  the  great  Gatun  Lake, 
at  its  Pacific  terminal,  and  between  the  Pedro  Miguel 
and  Miraflores  locks  was  a  small  artificial  lake.  From 
Miraflores  to  the  Pacific,  a  sea-level  channel  500  feet 
wide  was  to  be  dug. 

Another  change  in  the  plans  was  approved  by  the 
President  on  recommendations  by  the  Navy  Board, 
on  January  15,  1908.  The  locks  were  ordered  en- 
larged from  95  by  900  feet  to  no  by  1,000  feet, 
usable  dimensions,  to  meet  the  anticipated  increase 
in  the  size  of  commercial  and  war  vessels.  Col. 
Goethals  did  not  think  a  width  of  no  feet  necessary, 
favoring   100  feet  width,  but  his  judgment  in  this 

135 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

instance  has  proved  to  be  wrong,  as  the  latest  Argen- 
tine battleship  is  98  feet  wide,  leaving  only  12  feet 
surplus  in  the  width  of  the  locks,  at  no  feet.  The 
Pennsylvania  of  our  Navy  will  be  97  feet  wide,  leav- 
ing 13  feet,  or  6^  feet  on  each  side  of  the  ship  in  the 
locks.  The  Imperator,  the  latest  giant  of  the  Ham- 
burg-American fleet,  is  96  feet  wide  and  900  feet  long, 
so  that  it  appears  that  the  locks  may  become  too  nar- 
row before  they  become  too  short.  The  cost  of  the 
locks  was  increased  $5,000,000  by  the  change  in  plans. 
A  third  vital  change  in  the  original  plans  came  on 
October  23,  1908,  when  the  President  authorized  the 
widening  of  the  Culebra  cut  for  five  miles  from  200 
feet  to  300  feet  at  the  bottom.  This  would  enable 
ships  to  pass  going  in  opposite  directions  anywhere 
in  the  Cut,  and  increased  the  cost  of  this  part  of  the 
canal  by  $14,000,000.  Since  these  three  important 
changes  there  have  been  no  substantial  changes  in  the 
canal  plans,  except  the  decrease  in  the  proposed  height 
of  the  huge  Gatun  dam.  Additional  excavation  to  the 
extent  of  70,871,594  cubic  yards  was  necessitated 
by  the  new  plans  over  the  estimate  of  103.795,000 
yards  made  in  1906,  or  a  total  of  174,666.594  yards 
for  the  completed  canal.  But  slides  that  later  devel- 
oped, and  further  changes  in  the  plans  since  1908 
have  added  47,000,000  yards  to  that  total,  bringing  it 
up  to  221,000,000  yards.  Thus  Col.  Goethals  has  had 
to  dig  more  than  twice  as  much  dirt  as  Mr.  Stevens 
expected  to  take  out,  and  is  doing  it  in  less  time  than 
was  estimated  for  the  original  yardage !  The  original 
canal  of  103,795,000  yards  was  dug  by  the  Americans 

136 


GOETHALS 

by  April  6,  1910,  six  years  after  work  began,  and  two 
years  and  a  half  of  that  time  had  been  spent  in  pre- 
paratory work. 

Basing  his  figures  on  the  revised  plans,  Col.  Goeth- 
als  in  1908  issued  the  following  estimate  of  the  cost 
of  the  Panama  Canal : 

Atlantic  Division — 7  Miles 

Breakwater  in  Limon  Bay $11,432,000 

From  Caribbean  Sea,  channel  to  Ga- 

tun   Locks 17,736,000 

Gatun  Locks,  three  twin  locks 25,824,000 

Gatun  Dam 13,572,000 

$68,564,000 

Central  Division — 32  Miles 

Channel    from    Gatun    Locks    to    Bas 

Obispo  $7,977,000 

Culebra  Cut,  Nine  Miles,  Bas  Obispo 

to  Pedro  Miguel  Lock 80,481,000 

$88,458,000 

Pacific  Division — 8  Miles 

Pedro  Miguel  Lock $12,693,000 

Pedro  Miguel  Dam 251,000 

Miraflores  Locks 19,715,000 

Miraflores   Dam 2,156,000 

Channel,  Pedro  Miguel  to  Pacific. . . .  13,170,000 

$47,985,000 
137 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

New   Panama  Railroad $8,164,000 

Land  Damages 500,000 

General  Items 

Municipal   Improvements $12,1 14,000 

Buildings 14,651,000 

General   Expenses,    Salaries,    Subsist- 
ence, etc 23,730,000 

Loans  to  P.  R.  R 8,300,000 

Contingencies   20,000,000 

Lighthouses,   Ships,   Wharves 3,850,000 

Double-tracking,  Land  and  Stock  Pur- 
chases      1,450,000 

$84,095,000 
Grand  Total  Cost  of  Construction.  .   $297,766,000 

All  Other  Items 

Sanitation   $20,053,000 

Civil  Administration   7,382,000 

Paid  for  French  Property 40,000,000 

Paid  for  Canal  Zone 10,000,000 

$77435-000 
Total  Cost  for  Completed  Canal. . .     $375,201,000 

Beginning  July  i,  1908,  Col.  Goethals  initiated 
changes  in  the  organization,  which  was  to  be  the  final 
one  for  the  canal.  The  Department  of  Engineering 
and  Construction  was  divided  into  three  grand  divi- 

138 


GOETHALS 

sions,  to  be  known  as  the  Atlantic,  Central,  and  Pa- 
cific. The  Atlantic  division  comprised  that  part  of 
the  canal  which  extended  from  deep  water  in  the 
Caribbean  Sea  to,  and  including,  the  Gatun  locks  and 
dam,  about  seven  miles  of  the  canal.  The  Cen- 
tral division  comprised  the  channel  through  the  Cha- 
gres  River  valley  from  the  Gatun  Locks  to  Bas 
Obispo,  where  the  Culebra  cut  began,  and  for  nine 
miles  through  the  continental  divide  to  the  Pedro 
Miguel  Lock,  about  thirty-two  miles  of  the  canal.  The 
Pacific  division  comprised  the  Pedro  Miguel  Lock 
and  Dam,  the  short  channel  to  the  Miraflores  Locks 
and  Dam,  and  including  those  features,  and  the  chan- 
nel to  deep  water  in  the  Pacific,  about  eight  miles  of 
the  canal. 

Of  the  forty-seven  miles  of  the  canal  proper,  the 
Central  division  had  the  greatest  mileage,  its  construc- 
tion was  to  be  the  costliest  and  the  material  handled 
to  be  far  in  excess  of  either  of  the  other  two  divisions. 
It  is  in  the  Central  division  that  the  main  excavation 
of  the  canal  has  been  made,  as  the  mountain  chain 
had  to  be  pierced  with  a  cut,  the  bottom  of  which 
would  be  only  forty  feet  above  sea-level,  necessitating 
<^iggin&  down  from  the  highest  point  on  the  surface, 
a  depth  of  272  feet,  between  Gold  and  Contractor's 
hills.  The  French  dug  down  161  feet  at  this  point, 
but  not  so  wide  as  the  American  plans  required  so  that 
considerably  more  than  1 1 1  feet  depth  remained  for 
the  Americans  to  dig.  From  this  highest  point  the 
mountains  slope  toward  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  with 
a  consequent  lessening  of  the  depth  of  the  excavations 

139 


THE    AMERICANS    IX    PANAMA 

to  reach  the  proposed  bottom  of  the  canal.    Practically 
all  the  material  had  to  be  blasted  before  removal. 

Since  1908  the  organization  has  remained  un- 
changed as  to  the  heads  of  the  divisions  in  the  depart- 
ment of  engineering  and  construction.  As  finally 
designed  by  Col.  Goethals,  the  organization  of  the 
canal  forces  is  as  follows,  with  the  incumbents  as  of 
July  I,  1912: 

Engineering  and  Construction 

Col.  Geo.  W.  Goethals,  Chairman  and  Chief  Engi- 
neer, Culebra. 

CoL.  H.  F.  Hodges,  Assistant  Chief  Engineer,  in 
charge  of  Lock  and  Dam  construction,  Culebra. 

Civil  Engineer  H.  H.  Rousseau,  Assistant  to  the 
Chief  Engineer,  in  charge  of  mechanical  equip- 
ment and  supervision  of  expenditures  and  esti- 
mates, Culebra. 

Lieut.-Col.  D.  D.  Gaillard,  Engineer,  Central  Divi- 
sion, Empire. 

LiEUT.-CoL.  William  L.  Sibert,  Engineer,  Atlantic 
Division,  Gatun, 

S.  B.  Williamson,  Engineer,  Pacific  Division,  Coro- 
zal, 

A.  L.  Robinson,  Superintendent,  Mechanical  Division, 
Gorgona. 

All  Other  Departments 

Lieut. -CoL.  Eugene  T.  Wilson,  Subsistence  Officer, 

Cristobal, 
Col.  C.  a.  Devol,  Chief  Quartermaster,  Culebra, 

140 


GOETHALS 

Mr.  Maurice  H.  Thatcher,  Head  of  Civil  Admin- 
istration, Ancon, 
H.  A.  GuDGER,  Chief  Justice,  Ancon, 
Frank  Feuille,  Counsel  and  Chief  Attorney,  Ancon, 
Col.  W.  C.  Gorgas,  Chief  Sanitary  Officer,  Ancon, 
Edward  J.  Williams,  Disbursing  Officer,  Empire, 
H.  A.  A.  Smith,  Examiner  of  Accounts,  Empire, 
Maj.  F.  C.  Boggs,  General  Purchasing  Officer,  Wash- 
ington, D.  C, 
J.    A,    Smith,    Superintendent,    Panama    Railroad, 
Colon. 

The  headquarters  of  the  division  engineers  and  the 
department  heads  are  in  the  towns  nearest  to  the 
scenes  of  their  activities.  Beneath  the  higher  officials 
are  a  host  of  assistants  who  exercise  important  super- 
visory functions,  and  then  come  the  35,000  employees. 

How  largely  the  Army  and  Navy  have  dominated 
the  canal,  since  1907,  is  shown  by  the  foregoing  or- 
ganization, in  which  nine  out  of  seventeen  heads  of 
departments  are  from  the  government  forces.  But 
this  does  not  show  the  extent  of  this  domination, 
because  the  full  organization  of  subordinate  officials 
shows  twenty-two  additional  Army  and  Navy  men  in 
important  positions. 

The  Pacific  Division  is  the  only  one  of  the  three 
grand  divisions  with  a  civilian  engineer  in  charge,  and 
there  are  no  Army  or  Navy  men  in  this  division  from 
top  to  bottom.  The  idea  seems  to  have  been  to  pit  a 
civilian  engineer  against  the  Army  men,  who  are  in 
charge  of  the  Atlantic  and  Central  Divisions.     The 

141 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

Pacific  Division,  under  Mr.  Williamson,  substantially 
demands  the  same  engineering  ability  as  the  Atlantic 
Division  under  Lieut.-Col.  Sibert,  because  each  in- 
cludes lock  and  dam  construction  and  channel  dredg- 
ing. The  cost-keeping  accountant  has  shown  where 
the  civilian  engineer  has  done  his  work  more  cheaply 
than  the  Army  engineer,  but  the  difference  is  ac- 
counted for  in  the  physical  obstacles  that  must  be  sur- 
mounted in  the  Atlantic  Division,  in  obtaining  sand 
and  rock  for  the  locks. 

None  of  the  complaints  at  government  red  tape 
which  bristled  all  through  the  annual  reports  of 
Messrs.  Stevens  and  Wallace  may  be  noted  in  Col. 
Goethals'  reports.  The  Army  men  on  the  canal  might 
exclaim,  with  Brer  Rabbit,  that  they  were  born  and 
bred  in  the  briar  patch  of  red  tape,  and  were  just  in 
their  element  when  dropped  into  the  Big  Ditch.  Col. 
Goethals  looked  ahead  in  making  up  his  annual  esti- 
mates of  appropriations  needed  for  the  year  in  ad- 
vance, and  in  making  orders  for  equipment,  materials 
and  supplies,  so  that  much  of  the  vexation  of  the  early 
years  was  avoided.  Every  head  of  a  department  must 
hand  in  an  estimate  of  what  will  be  needed  to  run  him 
for  the  ensuing  year  and  this  plan  keeps  the  canal 
ahead  of  its  demands  in  all  lines. 

The  equanimity  with  which  Col.  Goethals  has  met 
every  unexpected  development  in  the  construction 
work  is  a  distinguishing  feature  of  the  man's  mental 
processes.  If  he  ever  has  for  one  moment  entertained 
the  shadow  of  a  doubt  of  the  success  of  the  lock-type 
canal,  he  has  not  allowed  his  fears  to  be  manifested. 

142 


GOETHALS 

The  slides,  the  sHp  in  the  Gatun  dam,  the  volcanic 
evidences  in  the  Culebra  cut,  the  cracks  in  the  lock 
walls,  earthquake  disturbances,  and  a  host  of  lesser 
troubles  have  not  shaken  his  faith.  One  can  hear  em- 
ployees and  subordinate  officials  voicing  all  kinds  of 
dark   forebodings,   but  never  the   Chief   Engineer. 

The  mammoth  Gatun  dam  had  been  begun  in  1906, 
and  by  1908  was  taking  form  under  the  constant 
dumping  of  rock  and  earth  from  the  Culebra  cut. 
On  November  20,  1908,  a  toe  of  the  great  dam  slipped, 
where  the  dam  intersected  the  old  French  canal  chan- 
nel, carrying  about  200  feet  of  the  structure  away. 
The  hostile  press,  and  those  who  had  consistently  op- 
posed a  dam  at  Gatun,  immediately  raised  a  storm  of 
criticism  against  the  stability  of  the  proposed  artificial 
mountain.  The  old  wound,  caused  from  the  battle 
of  the  levels,  was  reopened  and  so  violent  was  the  out- 
burst that  President  Roosevelt  took  a  characteristic 
step  to  quiet  the  issue. 

He  asked  President-elect  Taft  to  go  to  the  Isthmus, 
accompanied  by  Frederic  P.  Stearns,  Arthur  P.  Davis, 
Henry  A.  Allen,  James  D.  Schuyler,  Isham  Randolph, 
John  R.  Freeman  and  Allen  Hazen,  all  eminent  engi- 
neers, to  make  an  investigation.  The  report  made  on 
February  16,  1909,  completely  vindicated  the  plan  for 
a  dam  at  Gatun  with  the  statement  that  if  any  error 
had  been  made,  it  was  on  the  side  of  precaution.  They 
found  the  dam  started  along  lines  so  excessively  stable 
that  they  recommended  that  the  height  be  cut  from 
135  feet  above  sea-level  to  115  feet,  which  would  still 

143 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

leave  the  top  of  the  dam  thirty  feet  above  the  level 
of  Gatun  Lake. 

An  absolutely  free  hand  always  has  been  given  to 
critics  of  the  canal.  Having  nothing  to  conceal,  and 
with  firm  faith  in  the  technical  soundness  of  the  plans 
adopted,  the  government  has  had  nothing  it  wished 
to  keep  from  the  light.  Whenever  criticism  of  any 
feature  became  especially  severe,  President  Roosevelt 
promptly  answered  it  by  a  full  and  scientific  investiga- 
tion with  the  inevitable  result  that  the  critics  slunk 
into  silence.  Since  President  Taft  has  been  in  office 
the  canal  has  been  advanced  to  the  point  where  the 
sceptical  are  cautious  in  criticism,  and  only  some 
catastrophe  of  nature,  in  reasonable  probability,  can 
undo  the  achievement. 

The  six  years  from  January  i,  1907,  to  January  i, 
191 3,  constitute  the  main  construction  period  of  the 
Panama  Canal.  Col.  Goethals  has  been  Chief  Engi- 
neer all  but  three  months  of  that  time.  Steadily,  foot 
by  foot,  the  walls  of  the  locks  crept  up  and  the  bottom 
of  the  Culebra  cut  went  down.  By  October,  1908, 
the  preparatory  work,  substantially  accomplished  by 
Mr.  Stevens,  passed  its  highest  point,  and  all  energies 
were  centered  on  the  work  of  construction.  Quarters, 
municipal  work,  road-making,  subsistence  and  com- 
missary were  solved  problems  and  the  "  No  Help 
Wanted  "  sign  was  displayed,  the  labor  problem,  too, 
being  substantially  worked  out.  The  chief  business 
was  to  make  the  organization  more  efficient  by  antici- 
pating needs  of  equipment  and  supplies,  and  keeping 
the  morale  of  the  workers  to  a  keen  edge  through  ab- 

144 


GOETHALS 

solute  justice.  Col.  Gorgas  had  the  health  problem 
in  hand. 

Sixty-three  steam  shovels,  in  1907,  were  increased 
to  100;  the  284  locomotives  were  augmented  to  315; 
cars  of  all  kinds  from  2,700  to  4,356;  the  mileage  in 
the  Canal  Zone  was  increased  from  185  to  about  500 
miles  for  the  Panama  Railroad  and  Commission 
tracks ;  the  number  of  unloaders,  bank  spreaders,  track 
shifters  and  pile  drivers  was  increased  from  a  third  to 
three  times  the  number  left  by  Mr.  Stevens;  twenty 
dredges  were  put  in  service,  560  drills  for  blasting, 
fifty-seven  cranes,  twelve  tow  boats,  eleven  clapets, 
seventy  barges  and  lighters,  fourteen  launches,  beside 
much  other  machinery  and  equipment  not  so  note- 
worthy. The  foregoing  figures  do  not  include  the 
Panama  Railroad  equipment,  which  consists  of  seventy 
locomotives,  1,534  cars  and  coaches,  and  various  other 
rolling  stock  common  to  a  railroad.  Practically  all 
repairs  and  creative  mechanical  work  was  concentrated 
in  the  Gorgona  and  Empire  shops,  with  capacities  com- 
mensurate with  the  equipment.  The  Empire  shop 
specialized  on  steam  shovel  repairs,  but  in  July,  1912, 
the  bulk  of  its  work  was  consolidated  with  Gorgona. 
The  date  when  the  equipment  reached  a  maximum  is 
fixed  by  Col.  Goethals  as  July  i,  1910.  About  350,000 
tons  of  coal  and  500,000  barrels  of  oil  have  been  used 
annually. 

Dredging  had  progressed  in  the  Pacific  entrance  to 
a  point  where  five  miles  of  the  canal  could  be  opened 
to  navigation,  on  February  i,  1909.  The  Newport 
and  San  Hose,  of  the  Pacific  Mail  Fleet,  of  American 

145 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

register,  were  the  first  ships  to  go  through.  Consider- 
able excavating  was  done  in  both  entrances  by  steam 
shovels,  the  water  being  held  out  by  dikes. 

A  striking  instance  of  miscalculating  the  cost  of 
one  phase  of  canal  construction  is  found  in  the  esti- 
mate made  by  Prof.  Burr,  of  the  first  Commission, 
which  placed  the  cost  of  private  lands  that  would  be 
used  in  the  Gatun  Lake  and  elsewhere  at  $18,656,000. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  something  more  than  $300,000 
has  been  spent  in  this  way  and  $500,000  is  the  maxi- 
mum as  estimated  by  Col.  Goethals,  in  1908.  The  area 
of  the  Gatun  Lake  crosses  into  the  Republic  of  Pana- 
ma on  the  West  side  of  the  canal,  and  the  private 
property  so  condemned  as  well  as  in  the  Canal  Zone 
is  valued  by  a  joint  commission  of  Panamans  and 
Americans. 

Columbus  had  been  honored  by  naming  Colon  and 
Cristobal  for  him  at  the  Atlantic  entrance  of  the  canal, 
and  an  Executive  order  on  April  30,  1909,  honored 
the  discoverer  of  the  Pacific  by  changing  the  name  of 
the  Pacific  terminal  from  La  Boca  to  Balboa.  It  is 
at  Balboa  that  the  permanent  machine  shops,  dry 
docks,  yards,  wharves,  warehouses,  and  general  equip- 
ment to  cost  $20,000,000  will  be  located.  Col.  Goeth- 
als' conception  of  making  the  canal  adequate  for  all 
the  needs  of  shipping  has  a  military  utility  that  is  not 
sufficiently  recognized.  By  making  it  possible  for 
vessels  to  coal  at  the  canal,  secure  fresh  provisions,  get 
repairs  made  and  expeditiously  handle  cargoes,  the 
United  States  makes  it  unnecessary  for  any  foreign 
power  to  establish  a  coaling  station  and  similar  facili- 

146 


Photos,  1,  Harris  it  Eic'uuj,  WuNliiiujIon,  D.  C. ;  i,  i,  5,  Ctincdinst, 
Washington,  D.  C. ;  3,  Pictorial  News  Assn. 

I.  LiEUT.-CoL.  H.  F.  Hodges.  2.  H.  H.  Rousseau,  U.  S.  N. 
3.  S.  B.  Williamson  with  President  Taft.  4.  Lieut.-Col. 
D.  D.   Gaillard.     5.  LiEUT.-CoL.  William  L.  Sibert. 


GOETHALS 

ties  in  this  hemisphere,  on  the  pretext  of  caring  for 
its  merchant  marine.  With  ice  plant,  cold  storage, 
bakery  and  other  subsistence  and  commissary  facili- 
ties already  established,  it  will  be  easy  for  the  govern- 
ment to  institute  the  practices  mentioned  at  Balboa 
coincidental  with  the  opening  of  the  canal.  Col.  Goeth- 
als  has  been  working  toward  that  end  for  years  and 
the  bill  passed  in  the  19 12  Congress  approves  his  ideas. 

In  1909,  Col.  Goethals  seems  to  have  had  the  idea 
of  making  the  Canal  Zone  habitable,  for  an  extensive 
scheme  of  road-making  was  begun,  and  $75,000  was 
spent  in  a  survey  of  the  Canal  Zone.  The  survey 
never  was  finished,  and  since  then  Col.  Goethals 
changed  his  views,  in  favor  of  making  the  Canal  Zone 
a  military  reservation,  the  part  not  in  use  to  be  left 
to  the  jungle  and  only  canal  employees  allowed,  with- 
out special  permission,  in  the  ten-mile  limits.  Critics 
in  the  United  States  displayed  their  ignorance  by  pro- 
testing that  the  land  in  the  Canal  Zone  should  be 
opened  to  settlement,  like  our  western  lands.  The 
canal  occupies  96  square  miles  of  the  436  in  the  Canal 
Zone  and  'j'^  square  miles  are  privately  owned.  There 
is  very  little  of  what  is  left  that  Americans  would 
occupy.  It  is  in  the  main  mountainous,  and  without 
a  system  of  roads  that  would  be  prohibitive  in  cost, 
would  not  be  accessible  in  the  rainy  season.  Col. 
Goethals  disposes  of  the  idea  of  settlement  in  his  usual 
terse  way  when  he  says :  "  The  inducements  offered 
by  farm  lands  in  the  Canal  Zone  are  not  likely  to  at- 
tract Americans.    Other  occupants  are  not  desirable." 

The  Americans  have  made  an  investment  at  Panama 

147 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

which  should  be  guarded  from  every  possible  danger. 
In  times  of  war  everybody  in  the  Canal  Zone,  of 
course,  would  be  subjected  to  scrutiny  and  possibly 
to  ejection.  It  will,  therefore,  save  trouble  and  ex- 
pense to  begin,  right  at  the  start,  to  treat  it  as  a  mili- 
tary reservation  is  treated  in  the  United  States.  The 
expense  of  sanitation  and  civil  government  would  be 
too  great  to  make  settlement  profitable. 

Work  on  the  fortifications  was  begun  in  191 1,  on 
Flamenco  Island,  three  miles  out  in  the  bay  at  the 
Pacific  entrance,  and  on  Toro  Point  at  the  Atlantic 
entrance.  The  estimate  for  their  cost,  as  fixed  by  the 
ofiicers  appointed  to  design  them,  is  $12,475,328,  and 
Congress,  in  March,  191 1,  appropriated  $3,000,000  of 
that  amount.  The  latest  and  largest  disappearing  rifles 
will  be  installed  after  the  concrete  work  is  finished. 
The  locks  at  the  Pacific  end  are  nearly  ten  miles  from 
the  fortifications,  which  insures  them  against  bombard- 
ment by  an  enemy's  ships,  and  the  Atlantic  locks  are 
seven  miles  from  the  fortifications.  Some  form  of 
defense  from  airships  must  be  worked  out. 

It  w^ould  be  just  as  logical  to  say  that  New  York 
should  remove  its  traffic  policemen  from  Thirty-fourth 
Street  and  Broadway,  as  to  argue  that  the  United 
States  should  not  fortify  the  canal.  The  policemen 
are  there  to  aid  traffic  by  enforcing  the  rules  which 
make  order  possible,  and  fortifications  are  necessary 
at  Panama  to  insure  that  no  nation,  whether  fighting 
the  United  States  or  some  other  nation,  shall  disable 
a  world  transit  route.  Neutrality  would  be  a  myth 
without  a  strong  police  power  at  Panama.     It  is  to 

148 


GOETHALS 

the  interest  of  every  nation  that  the  canal  be  so  poHced 
and  fortified  that  commerce  could  not  be  disrupted 
through  the  deliberate,  or  unintentional,  actions  of 
belligerent  nations.  Warships  of  all  nations  may  pass 
through  the  canal,  but  if  of  nations  engaged  in  war, 
they  cannot  linger  at  either  end  of  the  canal  after  or 
before  passage. 

When  the  canal  is  completed,  the  beautiful  towns 
along  the  route  will  be  abandoned.  Gorgona,  Bas 
Obispo,  Las  Cascadas,  Empire,  Culebra,  and  Paraiso 
will  be  razed.  A  permanent  camp  for  the  Army  will 
be  located  on  the  East  side  of  the  canal,  across  the  Cut 
from  the  town  of  Culebra.  Marines  have  been  in  the 
Canal  Zone  since  1904,  and  in  191 1  the  Tenth  Infantry 
was  added  to  the  permanent  garrison,  which  will  be 
further  augmented  by  several  regiments.  The  sol- 
diers will  police  the  Canal  Zone  after  construction 
work  is  finished.  Balboa  and  Cristobal  will  be  the 
principal  cities,  though  at  Gatun  and  Pedro  Miguel 
forces  to  operate  the  locks  will  be  housed. 

President  Taft  signed,  on  August  24,  191 2,  a  bill 
for  the  permanent  government  and  operation  of  the 
canal.  Col.  Goethals'  ideas  were  followed  almost  to 
the  letter  in  drawing  this  bill.  The  President  is  au- 
thorized, as  soon  as  the  canal  is  sufficiently  near  com- 
pletion, to  abolish  the  present  Commission  and  to 
appoint  a  Governor,  for  a  term  of  four  years,  at  a  sal- 
ary of  $10,000  per  annum.  In  time  of  war,  the  Presi- 
dent may  substitute  an  Army  officer  for  this  Governor. 
Salaries  and  wages  are  not  to  be  more  than  twenty- 
five  per  cent  greater  than  in  the  United  States,  and 

149 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

many  of  the  perquisites  now  enjoyed  by  the  employees 
are  to  be  eHminated.  The  Canal  Zone  will  be  open  to 
only  such  persons  as  the  Governor  may  admit ;  Ameri- 
can coast-wise  ships  are  exempted  from  paying  tolls 
for  passage;  foreign-built  ships  owned  by  Americans 
may  register  under  the  American  flag ;  ships  owned  by 
railroads  cannot  pass  through  the  canal ;  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  is  given  power  to  determine 
cjuestions  of  competition;  and  the  present  judiciary 
system  is  continued  with  right  of  appeal  to  the  Fed- 
eral courts  in  the  United  States.  In  addition,  the  gov- 
ernment may  sell  ships  supplies  and  coal  and  provide 
facilities  for  repairing  vessels  at  the  canal  terminals. 

At  the  close  of  the  fiscal  year  ended  June  30,  1912, 
Col.  Goethals  could  look  forward  to  one  year  more  of 
the  arduous  labor  and  heavy  responsibility  he  has 
borne,  before  the  big  job  would  be  in  the  clear.  In- 
voicing conditions  at  that  date,  we  find  that  the  great 
Gatun  dam  was  more  than  90  per  cent  completed ;  the 
concrete  work  in  the  locks  and  spillway  was  about  90 
per  cent  completed ;  the  Culebra  cut  was  approximately 
90  per  cent  completed ;  the  relocated  Panama  Rail- 
road was  finished,  and  the  work  of  establishing  per- 
manent shipping  facilities  at  Balboa  and  Cristobal  was 
under  way. 

Owing  to  fresh  slides  in  the  Culebra  cut,  and  to 
changes  in  plans  in  the  Pacific  division,  a  new  estimate 
of  the  total  excavation  for  the  completed  canal  and 
accessory  plant  became  necessary  at  the  beginning  of 
the  last  complete  fiscal  year  of  canal  construction — 
July  I,  1912,  to  June  30,  1913.    The  revised  estimate 

150 


GOETHALS 

then  placed  the  excavation  at  212,227,000  cubic  yards, 
of  which  amount  175,901,052  cubic  yards  had  been 
removed  at  the  end  of  July,  19 12,  leaving  to  be  exca- 
vated for  the  completed  canal,  36,325,948  cubic  yards. 
The  latest  estimate,  however,  raises  the  total  excava- 
tion to  221,000,000  yards.  The  canal  organization 
cannot  remove  the  uncompleted  portion  before  the  first 
ship  is  scheduled  to  pass  through  the  canal,  in  Septem- 
ber, 1 91 3,  but  of  the  47,000,000  yards  left,  more  than 
8,000,000  yards  are  to  be  excavated  outside  of  the 
canal  proper,  or  in  the  sites  for  the  coaling  station, 
dry  docks  and  terminal  at  Balboa,  so  that  the  actual 
canal  channel  substantially  will  be  finished  before  the 
passage  of  the  first  ship. 

The  Atlantic  division  in  July,  19 12,  lacked  8,009,- 
778  yards  of  completion;  the  Central  division,  includ- 
ing the  Culebra  cut,  lacked  10,678,953  yards;  and  the 
Pacific  division,  17,637,217  yards — a  grand  total  for 
the  whole  canal  of  36,325,948.  The  ancient  trouble, 
slides,  prevented  the  completion  of  the  Culebra  cut  in 
1912. 

During  the  early  part  of  1912,  the  Gatun  Lake  was 
stationary  at  about  17  feet,  but  with  the  beginning 
of  the  rainy  season  in  May  it  began  to  rise,  and  the 
plan  was  to  hold  the  lake,  by  use  of  the  spillway,  at 
a  head  of  water  of  50  feet  until  the  beginning  of  the 
rainy  season  in  1913,  when  it  will  be  allowed  to  raise 
to  80  feet,  and  this  would  back  the  water  up,  by  Sep- 
tember, 1 91 3,  to  a  depth  through  the  Culebra  cut  to 
permit  the  passage  of  some  kind  of  a  ship.  The  ulti- 
mate level  of  the  lake  will  be  85  feet. 

151 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

There  have  been  many  estimates  of  Col.  Goethals 
in  the  magazines  and  newspapers  and  in  books.  They 
all  pay  tribute  to  him  as  an  administrator  without  a 
superior.  Some  writers  have  been  so  impressed  by 
the  man  that  they  rate  him  a  larger  fact  than  the  canal 
itself.  Yet  it  is  possible  to  gauge  the  man  without 
overshooting  the  mark  in  that  fashion.  Congress 
gave  him  a  credit  of  $290,000,000  and  allowed  his 
estimates  of  annual  expenditures.  He  has  missed  the 
worries  of  a  private  contractor  who  has  to  consider 
the  financial  ways  and  means  of  his  operations,  and 
besides,  the  dissatisfaction  of  employees  have  been 
stifled  by  an  unparalleled  standard  of  pay  and  by 
gratuities  that  make  nearly  every  position  in  the  Canal 
Zone  in  the  nature  of  a  sinecure.  Contentedness  has 
been  bought  by  pouring  millions  of  dollars  into  creat- 
ing not  merely  comfortable,  but  even  luxurious  con- 
ditions of  living  for  the  employees. 

No  private  enterprise  could  succeed  for  a  moment 
on  such  a  basis.  On  its  economic  side,  the  canal 
proves  nothing  because  any  competent  organization 
could  bring  things  to  pass  if  only  enough  money  is 
forthcoming,  as  has  been  the  case  under  the  govern- 
ment in  Panama.  An  admirable  job  has  been  done  in 
Panama,  but  it  has  not  been  economically  done,  in  the 
usual  understanding  of  that  word.  Nobody  set  out  to 
do  it  economically.  Every  leak  has  been  plastered 
with  a  dollar.  At  no  point  does  the  canal  project 
affect  a  complete  economic  operation.  Money  is  being 
spent  but  it  is  not  being  made.  The  work  is  being 
done  without  regard  to  its  ever  paying. 

152 


GOETHALS 

Socialists,  therefore,  should  be  cautious  in  holding 
up  the  canal  as  an  example  of  their  theories  in  suc- 
cessful practice.  Industrial  life,  even  under  Socialism, 
would  have  to  do  what  the  canal  project  has  not  done 
and  is  not  required  to  do,  namely,  justify  itself  as  a 
business  proposition.  The  canal  ultimately  may  do 
this,  but  it  will  not  be  because  it  was  designed  and  con- 
structed with  that  imperative  end  in  view.  Even  the 
commissary  and  subsistence  operations  that  usually 
evoke  strong  approval  as  evidences  of  governmental 
efficiency,  possess  no  socialistic  and  slight  communal 
aspects.  The  government  has  made  them  pay  by 
arbitrarily  exacting  a  profit  under  noncompetitive  con- 
ditions. None  of  the  forces  of  industrial  life  that  tend 
to  make  for  favorable  or  unfavorable  economic  con- 
ditions, can  operate  in  a  government  job  which  se- 
cures its  capital,  not  because  of  the  intrinsic  merit  of 
the  enterprise,  but  through  the  gratuitous  function  of 
taxation. 

If  we  turn  to  the  purely  technical  side  of  the  project, 
unquestionably  the  highest  praise  is  due  to  the  Army 
engineers.  On  its  engineering  side,  the  canal  proves 
that  the  government  does  not  have  to  go  outside  its 
own  forces  to  find  the  highest  order  of  ability.  The 
American  people  never  again  will  clamor  for  private 
initiative  and  execution  of  any  enterprise  they  may 
want  accomplished. 

Col.  Goethals  is  indeed  a  great  administrator.  Even 
if  the  employees  have  had  soft  conditions  of  employ- 
ment, it  is  an  achievement  to  impress  35,000  men  with 
a  faith  both  in  your  capacity  as  an  engineer  and  your 

153 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

sense  of  justice.  This  writer  knows  of  no  higher 
tribute  that  can  be  paid  to  him  than  the  statement  that 
in  five  months  in  the  Canal  Zone  he  never  heard  any- 
one speak  slurringly  of  the  Chief  Engineer.  Col. 
Goethals  has  been  no  respecter  of  persons.  In  1912, 
two  officials  drawing  $300  a  month  salary  each,  were 
discharged  as  summarily  as  any  common  laborer 
would  have  been,  for  breaches  of  the  rules.  It  has 
been  his  practice  to  give  his  Sunday  mornings  to  hear- 
ing grievances  from  employees,  and  those  without 
just  grounds  of  complaint  are  sent  about  their  business 
peremptorily,  while  those  who  have  been  wronged  are 
given  justice,  no  matter  how  high  the  official  who  is 
in  error.  The  man's  admirable  poise  is  shown  in  the 
just  way  he  has  exercised  the  absolute  power  of  a 
Czar,  for  when  he  sets  his  pen  to  paper  a  new  law  is 
made  in  the  Canal  Zone.  Those  who  cannot  square 
their  conduct  with  his  fiat,  go  out  on  the  next  steamer, 
whether  an  individual  or  a  labor  union  en  masse. 

As  Admiral  Schley  said  of  the  controversy  over  the 
battle  of  Santiago,  "  there  is  honor  enough  for  us  all," 
so  with  regard  to  the  Panama  Canal.  Col.  Goethals, 
as  the  star  of  the  last  six  years,  gets  the  curtain  calls, 
but  even  if  we  assign  Messrs.  Stevens  and  Wallace 
to  the  roles  of  villains,  they,  too,  did  their  parts  well. 
And  the  whole  company  of  Americans,  composing  the 
chorus  or  supernumeraries,  have  contributed  vitally 
to  the  success  of  the  play.  After  all,  it  is  no  one 
man,  but  the  Spirit  of  Americanism,  indomitable  and 
triumphant,  that  we  admire  in  Panama.  Future  gen- 
erations will  see  in  Col.  Goethals  the  outward  head 

154 


GOETHALS 

of  this  national  characteristic,  but  the  final  verdict  of 
approval  will  be  much  broader  and  more  just  than 
that,  even  to  the  admission  that  all  praise  belongs  to 
the  Americans  in  Panama. 


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156 


CHAPTER    XIV 

LOCKS  AND  DAMS 

AN  elevator  system  for  ships  is  being  installed  at 
Panama  at  a  cost  of  $58,000,000.  These  ele- 
vators, known  as  locks,  will  raise  ships  to  and  lower 
them  from  the  great  artificial,  inland  lake  which  is 
85  feet  above  sea-level. 

In  a  sea-level  canal,  such  as  Suez,  ships  steam 
through  a  dug-out  channel  from  one  ocean  to  another. 
But  at  Panama,  the  plan  adopted  involves  the  lifting 
of  ships  over  the  Isthmus  and  the  locks  are  the  means 
whereby  they  are  lifted.  For  this  physical  operation 
there  are  six  locks  on  the  Atlantic  side  and  six  on 
the  Pacific  side,  at  each  end  of  the  Gatun  Lake. 

A  ship  arriving  at  Colon  from  New  York,  on  its 
way  to  San  Francisco,  enters  the  sea-level  channel  in 
Limon  Bay  and  steams  for  seven  miles  through  the 
canal,  which  is  500  feet  wide  and  41  feet  deep,  to 
Gatun.  Here  its  way  is  barred  by  a  massive  pile  of 
masonry  with  impressive  steel  gates  and  towering  85 
feet  above  the  ship  is  the  surface  of  the  Gatun  Lake. 
To  the  West  of  the  ship  runs  the  man-made  mountain, 
the  Gatun  dam,  which  holds  the  lake  in  bounds.  The 
problem  is  to  lift  the  ship  to  this  lake. 

As  if  by  magic,  the  gates  swing  open  and  an  electric 
locomotive,  which  has  run  out  on  a  guide  wall  and 
fastened  to  the  ship,  tows  it  into  the  first  lock.    The 

157 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

gates  swing  together  and  the  ship  is  imprisoned  in  a 
chamber  i.ooo  feet  long  and  no  feet  wide  and  built 
of  concrete.  In  a  moment  the  water  in  this  chamber 
begins  to  rise,  being  supplied  through  holes  in  the 
bottom,  and  the  ship  rises  with  the  water. 

Fifteen  minutes  after  entering  the  lock,  the  ship 
has  risen  with  the  water  for  27I  feet.  If  the  full 
capacity  for  filling  the  lock  should  be  used  the  ship 
would  rise  that  height  in  eight  minutes.  Another  set 
of  gates  swing  open  in  front  of  the  ship,  and  the  loco- 
motives tow  it  into  the  second  lock,  a  concrete  cham- 
ber of  the  same  dimensions.  The  gates  having  closed 
behind,  this  chamber  begins  filling  with  water  until  the 
ship  is  raised  again  for  2y^  feet.  A  third  set  of  gates 
open  and  the  ship  is  towed  into  the  final  lock  where 
the  operation  is  repeated  with  a  raise  of  30  feet,  or  a 
total  lift  for  the  three  locks  of  85  feet.  When  the 
gates  in  front  swing  open  the  ship  steams  out  into  the 
Gatun  Lake.  The  time  spent  in  climbing  85  feet  was 
an  hour  and  a  half. 

For  sixteen  miles  through  this  lake  the  ship  steams 
in  a  channel  i  ,000  feet  wide ;  for  four  miles  in  a  chan- 
nel 800  feet  wide,  and  for  three  miles  in  a  channel 
500  feet  wide,  or  twenty-three  miles  in  all.  Then  it 
enters  the  famous  Culebra  cut,  which  is  300  feet  wide 
through  the  continental  mountain  divide,  and  nine 
miles  long.  At  the  end  of  the  Cut  is  the  Pedro  Miguel 
lock,  thirty-two  miles  from  Gatun. 

After  entering  this  lock,  which  essentially  is  the 
same  as  the  ones  on  the  Atlantic  side,  the  ship  goes 
through  the  reverse  of  the  process  at  Gatun.     The 

158 


LOCKS    AND    DAMS 

water  in  the  concrete  chamber  begins  falHng,  taking 
the  ship  down  with  it.  When  it  has  fallen  30  feet  the 
gates  in  front  open  and  the  ship  goes  out  into  another 
artificial  lake,  a  mile  and  a  half  long,  at  the  end  of 
which  are  the  Miraflores  locks.  These  two  locks  lower 
the  ship  2y^  feet  each,  or  a  total  for  the  three  locks 
of  85  feet,  which  was  the  height  the  ship  was  raised 
on  the  other  side.  The  ship  then  steams  through  a 
sea-level  channel  for  seven  miles  to  the  Pacific,  having 
made  the  whole  journey  from  deep  water  in  the  At- 
lantic to  deep  water  in  the  Pacific,  fifty  miles,  in  ten 
hours. 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
oceans  are  still  separated  by  thirty-two  miles  of  land 
at  Panama,  on  which  is  a  fresh-water  lake  85  feet 
above  sea-level.  The  locks  simply  are  so  many  stair- 
steps up  to  and  down  from  this  lake.  At  both  ends 
the  locks  are  built  in  pairs,  or  twins,  so  that  ships 
going  in  opposite  directions  may  pass  through  them 
simultaneously.  A  wall  60  feet  thick  separates  the 
locks,  and  if  one  set  should  become  disabled,  the  ad- 
joining set  still  would  be  available  for  passage.     The 

/  time  required  for  a  ship  to  mount  the  three  locks  on 
one  side  and  descend  the  three  locks  on  the  other  side 

i  is  three  hours. 
^"  On  the  Atlantic  side,  the  locks  at  Gatun  are  con- 
nected and  constitute  one  solid  piece  of  masonry.  On 
the  Pacific  side  the  lock  at  Pedro  Miguel  is  separated 
from  two  locks  at  Miraflores  by  a  small  lake  a  mile 
and  a  half  long.  This  lake,  like  the  great  Gatun  Lake, 
is  formed  by  damming  rivers.     A  dam  at  the  Pedro 

159 


THE    AMERICANS    IX    PANAMA 

Miguel  lock,  which  is  the  first  lock  encountered  going 
toward  the  Pacific,  holds  the  waters  of  Gatun  Lake 
from  spilling  down  the  Pacific  slope. 

Chief  Engineer  Stevens  began  the  excavations  in 
the  Gatun  and  Pedro  Miguel  lock  sites  in  1906,  shortly 
after  the  decision  was  made  for  a  lock-type  canal,  but 
most  of  the  excavation  and  all  of  the  concrete  lay- 
ing has  been  done  under  Col.  Goethals.  It  was  neces- 
sary to  remove  about  5,000,000  cubic  yards  of  rock 
and  earth  from  the  site  of  the  three  locks  at  Gatun 
to  prepare  a  foundation  for  the  tremendously  heavy 
structure.  Careful  borings  had  been  made  to  ascertain 
if  a  suitable  foundation  could  be  found  there. 

On  August  24,  1909,  the  first  concrete  was  laid  in 
the  Gatun  lock  site.  Rock  of  a  desirable  kind  for  use 
in  making  the  concrete,  as  well  as  sand,  could  not  be 
found  in  the  Canal  Zone,  and  experiments  along  the 
coast  showed  that  at  Porto  Bello,  twenty  miles  East  of 
Colon,  good  rock  could  be  quarried,  and  sand  was  dis- 
covered in  suitable  quantities  and  quality  at  Nombre 
de  Dios,  forty  miles  East  of  Colon.  These  two  places 
are  the  oldest  on  the  Isthmus,  Columbus  having  been 
there  in  1502. 

Rock  crushing  began  at  Porto  Bello  on  March  2, 
1909.  If  all  the  rock  and  sand  removed  from  Porto 
Bello  and  Nombre  de  Dios  was  placed  in  barges 
separated  by  the  usual  distances  in  a  tow,  they  would 
reach  from  Colon  to  New  Orleans,  or  1,500  miles. 
Tliis  material  was  towed  to  Colon  and  thence  through 
the  old  French  canal  to  Gatun.    Here  it  was  unloaded 

160 


LOCKS    AND    DA]MS 

by  machinery  and  stored  conveniently  for  the  concrete 
mixing  plant. 

All  the  machinery  and  equipment  for  building  the 
locks  was  designed  on  a  scale  commensurate  with  the 
unprecedented  size  of  the  structures.  Eight  giant 
mixers  were  fed  with  rock,  sand,  and  cement  by  cars 
operated  by  electricity,  the  finished  product  coming 
from  each  of  the  mixers  at  the  rate  of  64  cubic  feet 
for  each  complete  operation. 

To  get  the  concrete  into  place,  four  cableways, 
suspended  across  the  lock  site  on  towers  85  feet  high, 
were  installed.  Electrically  operated  cars  brought  the 
concrete  to  these  towers  where  great  buckets  were 
filled.  These  buckets  then  were  run  up  to  the  cables, 
and  out  on  the  cables  to  a  given  point,  where  they 
were  lowered  and  the  concrete  dumped  into  the  proper 
position. 

After  the  floors  of  the  locks  had  been  laid,  the  walls 
were  built  in  the  usual  manner  of  erecting  steel  forms, 
which  were  removed  when  the  concrete  had  hardened. 
At  Gatun  the  walls  of  the  locks  were  built  in  sections 
36  feet  long,  and  joined  together,  on  the  idea  that  such 
construction  would  have  less  tendency  to  settle  and 
crack  than  if  it  was  built  in  one  solid,  continuous  wall. 
This  may  be  appreciated  when  it  is  understood  that 
at  Gatun  the  locks  form  a  concrete  wall  about  3,500 
feet  long,  or  considerably  more  than  half  a  mile.  The 
usable  part  of  each  lock  is  1,000  feet  long  and  there 
are  three  in  flight.  The  twin  locks  have  an  outside 
wall  52  feet  wide,  an  inside  measurement  no  feet 
wide,  a  separating  wall  60  feet  wide,  another  inside 

161 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

measurement  of  no  feet,  and  a  final  outside  wall  52 
feet  wide,  or  a  total  width  for  both  locks  lying  side 
by  side,  from  outer  wall  to  outer  wall,  of  384  feet. 

In  each  of  the  outside  walls  and  in  the  center  wall 
tunnels  18  feet  in  diameter  were  constructed  for  use 
in  filling  and  emptying  the  locks  with  water  during 
the  processes  of  raising  and  lowering  ships.  Smaller 
tunnels  run  out  from  these  main  longitudinal  tunnels, 
under  the  floors  of  the  locks  with  openings  through 
which  the  water  is  turned  into  or  withdrawn  from  the 
lock  chambers  by  gravitation.  Valves  operated  by 
electricity  regulate  the  flow  of  the  water.  The  water 
for  operating  the  locks  starts  from  the  Gatun  Lake 
and  flows  through  the  tunnels  downgrade,  through 
the  three  locks,  until  it  finally  is  used  in  the  lowest 
lock  when  it  is  spilled  into  the  sea-level  channel. 

The  first  concrete  for  the  Pacific  side  locks  was 
laid  at  Pedro  Miguel  on  September  i,  1909,  seven 
days  after  the  beginning  of  operations  at  Gatun.  It 
was  in  February,  19 10,  that  concrete  work  was 
started  in  the  two  locks  at  Miraflores,  which,  in  19 12, 
were  the  most  backward  feature  of  canal  construction. 
For  all  twelve  locks,  4,302,563  cubic  yards  of  con- 
crete is  required.  Three  years  after  beginning  the 
concrete  work,  or  in  August,  191 2,  the  locks  were 
more  than  90  per  cent  completed,  the  one  at  Pedro 
Miguel  being  the  nearest  done  with  98  per  cent  of 
the  estimated  concrete  in  place.  The  three  locks  at 
Gatun  then  had  about  95  per  cent  in  place  and  the  two 
at  Miraflores  about  80  per  cent. 

For  the  three  locks  at  Gatun,  2,000,000  cubic  yards 
162 


LOCKS    AND    DAMS 

of  concrete  was  required;  for  the  one  lock  at  Pedro 
Miguel,  889,827  cubic  yards;  and  for  the  two  locks 
at  Miraflores,  1,412,736  cubic  yards.  A  contract  was 
awarded  the  Atlas  Portland  Cement  Co.  for  4,500,000 
barrels  of  cement,  with  the  privilege  of  increasing  this 
order  by  15  per  cent,  and  in  191 2  another  1,000,000 
barrels  were  bought  to  complete  the  canal.  The 
stability  of  the  locks  depends  upon  the  quality  of 
cement  used,  hence  the  Government  inspectors  have 
watched  this  factor  jealously. 

Rock  for  the  Pacific  locks  has  been  obtained  at  a 
quarry  opened  in  Ancon  hill,  at  the  Pacific  entrance 
of  the  canal.  The  sand  has  been  brought  from 
Chame,  about  2^  miles  up  the  coast  from  Panama. 
The  Pacific  division  has  been  at  much  less  expense 
in  obtaining  materials  than  the  Atlantic  division,  ac- 
counting for  the  difference  in  the  cost  of  construc- 
tion in  the  two  divisions.  The  Pacific  division  was  at 
one  disadvantage  in  that  the  three  locks  were  not  to- 
gether, as  on  the  Atlantic  side,  necessitating  prac- 
tically two  separate  jobs.  The  amount  of  excavation 
at  Pedro  Miguel  to  secure  a  foundation  was  770,000 
cubic  yards  and  at  Miraflores,  2,247,600  cubic  yards, 
a  total  for  the  three  locks  of  3,017,600  yards,  which 
is  nearly  2,000,000  yards  less  than  had  to  be  excavated 
in  the  site  of  the  three  Atlantic  locks. 

All  twelve  locks  were  half  done  as  regards  the 
concrete  work,  about  May  i,  191 1.  The  best  month's 
record  for  laying  concrete  was  made  in  April,  191 2, 
in  the  Pacific  division,  when  97,735  cubic  yards  were 
laid.     The   concrete   is   all   of   reenforced   construc- 

163 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

tion,  and  an  unusual  feature  has  been  the  placing  of 
rocks  weighing  many  tons  throughout  the  walls.  The 
lock  walls  at  Pedro  Miguel  were  not  built  in  sections 
as  at  Gatun,  but  as  one  solid  piece  of  masonry  more 
than  i,ooo  feet  long.  At  Miraflores  the  two  locks 
Avere  built  in  sections,  as  at  Gatun. 

The  gates  for  the  locks  were  contracted  for,  in 
1910,  to  cost  $5,374,474.82.  Their  construction  and 
erection  are  by  the  McClintic-Marshall  Construction 
Company,  of  Pittsburgh,  under  the  inspection  of  the 
Commission.  This  concern,  in  191 2,  had  more  than 
1,000  men  at  work  and  were  rushing  the  construction 
to  meet  the  dates  agreed  upon  for  their  completion. 
Under  the  contract  this  company  had  until  January  i, 
1914,  to  finish  the  work,  but  estimated  that  this  time 
could  be  beaten  by  six  months.  The  date  for  finishing 
the  gates  at  Pedro  Miguel  lock  was  May  i,  19 12,  but 
the  contractor  was  behind  on  this  program;  at  Gatun 
the  gates  were  to  be  erected  by  February  i,  191 3;  and 
at  Miraflores  by  June  i,  1913.  Work  was  rushed  on 
the  gates  at  the  lake  end  of  the  Gatun  locks,  in  the 
summer  of  191 2,  to  hold  out  the  rising  water.  On 
July  I,  1912,  out  of  a  total  of  58,000  tons  of  steel 
required  in  all  the  gates,  19.631  tons  had  been  erected, 
or  34  per  cent,  leaving  to  be  erected  before  Septem- 
ber, 1 91 3,  when  the  first  ship  is  scheduled  to  go 
through,  38,369  tons. 

There  are  46  gates  in  all  twelve  locks,  with  two 
leaves  to  the  gate,  or  92  leaves.  The  gates  are  from 
47  to  79  feet  high,  are  7  feet  thick,  and  weigh  from 
300  to  600  tons  each  leaf.    They  are  constructed  with 

164 


u 


LOCKS    AND    DAMS 

interior  cells,  which  at  the  bottom  will  be  air  cham- 
bers to  assist  in  their  manipulation,  and  at  the  top, 
water  chambers,  to  increase  their  weight  as  the  water 
rises  in  the  locks.  The  sheathing  is  with  steel  plates 
riveted  on  heavy  girders.  These  gates  will  be  opened 
and  shut,  to  permit  the  entrance  or  egress  of  ships, 
by  electrical  apparatus. 

As  95  per  cent  of  the  vessels  in  the  world  are  less 
than  600  feet  long,  it  would  be  a  great  waste  of 
water  and  time  to  use  the  full  1,000-foot  lock  in  each 
passage.  So  intermediate  gates  are  being  constructed 
which  will  permit  the  use  of  only  400  or  600  feet  as 
the  particular  vessel  may  require.  There  are  recesses 
in  the  lock  walls  which  allow  the  gates  to  be  opened 
and  still  leave  a  clear  width  of  no  feet.  At  the  en- 
trance of  the  locks,  a  chain,  with  links  three  inches 
in  diameter,  stretches  from  one  side  to  the  other  to 
stop  vessels  which  might  not  obey  the  signals.  In 
case  the  first  gates  should  be  rammed  and  broken,  a 
second  set  of  gates  especially  provided  for  emergencies 
have  been  constructed  behind  the  first  set.  If  both 
sets  of  gates  should  be  demolished,  the  water  would 
rush  through  with  a  fearful  velocity,  but  provision 
has  been  made  against  this  contingency  by  having 
in  readiness  emergency  dams,  which  would  be  swung 
out  over  the  lock  and  forced  down  through  the  in- 
rushing  water.  This  dam,  built  of  steel,  is  open  at 
the  bottom  and  steel  plates  are  then  shoved  down  it, 
gradually  closing  the  openings  until  the  flow  is 
stopped.  A  floating  caisson  would  then  be  placed  in 
position  and  sunk,  completely  shutting  out  water  from 

165 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

the  lock,  the  emergency  dam  would  be  raised,  and 
repairs  begun. 

It  is  to  prevent  such  accidents  that  the  plan  of 
towing  vessels  through  the  locks  with  electric  loco- 
motives was  adopted,  as  then  no  misunderstanding 
of  signals  from  the  captain  to  the  engineer  of  a  ship 
could  result.  The  tracks  for  these  locomotives  are  on 
each  side  wall  of  the  locks,  and  two  will  fasten  to  the 
rear  and  two  to  the  front  of  a  ship  to  effect  a  passage. 
If  all  twelve  locks  were  joined  end  to  end  they  would 
make  a  canyon  nearly  three  miles  long,  no  feet  wide 
and  80  feet  deep. 

The  Gatun  Dam 

The  natural  topography  of  the  Isthmus  at  Panama 
permitted  the  Chagres  River  to  escape  into  the  Carib- 
bean Sea  through  a  break  in  the  mountains  at  Gatun. 
Engineers  logically  considered  that  this  was  the  point 
at  which  a  dam  should  be  thrown  across  the  Chagres 
River.  Two  valleys  were  formed  at  Gatun  by  a  hill 
which  rose  in  the  center  to  an  elevation  of  no  feet, 
and  the  dam  that  was  designed  runs  from  the  Gatun 
locks  to  this  hill  and  from  this  hill  to  the  mountains, 
a  total  distance  of  7,500  feet,  or  a  mile  and  a  half. 

As  the  Chagres  River  every  year  discharges  enough 
water  to  fill  the  lake,  some  means  of  disposing  of  the 
surplus  water  had  to  be  provided.  The  plan  adopted 
called  for  a  spillway  to  be  constructed  in  this  hill, 
about  third-way  in  the  dam  site.  This  spillway  is  of 
concrete,  requiring  225,000  cubic  yards  to  complete. 

166 


LOCKS    AND    DAMS 

On  July  I,  19 1 2,  it  was  more  than  90  per  cent  com- 
pleted. 

The  floor  of  the  spilhvay  is  10  feet  above  sea-level, 
and  300  feet  wide  through  the  hill,  which  involved 
excavation  through  rock  for  a  depth  of  100  feet  at  the 
highest  point  of  the  hill.  A  concrete  dam  was  built 
on  this  floor  to  a  height  of  69  feet  above  sea-level 
and  in  shape  like  a  semicircle.  On  top  of  the  concrete 
dam,  piers  were  built  with  an  arrangement  for  steel 
gates.  These  steel  gates  will  be  electrically  operated 
and  regulate  the  flow  of  water  out  of  the  lake.  As 
much  as  140,000  cubic  feet  of  water  per  second  may 
escape  through  the  spillway  when  the  gates  are  open. 

There  will  not  be  a  complete  loss  of  this  water,  as 
on  the  east  side  of  the  spillway  a  power  plant  of 
the  hydro-electric  type  will  be  operated.  A  drop  of 
75  feet  by  the  water  will  operate  turbine  engines 
which  in  turn  will  operate  the  electric  machinery  that 
will  generate  all  the  pov^^er  and  illuminating  current 
needed  from  one  end  of  the  canal  to  the  other.  But 
an  additional  power  plant  will  be  maintained  at  Mira- 
flores  for  emergencies.  The  power  to  operate  the  lock 
gates  will  come  from  the  spillway  plant. 

The  Gatun  dam  is  so  stupendous  that  it  almost 
seems  to  be  a  continuation  of  the  hills  that  enclose 
the  lake.  It  in  fact  does  complete  the  natural  moun- 
tain chains  that  form  the  barriers  of  the  Chagres 
River.  It  is  105  feet  high,  or  20  feet  above  the  or- 
dinary level  of  the  lake  at  85  feet  elevation.  The 
plan  of  construction  has  been  to  build  parallel  mounds, 
for  the  mile  and  a  half,  1,200  feet  apart.     Between 

167 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

these  mounds,  built  of  rock  and  earth,  a  core  for  the 
dam  has  been  constructed  by  pumping  mud  and  sand 
from  the  bed  of  the  Chagres  River.  About  20  per 
cent  of  the  material  pumped  is  solid  matter,  and  when 
it  has  deposited  the  water  is  pumped  off.  This  op- 
eration has  been  repeated  until  an  impervious  heart 
has  been  made  in  the  dam.  Even  if  water  from  the 
lake  penetrated  the  outside  walls  of  rock  and  earth, 
it  would  find  this  core  water-tight.  The  dam  is  nearly 
half  a  mile  thick  at  the  base,  398  feet  thick  where 
the  water  surface  strikes  it  at  85  feet,  and  is  100  feet 
wide  at  the  top.  The  outer  coverings  of  rock  and 
earth  on  the  dam  close  over  the  hydraulic  core  at  the 
crest.  For  about  500  feet  the  dam  will  be  subjected 
to  the  full  pressure  of  85  feet  of  water,  at  other  points 
to  a  less  severe  pressure. 

Engineers  consider  the  dam  excessively  safe  and 
the  layman  has  no  difficulty  in  appreciating  its 
strength.  This  feature  was  subjected  to  a  storm  of 
criticism  throughout  the  early  days  of  the  canal  be- 
cause some  engineers  believed  the  earth  would  not 
support  so  heavy  a  structure,  but  the  present  Chief 
Engineer  never  has  doubted  its  stability.  About  half 
of  the  material  required,  21,994,111  cubic  yards,  has 
been  brought  from  the  Culebra  cut.  On  July  i,  19 12, 
the  dam  was  more  than  90  per  cent  completed,  leaving 
less  than  10  per  cent  to  be  done  before  the  passage 
of  the  first  ship. 

On  the  Pacific  side,  the  first  dam  encountered  is  at 
Pedro  Miguel  and  serves  to  hold  the  waters  of  Gatun 
Lake  at  its  southern  end.     It  is  1,400  feet  long  and 

168 


LOCKS    AND    DAMS 

forty  feet  wide  at  the  top.  The  maximum  height 
of  the  water  against  this  dam  will  be  40  feet.  The 
plan  of  construction  is  much  the  same  as  at  Gatun, 
but  only  about  1,000,000  cubic  yards  will  be  required. 

After  a  ship  is  lowered  30  feet  by  the  Pedro  Miguel 
lock,  it  finds  itself  in  an  artificial  lake  a  mile  and  a 
half  long.  This  lake  is  formed  by  two  dams,  the 
one  to  the  west  being  2,300  feet  long,  and  40  feet 
wide  at  the  top,  holding  a  maximum  head  of  water 
of  40  feet.  It  is  constructed  with  a  hydraulic  core  like 
the  Gatun  dam.  On  the  east  a  concrete  dam  500  feet 
long,  and  provided  with  a  spillway,  as  at  Gatun,  and 
capable  of  discharging  7,500  cubic  feet  of  water  per 
second,  will  hold  the  small  lake  in  control.  The  Cocoli 
River  is  the  principal  feeder  of  this  lake. 

Records  kept  by  the  French,  and  by  the  Americans 
since  1904,  show  conclusively  that  enough  water 
always  will  be  available  to  keep  the  Gatun  Lake  and 
the  tiny  Miraflores  Lake  adequately  supplied  with 
water.  No  trouble  at  all  can  develop  during  the  eight 
months  of  rainy  season,  and  in  the  dry  season  of  four 
months  enough  water  will  have  been  stored  in  the 
lake  by  means  of  the  regulating  works  in  the  Gatun 
dam  spillway  to  allow  for  all  losses  through  evapora- 
tion, seepage,  power  consumption,  and  loss  through  the 
locks.  During  the  wet  season  the  lake  will  be  raised 
from  elevation  85  for  two  feet,  to  elevation  87,  over 
an  area  of  164  square  miles.  This  water  could  be 
used  until  the  lake  falls  to  about  82  feet,  or  five  feet 
over  the  164  square  miles.  In  an  average  dry  season 
this  would  permit  58  complete  transits  of  the  canal 

169 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

every  24  hours,  if  the  full  1,000- foot  capacity  of  the 
locks  is  used,  or  more  than  the  period  would  allow 
if  vessels  followed  at  intervals  of  one  hour. 

The  Gatun  Lake  is  backed  up  among  the  hills  by 
the  dam  until  it  reaches  a  width  of  more  than  twenty 
miles  at  the  widest  point,  and  a  length  between  Gatun 
and  Pedro  Aliguel  of  thirty-two  miles.  It  will  be 
broken  by  many  small  islands,  and  stretches  of  high 
lands,  and  is  narrowest  in  the  Culebra  cut  where  for 
nine  miles  the  width  is  300  feet.  From  Gatun  to  the 
entrance  of  the  Cut,  a  distance  of  twenty-three  miles, 
lighthouses  are  stationed  at  commanding  points  to 
guide  ships  at  night.  The  channel  throughout  is  at 
an  average  depth  of  45  feet.  In  order  to  raise  the 
relocated  Panama  Railroad  above  the  level  of  the 
lake  it  was  necessary  to  make  fills  to  the  extent  of 
16,425,292  cubic  yards. 

The  Navy  Department  has  selected  a  site  near  San 
Pablo,  about  twenty  miles  inland  from  the  Atlantic, 
and  on  the  East  side  of  Gatun  Lake,  for  a  high 
power  wireless  station.  It  is  to  be  at  an  elevation 
of  no  feet  above  the  level  of  the  lake  and  capable 
of  sending  a  message  for  3.000  miles,  to  Washing- 
ton, D.  C.,  or  to  a  similar  station  on  the  California 
coast.  Smaller  stations  will  be  maintained  at  Colon 
and  Balboa  in  the  Canal  Zone,  and  at  Porto  Bello. 
The  Republic  of  Panama  and  private  companies  will 
not  operate  stations  in  competition  with  the  American 
government. 

If  the  great  Gatun  dam  should  break,  the  water  in 
the  lake  might  sweep  devastatingly  over  the  city  of 

170 


LOCKS    AND    DAMS 

Colon,  seven  miles  away,  or  pass  through  the  old  bed 
of  the  Chagres  River  harmlessly  into  the  Caribbean 
Sea.  While  the  pressure  on  the  dam  will  be  terrific, 
no  such  catastrophe  is  considered  probable. 


171 


CHAPTER    XV 

THE   CULEBRA    CUT 

POPULAR  interest  always  has  centered  chiefly  in 
the  excavation  phase  of  canal  construction,  los- 
ing sight  of  the  fact  that  the  locks,  dams,  and  break- 
waters call  for  an  expenditure  of  $85,643,000.  The 
Culebra  cut  has  been  exploited  more  than  any  other 
feature  of  the  canal,  yet  it  was  estimated  to  cost 
$80,481,000,  or  five  million  dollars  less  than  the  fea- 
tures just  enumerated.  Even  the  dredging  of  fifteen 
miles  of  sea-level  channel  has  received  little  publicity, 
and  this  was  to  cost  no  less  than  $30,906,000. 

The  physical  aspects  of  the  dry  excavation  doubt- 
less account  for  this  singling  out  of  one  feature  by 
the  public  mind.  However  stupendous  the  laying  of 
concrete  might  be  in  the  locks,  or  the  sucking  up  of 
mud  by  the  dredges,  they  are  not  as  impressive  as  cut- 
ting through  a  mountain  chain.  They  are  prosaic 
operations  compared  with  the  picturesque  attempt  to 
change  geological  conditions.  In  the  Culebra  cut, 
Man  was  wrestling  with  Nature,  whereas,  in  lock- 
building,  he  merely  is  playing  the  role  of  mason. 

One  finds  in  government  work  that  the  chief  aim 
seems  to  be  to  plant  two  employees  where  only  one 
worked  before,  and  the  canal  organization  is  the  least 
overworked  set  of  employees  in  the  world,  but  in  the 
excavation  phase  of  the  government  work  the  organ- 

172 


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W 
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THE    CULEBRA    CUT 

ization  has  attained  as  great  efficiency  as  any  private 
contractor  could  have  attained,  under  the  conditions 
adopted  in  the  Canal  Zone.  World  records  for  steam 
shovel  performances  have  been  broken  by  government 
employees   in   Panama  under  adverse  circumstances. 

The  Culebra  cut  is  nine  miles  long  with  a  curve  for 
nearly  every  mile.  At  these  curves,  the  cut  is  wid- 
ened to  permit  the  ships  to  pass  easily.  Always  the 
chief  problem  has  been  one  of  transportation,  or  how 
to  keep  empty  cars  in  front  of  the  steam  shovels  con- 
stantly, in  a  canyon  only  three  hundred  feet  wide. 
In  a  working  day  of  eight  hours  it  has  been  found 
possible  to  keep  the  steam  shovels  working  only  about 
six  hours,  because  of  this  circumscribed  field  of  op- 
erations. 

Naturally  the  75  miles  of  track  in  the  Culebra  cut 
must  be  shifted  constantly  as  the  excavation  work 
carries  the  levels  down.  This  keeps  the  track  shifters 
and  hundreds  of  men  at  work  day  and  night.  During 
the  maximum  operations  in  the  Cut,  6,000  men  were 
employed  in  the  daytime,  while  at  night  400  men 
worked  to  keep  the  steam  shovels  in  repair,  to  re- 
plenish their  coal  bins,  blast  more  material  for  the 
shovels,  and  otherwise  to  get  the  Cut  in  shape  for  the 
next  day's  activities. 

About  100,000,000  cubic  yards  w^ere  to  be  removed 
to  complete  this  part  of  the  canal,  or  practically  half 
the  total  excavation.  On  July  i,  191 2,  the  beginning 
of  the  last  year  of  work,  there  were  7,399,615  yards 
left  to  be  removed,  which  would  have  been  out  by 
January  i,  1913,  at  the  rate  of  excavation,  if  it  had 

173 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

not  been  for  the  slides.  To  this  had  to  be  added 
6,000,000  yards  from  that  source,  or  more  than 
14,000,000  yards  to  be  removed  in  order  to  get  the  Cut 
in  shape  for  the  passage  of  the  first  ship.  It  was  de- 
cided then  to  keep  the  38  steam  shovels  at  work  and 
operations  at  full  blast  until  July,   191 3. 

For  the  whole  length  of  the  Cut,  the  average  depth 
from  the  surface  to  the  proposed  bottom  of  the  canal 
was  about  120  feet,  the  highest  point  on  the  center 
line  of  the  canal  being  at  Culebra  between  Gold  and 
Contractor's  hills  where  excavation  has  gone  down 
272  feet.  After  the  soil  had  been  removed  for  a 
short  depth,  solid  rock  was  struck  and  to  January  i, 
1913,  54,504,150  pounds  of  dynamite  were  used  in 
blasting,  or  the  staggering  total  of  27,252  tons.  The 
lay  mind  thinks  of  a  pound  of  dynamite  as  impres- 
sive, but  its  use  in  the  canal  work  has  been  bewilder- 
ingly  heavy. 

The  following  table  shows  the  amount  of  dynamite 
used  for  the  nine  years  of  American  operations : 

1904  and  1905  500,000  lbs. 

1906  1,400,000    " 

1907  5,087,000    " 

1908  6,822,000    " 

1909  8,270,000    " 

1910   10,403,000    " 

191 1    9-501.850    " 

1912   8,533,000    " 

1913    3.986,500    " 

174 


THE    CULEBRA    CUT 

Most  of  the  explosive  has  been  used  in  the  Culebra 
cut.  It  is  estimated  that  a  pound  of  dynamite  will 
break  up  2.14  cubic  yards  of  rock  and  earth,  and  as 
much  as  26  tons  has  been  set  off  in  one  blast  in  the 
canal.  Stringent  rules  have  prevailed  to  prevent  ac- 
cidents, and  while  deaths  from  this  cause  have  run 
into  the  hundreds  the  handling  of  this  amount  of 
dynamite  has  been  distinguished  for  the  small  number 
of  fatalities.  In  September,  1908,  a  steam  shovel  dug 
up  a  bushel  of  dynamite  left  by  the  French  in  1887, 
but  it  had  lost  its  potency.  The  largest  single  ship- 
ment of  dynamite  to  Panama  was  846  tons  received 
on  June  27,  191 1,  without  an  accident  in  loading  or 
unloading  from  the  steamer. 

All  through  the  day  drills,  operated  by  compressed 
air,  are  boring  into  the  rock  in  the  Cut  for  24  feet. 
A  small  charge  of  powder  is  set  off  at  the  bottom 
of  these  holes  to  enlarge  them  for  the  real  charge 
of  as  much  as  200  pounds.  Then  after  the  men  have 
quit  for  the  noon  hour,  or  after  five  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  the  charges  are  set  off  by  electric  current. 
It  sounds  like  the  steady  booming  of  artillery  in  the 
Cut.  Many  persons  have  been  killed  by  being  struck 
by  rocks  hurled  long  distances  in  these  blasts.  The 
next  morning  the  steam  shovels  find  plenty  of  food 
for  their  hungry  jaws,  which  bite  off  four  or  five 
cubic  yards  at  a  dip,  swing  around  and  drop  the  six 
or  seven  tons  upon  the  cars.  Frequently  they  lift 
rocks  so  heavy  that  the  cars  are  broken. 

From  150  to  175  trains  a  day  loaded  with  ex- 
cavated materials  leave  the  Culebra  cut  for  the  dumps. 

175 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

A  great  deal  has  gone  to  build  the  mighty  Gatun  dam ; 
much  has  been  used  in  reclaiming  nearly  400  acres 
from  the  ocean  at  Balboa,  the  Pacific  terminal;  the 
new  Panama  Railroad  has  required  millions  of  yards 
in  making  fills;  and  the  breakwater  at  Balboa  also 
has  taken  a  considerable  amount.  What  could  not 
be  usefully  employed  has  been  wasted  on  dumps.  The 
average  haul  from  the  Cut  has  been  twelve  miles,  but 
as  much  as  thirty  miles  must  be  traveled  by  some  of 
the  dirt  trains.  Twenty  flat  cars  constitute  a  train 
and  one  car  can  be  loaded  by  a  shovel  in  two  and  a 
half  minutes,  or  with  seven  scoops ful  of  earth  and 
rock.  When  the  trains  get  to  the  dumps,  an  unloading 
plow  is  drawn  by  a  steel  cable  over  the  flat  cars,  sweep- 
ing the  material  off  the  side  which  is  open.  Then 
spreaders  are  pushed  over  the  track  to  shove  the  ma- 
terial to  one  side  and  down  the  embankment.  Track 
shifters  later  come  along  and  move  the  track  over  to 
the  edge  of  the  fill.  Between  1,000,000  and  1,500,000 
yards  have  gone  out  of  the  Culebra  cut  every  month, 
except  one,  since  December,   1907. 

The  employees  are  carried  from  the  various  towns 
to  their  work  in  the  Cut,  or  on  the  locks  and  dams,  by 
labor  trains.  The  largest  labor  train  in  the  world 
was  operated  out  of  Panama  to  Pedro  Miguel  until 
July,  191 2,  when  it  was  divided  into  two  sections. 
These  trains  bring  them  to  their  homes,  or  the  hotels, 
for  the  noon  meal,  consuming  from  ten  minutes  to 
half  an  hour  in  the  journey.  But  as  the  rest  period 
at  noon  is  for  two  hours  in  the  Canal  Zone,  ample 
time  for  eating  is  allowed.     Tourists  go  through  the 

176 


THE    CULEBRA    CUT 

Cut  on  a  special  train  that  costs  the  government  a 
great  deal  of  money  because  of  the  disarrangement  of 
dirt  train  schedules,  every  minute  a  shovel  is  kept 
idle  thereby  costing  Uncle  Sam  a  pretty  penny  and 
making  the  men  swear  because  they  may  be  sweating 
for  a  record  day's  work. 

In  the  month  of  IMarch,  1909,  more  dirt  was  taken 
out  than  in  the  first  twenty-two  months  of  operations. 
The  excavation  in  one  month  usually  exceeds  an 
amount  equal  to  the  Pyramid  of  Cheops,  which  is 
750  feet  square  and  451  feet  high.  The  canal  force 
of  1909-1910-1911  would  have  dug  and  finished  the 
Suez  Canal,  March,  191 1,  retains  the  record  for  the 
greatest  excavation  in  the  Cut,  when  1,728,748  yards 
were  removed,  and  this  also  is  the  record  month  for 
excavation  for  the  whole  canal,  with  a  total  removal 
of  3,327,443  yards.  The  average  daily  output  of 
steam  shovels  rose  from  500  yards  in  1905,  when  only 
dirt  was  handled,  to  1,500  yards  in  191 1,  when  rock 
predominated.  The  cost  in  the  Central  division  has 
ranged  from  10  cents  a  yard  to  91  cents  a  yard,  with 
an  average  of  91  cents,  from  1904  to  1909,  and  fell 
to  51  cents  in  1911-12. 

Rains  interfere  with  the  excavation  work  in  the  Cut, 
reducing  the  output  in  the  rainy  season  several  hun- 
dred thousand  yards  a  month.  During  the  downpours, 
operations  must  be  suspended,  but  the  Cut  has  been 
dug  at  a  slant  on  both  sides  of  the  mountain  system, 
so  that  water  is  drained  out  of  it  by  gravity,  running 
out  at  both  ends.     Rivers  which  crossed  the  line  of 

177 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

the  canal  have  been  diverted  by  digging  new  channels 
for  them. 

The  precise  date  when  the  canal  was  half  dug,  in 
the  year  1910,  cannot  be  fixed  until  the  water  is 
turned  into  the  Cut  and  dredges  begin  handling  the 
slides,  after  ships  are  using  the  canal,  but  on  a  basis 
of  221,000,000  yards  excavation,  it  was  half  done 
about  July  i,  19 10.  Slides  make  a  revision  of  the 
estimates  almost  a  monthly  task  for  the  Chief  En- 
gineer, The  Culebra  cut  was  half  finished  about  July 
I,  1910. 

Almost  at  the  wind-up  of  operations  the  canal  dig- 
gers made  the  highest  records  for  excavation.  On 
April  II,  1912,  forty-four  steam  shovels  took  out 
68,505  yards  in  the  Cut,  which  is  the  record  for  one 
day  in  that  division.  Steam  shovel  No.  257  working 
at  Gatun  took  out  5,554  yards  in  one  day,  the  high- 
est record  in  the  Canal  Zone  for  one  shovel,  the  date 
being  May  2,  1912,  and  in  August,  1912,  the  same 
shovel  made  a  record  by  removing  86,844  yards  in 
26  working  days. 

That  part  of  the  Central  division  which  is  little 
mentioned,  extends  from  the  Gatun  locks  to  the  en- 
trance of  the  Culebra  cut,  about  twenty-three  miles. 
Only  about  12,400,000  yards  had  to  be  excavated  to 
complete  this  channel  as  it  follows  the  Chagres  River 
valley  from  about  sea-level  to  Bohio,  then  the  level 
rises  until  it  reaches  48  feet  above  sea-level  at  the 
Cut.  From  Gatun  to  Obispo  the  Chagres  River  crossed 
the  line  of  the  canal  twenty-three  times.  In  the  same 
distance  the  Chagres  River  has  26  tributaries,  the  more 

178 


THE    CULEBRA    CUT 

important  ones  being  the  Gatun  and  Trinidad  rivers. 
All  contribute  to  the  great  Gatun  Lake. 

The  slides,  which  have  been  accurately  and  inac- 
curately exploited  in  the  press,  represent  the  steep 
sides  of  the  Culebra  cut  breaking  off  and  falling  down 
into  the  excavated  part.  Even  where  the  Cut  has  been 
sunk  through  solid  rock  these  slides  occur,  as  the  rock 
formations  of  the  Isthmus  are  brittle  and  dissolve 
to  dust  after  exposure  to  the  atmosphere.  An  attempt 
was  made  to  prevent  slides  by  plastering  the  sides  of 
the  Cut  with  concrete,  but  the  experiments  were  fu- 
tile. There  are  between  fifteen  and  twenty  important 
slides  on  both  sides  of  the  nine-mile  Cut,  the  largest 
being  on  the  West  side  of  the  canal  near  the  town  of 
Culebra,  and  embracing  6;^  acres.  Around  the  towns 
of  Culebra  and  Empire  are  many  smaller  slides  that 
have  given  much  trouble  to  the  engineers.  Steam 
shovels,  locomotives,  and  flat  cars  have  been  caught 
in  these  slides,  but,  singularly,  few  lives  have  been 
lost. 

Sometimes  the  pressure  on  the  sides  of  the  canal 
operate  to  make  the  earth  bulge  up  in  the  bottom  of 
the  Cut.  Division  Engineer  Gaillard  devised  the  plan 
of  terracing  the  sides  of  the  Cut  to  relieve  this  pres- 
sure with  the  result  that  much  extraneous  material 
has  been  prevented  from  sliding  into  the  Cut.  En- 
gineers who  formerly  stood  stanchly  for  the  sea-level 
type  of  canal,  after  seeing  the  slides  of  the  present 
85-foot  level  lock  type,  are  forced  to  admit  that  the 
attempt  to  sink  a  cut  through  the  Isthmus  for  a  sea- 
level  channel  would  be  attended  by  such  prodigious 

179 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

earth  movements,  necessitating  such  an  inestimable 
additional  excavation,  as  to  make  it  well  nigh  im- 
possible. For  a  sea-level  canal  the  Culebra  cut  would 
have  to  go  85  feet  deeper  than  in  the  present  plan, 
which  would  require  both  a  wider  bottom  and  indefi- 
nitely wider  surface  opening,  and  then  the  slides  would 
be  immeasurably  greater  than  at  present.  The  best 
year's  work  in  the  Culebra  cut  was  16,586,891  yards. 
Slides  first  and  last  have  added  more  than  that  amount 
to  the  total  estimate  of  excavation  for  the  division. 
Yet  the  increase  in  efficiency  of  the  organization  has 
enabled  the  workers  to  handle  the  extra  amount  within 
the  time  and  cost  estimated  for  taking  out  the  original 
yardage. 

Three  methods  of  excavation  have  been  employed 
in  digging  the  seven  miles  of  sea-level  channel  on  the 
Atlantic  side  and  the  eight  miles  of  similar  channel 
on  the  Pacific  side.  Steam  shovels  dug  down  on  the 
Atlantic  side  to  forty  feet  below  sea-level,  with  great 
dikes  to  hold  out  the  water,  and  dredges  have  done 
the  remainder  of  the  excavating.  On  the  Pacific  side, 
in  addition  to  dredges  and  shovels  the  hydraulic 
method  has  been  used.  This  method  consists  of  play- 
ing a  powerful  stream  of  water  on  the  earth  and 
draining  the  water  with  the  soil  in  a  fluid  state  to  a 
selected  dump  which  has  been  boarded,  the  water  being 
drained  off  when  the  mud  has  deposited.  The  Atlantic 
entrance  required  an  excavation  of  47,523,000  cubic 
yards  and  the  Pacific  entrance  58.287,000  yards.  On 
July  I,  1912,  the  former  lacked  8,592,773  yards  of 

180 


THE    CULEBRA    CUT 

completion  and  the  latter  18,348,176  yards  of  comple- 
tion. Of  the  amount  removed  to  July,  1912,  from 
both  channels — 78,868,134  yards — steam  shovels  ex- 
cavated only  14,016,409  yards,  but  it  was  decided  to 
remove  most  of  the  remaining  material  in  the  Pacific 
channel  by  steam  shovels  during  the  remainder  of 
1 91 2  and  in  191 3,  to  about  July  ist,  when  it  is  planned 
to  take  the  great  dredge  Corozal  through  the  channel, 
and  locks  up  into  the  Culebra  cut  for  the  work  of 
handling  slides  and  silt  after  the  water  is  turned  into 
the  Cut,  in  preparation  for  the  passage  of  the  first  ship 
in  September. 

The  following  table  shows  the  excavation  year  by 
year  in  the  Culebra  cut,  from  May  4,  1904,  to  May 
4,  1 9 13,  a  period  of  nine  years  of  American  opera- 
tions : 

From  May  4,  1904  to  May  4,  1905 .      648,91 1  cu.  yds. 
"  "  "      1906.    1,250,570     " 

"      1907-   4,861,895     " 
"      1908.11,285,217     " 

"      1909-13,955753     " 
**      1910.14,886,427     " 

"      1911.15,925,976     " 

"      1912.16,446,313     " 

"      1913.14,754,155     " 


9yrs.  94,015,217  cu.  yds. 


By  calendar  years,  the  excavation  in  the  Culebra 
cut  is  as  follows,  to  September,  191 3: 

181 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 


1904 243,472  cu 

1905 914,254 

1906 2,702,991 

1907 9,i77'i30 

1908 13,912,453 

1909 14,557,034 

1910 15,398,599 

191 1 16,596,891 

1912 15,314,978 

1913 9,200,000 


yds. 


99,015,217011.  yds. 


For  the  whole  canal,  the  excavation  year  by  year 
since  1904  was  as  follows: 


May  4  to  December  31.  1904 243,472  cu 

January  i  to       "  1905 1,799,227 

"  "  1906 4.948,497 

1907 15.765,290 

"      "     1908 37,116,735 

"      "     1909 35,096,166 

"      "     1910 31,437,677 

"      "     191 1 31,603,899 

"      "     1912 29,258,852 

"  to  August  31,  191 3 13,653,564 


yds. 


205,933,379  cu.  yds. 


The  above  table  estimates  the  excavation  by  the 
time  the  first  ship  is  scheduled  to  pass  through  the 


1^2 


THE    CULEBRA    CUT 

canal.  Terminal  works  at  Balboa  requiring  more  than 
8,000,000  yards  excavation,  and  finishing  details  of 
the  canal  channel  proper,  will  bring  the  total  excava- 
tion, by  January  i,  19 14,  when  the  canal  is  expected 
to  be  in  regular  commercial  use,  to  221,000,000  cubic 
yards. 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  calendar  year  1908  marks 
the  highest  record  for  annual  excavation  since  the 
Americans  began,  overtopping  the  nearest  year's  rec- 
ord by  more  than  two  million  yards.  It  also  represents 
the  amazing  increase  of  two  and  a  half  times  the  out- 
put of  the  year  1907,  just  preceding  it,  the  explanation 
of  which  is  found  in  the  fact  that  the  long  period  of 
preparation  has  been  passed  in  1907  and  the  great 
canal  organization,  built  up  by  Mr.  Stevens,  struck  its 
stride  and  plunged  dynamically  at  the  natural  ob- 
stacles. 

The  year  1908  recorded  the  greatest  annual  exca- 
vation in  the  Atlantic  division,  the  year  1909  the  maxi- 
mum excavation  in  the  Central  division,  and  for  the 
Pacific  division  the  highest  annual  excavation  was  in 
1910. 

In  the  late  spring  of  1912,  the  press  in  the  United 
States  exploited  the  discovery  of  volcanic  formations 
in  the  bottom  of  the  Culebra  cut.  The  engineers  have 
not  been  alarmed  by  these  vaporous  emissions,  which, 
in  July,  had  about  stopped,  and  were  caused,  according 
to  the  Commission  geologist,  by  the  warm  atmospheric 
effect  upon  pyrite  material.  A  great  variety  of  col- 
ored stones  are  found  in  the  blasted  material  in  the 
Cut,  and  when  cut  and  polished  make  attractive  ring 

183 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

settings  and  other  souvenirs.  One  crystal-like  stone 
has  been  found  hard  enough  to  cut  glass.  No  coal 
or  other  usable  minerals  have  been  struck  in  the  ex- 
cavations. 

In  the  first  plans  for  relocating  the  Panama  Rail- 
road, it  was  designed  to  run  the  tracks  on  the  edge 
of  the  Cut  at  an  elevation  of  lo  feet  above  the  water 
level,  but  the  slides  made  this  impossible.  The  new 
line  was  placed  well  back  from  the  Cut  away  from  the 
probability  of  slides.  An  observation  tower  used  by 
thousands  of  tourists,  back  of  the  town  of  Culebra, 
for  viewing  operations  in  the  Cut,  was  removed  in 
June,  1912,  just  in  time  to  prevent  its  sliding  into  the 
cut,  and  in  August  two  slides  near  Empire  threw 
1,200,000  yards  into  the  Cut,  or  more  than  a  month's 
work. 

It  will  be  a  time  of  mingled  emotions  when  the  canal 
employees  stand  on  the  side  of  the  Cut,  in  191 3,  and 
watch  the  waters  of  Gatun  Lake  creep  up  and  cover 
the  scene  of  nine  years'  work,  and  then  to  watch  a 
ship  pass  in  an  interoceanic  trip  that  has  been  the 
dream  of  four  centuries. 


184 


CHAPTER   XVI 

LABOR 

SAN  FRANCISCO'S  Exposition,  in  191 5,  cele- 
brating the  formal  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
will  be  the  most  truly  international  Exposition  ever 
held  in  this  country  or  any  other. 

Not  only  is  the  object  of  the  Exposition  interna- 
tional in  interest,  but  there  is  not  a  nation  under  the 
sun,  possibly,  which  has  not  contributed  some  of  its 
citizens  to  the  construction  force  of  the  canal.  Pan- 
ama always  has  been  cosmopolitan,  a  world  transit 
route.  The  actual  promise  of  building  a  canal,  made 
when  the  Americans  took  charge,  centered  the  eyes  of 
the  adventurous  spirits  of  all  races  in  the  direction  of 
the  Isthmus. 

Every  nation  which  participates  in  the  Exposition 
will  feel  a  pride  that  the  canal,  in  some  measure,  large 
or  small,  owes  its  being  to  the  efforts  of  its  own  sub- 
jects. The  list  of  nationalities,  or  geographical  desig- 
nations, represented  among  the  employees  of  the  Com- 
mission, or  the  Panama  Railroad,  gives  an  idea  of  the 
international  appeal  the  canal  exerts. 

These  eighty-six  varieties  of  canal  employees  afford 
an  opportunity  to  brush  up  on  geography.  In  the  cen- 
sus of  the  Canal  Zone,  taken  in  February,  1912,  forty 
nationalities  are  listed,  while  in  the  following  list,  geo- 
graphical subdivisions  are  noted  to  emphasize  the 
variegated  labor  supply  at  Panama: 

185 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 


Africa. 

Fiji  Islands. 

Norway. 

Algeria. 

Finland. 

Panama. 

Antigua. 

Fortune  Islands. 

Peru. 

Arabia. 

France. 

Porto  Rico. 

Argentine. 

French  Guiana. 

Portugal. 

Australia. 

Germany. 

Philippines. 

Austria. 

Greece. 

Roumania. 

Barbados. 

Grenada. 

Russia. 

Belgium. 

Guadeloupe. 

San  Salvador. 

Bolivia. 

Guinea. 

Santo  Domingo. 

Brazil. 

Guiana. 

St.  Croix. 

Bulgaria. 

Guatemala. 

St.  Kitts. 

Bahama  Islands. 

Hindustan. 

St.  Lucia. 

Bermuda  Islands. 

Honduras. 

St.  Martins. 

Bohemia. 

Holland. 

St.  Thomas. 

British  Honduras. 

Hungary. 

St.  Vincent, 

Canada. 

Iceland. 

Scotland. 

Chile. 

India. 

Spain. 

China. 

Ireland. 

Sweden. 

Colombia. 

Italy. 

Switzerland. 

Costa  Rica. 

Jamaica. 

Syria. 

Cuba. 

Japan. 

Trinidad. 

Curacao. 

Liberia. 

Turkey. 

Demerara. 

Martinique. 

Turks  Island. 

Dominica. 

Mexico. 

Uruguay. 

East  Indies. 

Montserrat. 

Venezuela. 

Ecuador. 

Nassau. 

West  Indies. 

Egypt. 

Nevis. 

England. 

Nicaragua. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  American  occupation,  in 
1904,  there  were  746  men  employed  on  the  canal.  Ac- 
cording to  the  Quartermaster's  department  the  highest 
force  of  record  since  then  was  on  March  30,  1910, 
when  the  pay-rolls  showed  38,676  employees.  This 
record  nearly  was  reached  on  January  10,  191 2,  when 
there  were  38,505  employees  on  the  rolls.  The  cen- 
sus report,  as  of  February  i,  191 2,  estimated  the  num- 

186 


LABOR 

ber  of  employees  as  42,174,  for  the  Commission  and 
the  Panama  Railroad,  which  would  be  the  record  force 
in  the  history  of  the  project,  and  not  likely  to  be 
equaled  again  with  the  canal  nearing  completion. 

In  the  following  tables  the  maximum  force  for  each 
year  under  the  Americans  is  given,  from  figures  re- 
ported by  the  Quartermaster  and  the  Sanitary  de- 
partment. The  discrepancy  in  favor  of  the  Sanitary 
department  is  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  from 
five  to  ten  thousand  workers  always  have  been  in  the 
Canal  Zone  in  excess  of  the  number  actually  employed, 
and  had  to  be  cared  for  the  same  as  the  regularly 
employed  men.  The  third  column  shows  the  number 
of  Americans  in  the  Canal  Zone  for  the  same  period. 

Year  Quarter-  Sanitary  Ameri- 

master  Dept.  cans 

1904 3<5oo  6,213  700 

1905  10,500  16,512  1,500 

1906 23,901  26,547  3,264 

1907  3i»967  39.238  5.000 

1908  33-170  43391  5.126 

1909  35.405  47.167  5,300 

1910  38.676  50,802  5,573 

1911  37.271  48,876  6,163 

1912  38,505  48,000  6,008 

The  percentage  of  Americans  in  the  total  working 
force  usually  has  been  one  sixth  or  one  seventh. 
Their  work  is  of  a  supervisory  character,  or  skilled 
labor,  such  as  mechanics,  carpenters,  plumbers,  ma- 
sons, electricians,  etc.    They  also  are  the  steam  shovel, 

187 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

locomotive  and  marine  engineers,  railroad  conductors, 
time  inspectors,  firemen,  policemen,  all  branches  of 
civil  administration,  office  forces,  sanitary  and  hospital 
officers,  foremen,  civil  engineers,  and  the  Hke.  In  19 12 
there  were  4,064  wives  and  children  of  American  em- 
ployees. 

Laborers  did  not  come  to  the  Canal  Zone  in  suffi- 
cient numbers  during  the  early  years,  necessitating  re- 
cruiting offices  in  Europe,  the  West  Indies,  and  the 
United  States.  A  total  of  43,000  men  were  imported 
under  contract  with  the  Commission,  from  1904  to 
1 9 10,  and  it  was  thought  the  labor  problem  had  been 
solved,  but  in  July,  August,  and  September,  191 1,  it 
became  necessary  to  import  1,300  laborers  to  fill  up 
the  ranks  depleted  by  the  migration  of  employees  to 
other  Central  and  South  American  fields. 

Spain  furnished  the  largest  number  of  European 
laborers  to  the  canal  until  the  government  of  that 
country,  in  1908,  forbid  further  emigration  to  Pan- 
ama. The  Spaniards  also  proved  to  be  the  most 
satisfactory  common  labor  employed  by  the  Com- 
mission. Out  of  a  total  of  11,797  European  labor- 
ers imported  to  19 10,  8,222  were  Spaniards,  and 
the  others  came  principally  from  Italy,  France,  and 
Armenia. 

The  colored  labor  predominates  iw  the  Canal  Zone 
and  was  obtained  in  the  islands  of  the  West  Indies. 
Barbados  furnished  the  largest  number,  19,448;  Mar- 
tinique, 5,542;  Guadeloupe,  Jamaica,  Trinidad,  St. 
Kitts,  Curacao,  Fortune  Islands,  etc.,  4,677 — a  grand 
total  of  29,667.     Costa  Rica,  Colombia,  and  Panama 

188 


LABOR 

furnished  1,493:  unclassified,  2,163.  The  largest  im- 
migration for  one  year  was  in  1907,  when  14.942 
laborers  were  imported,  while  in  1906,  12,609  ar- 
rived. 

Chief^Engineer  Stevens  in  his  first  annual  report 
estimated  the  native  labor  to  be  about  33  per  cent  as 
efficient  as  common  American  laboE     Hmvever,  this 


standard  has  been  raised  under  the  perfection  of  the 
organization  in  later  years,  though  nothing  like  the 
capacity  for  hard  and  effective  work,  shown  in  labor 
under  private  management  in  the  United  States,  has 
been  developed.  Mr.  Stevens  asked  for  bids  for  sup- 
plying 2,500  Chinese  coolies  to  the  Canal  Zone,  in 
1906,  with  a  provision  for  15,000  if  needed,  but  this 
move  never  resulted  in  importing  any  Chinese  under 
contract.  Conditions  as  to  pay,  quarters,  and  treat- 
ment received  such  favorable  advertising  that,  in  19 10, 
more  than  2,000  Europeans  voluntarily  came  to  the 
Canal  Zone  to  seek  employment. 

The  color  line  has  been  dra^vnJiiJiie_Canal  Zone 
by  dividing  the  ^iployees  into  ''  gold  "  andj^lver  " 
men.  In  the  first  category  are  the  Americans,  and  in 
the  second  the  common  and  unskilled  laborers.  Wages 
are  paid  in  silver  to  the  laborers  and  salaries  to  the 
Americans  are  paid  in  gold.  This  distinction  is  not 
a  hard  and  fast  one  and  the  idea  was  adopted  as  the 
best  means  for  the  Government  to  draw  the  color 
line — a  practice  it  would  not  attempt  under  the  Con- 
stitution in  the  United  States.  Second-class  coaches 
are  provided  on  the  trains,   special  windows   in  the 

189 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

post  offices,  special  clerks  in  the  commissary,  and  sep- 
arate eating  places  for  the  silver  employees. 

Stability  has  not  been  a  feature  of  the  American 
working  force  at  Panama.  In  191 1,  the  gold  force 
changed  to  the  extent  of  60  per  cent,  and  the  average 
stay  on  the  Isthmus,  of  mechanics,  has  been  only  one 
year.  The  reason  for  this  is  found  partly  in  the  fact 
that  many  workers  come  simply  to  see  the  big  job 
and  make  expenses  while  on  the  trip  and  partly  in  the 
lack  of  diversions  after  work  hours.  There  are  sa- 
loons in  the  Canal  Zone,  and  the  clubhouses  afford 
billiards,  pool,  bowling,  gymnasium,  reading  room, 
and  a  weekly  moving  picture  show,  but  the  simple 
life  rules  supreme,  palling  on  those  who  have  a  taste 
for  the  gay  white  lights.  Panama  and  Colon  do  not 
afford  much  greater  entertainment  if  they  were  easily 
accessible  to  the  inland  canal  employees.  This  lack 
of  relaxation  and  recreation  facilities  is  the  only  draw- 
back to  the  otherwise  ideal  working  conditions  in  the 
Canal  Zone.  Eat,  sleep,  and  work  is  the  monotonous 
round  of  the  canal  employee  and  the  most  of  them 
save  money. 

Tourists  in  the  Canal  Zone  commonly  do  not  see 
the  great  shops  at  Gorgona  and  Empire,  where  repairs 
for  the  machinery  and  equipment  used  in  building  the 
canal  are  made,  and  where  original  iron  and  steel 
construction  is  done.  The  Gorgona  shops  cover  about 
22  acres  and  have  seven  miles  of  tracks.  Much  small 
iron  work,  such  as  making  bolts,  machinery  parts  and 
pattern  work,  is  done  more  cheaply  than  in  the  United 
States,   when  freight  to  the  Isthmus  is  considered. 

190 


I.  Old  FKiiNcii  Locumotivk.     2.  Steam    Shovel.     3.   Slide  in 
CuLEiiRA  Cut.    4.  Track  Shifter. 


LABOR 

Owing  to  the  long  distance  from  the  base  of  supplies 
these  shops  early  were  equipped  to  do  any  work  the 
canal  plant  might  require.  All  equipment  on  the  canal 
receives  rough  handling  in  the  desire  to  make  records 
in  excavation,  dumping  or  concrete  laying,  with  the 
consequence  that  the  shops  usually  are  crowded  with 
"^--broken-down  dump  cars,  locomotives,  steam  shovels, 
and  other  apparatus.  Gorgona  is  the  Pittsburgh  of  the 
Canal  21one.  'The  town  and  shops  will  have  to  be 
abandoned  before  the  opening  of  the  canal  as  the 
waters  of  Gatun  Lake  will  surround  it,  and  cover  the 
present  shop  site. 

Many  labor-saving  devices  have  been  born  of  ne- 
cessity in  the  Canal  Zone.  The  honor  for  inventing 
the  greatest  of  these  belongs  to  W.  G.  Bierd,  formerly 
general  manager  of  the  Panama  Railroad,  and  the 
man  who  most  largely  was  responsible  for  bringing 
that  archaic  system  from  chaos  to  order,  under  Chief 
Engineer  Stevens.  He  originated  a  Track  Shifter 
which  does  the  work  of  500  men  in  one  day  and  re- 
quires only  nine  men  to  operate  it.  This  locomotive 
machine  has  a  crane  which  raises  the  tracks,  ties  and 
all,  clear  of  the  ground,  then  swings  it  to  the  side 
for  three  feet  or  more,  according  to  the  elasticity  of 
the  rails.  Thus  the  hand  method,  of  pulling  out  spikes, 
removing  the  ties  to  the  desired  place  and  relaying  the 
rails,  is  abolished.  If  we  figure  that  one  track  shifter 
has  worked  an  average  of  300  days  in  the  last  six 
years,  it  has  done  work  which  by  the  old  hand  method 
would  have  required  more  than  1,000,000  men  to  do 
in  one  day,  or  500  men  working  each  day  during  the 

191 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

six  years.  The  track  shifter  in  that  six  years  re- 
quired 16,200  men,  on  the  basis  of  nine  men  a  day, 
for  its  operation.  There  were  three  track  shifters 
when  Col.  Goethals  took  charge  in  1907  and  there 
were  ten  in  1912.  At  10  cents  an  hour,  500  men  a 
day  would  cost  $400.  In  a  year  this  would  be 
$120,000  and  in  six  years  $720,000,  but  that  estimate 
of  the  cost  by  the  hand  method  is  too  low,  and  when 
the  number  in  use  is  considered,  making  allowances 
for  hours  not  at  work,  the  track  shifter  has  saved  the 
government  several  million  dollars.  Mr.  Bierd  re- 
ceived nothing  from  the  Commission  for  his  inven- 
tion. A  Spaniard  who  devised  a  simple  method  of 
dumping  steel  cars  received  $50  a  month  royalty. 

Strikes  have  never  been  successful  in  the  Canal 
Zone.  In  1904  President  Roosevelt  gave  the  Com- 
mission the  power  to  expel  anybody  from  the  Canal 
Zone  who,  in  its  discretion,  was  not  necessary  to  the 
work  of  building  the  canal,  or  was  objectionable  for 
any  reason.  No  such  power  resides  in  any  American 
State  government,  but  the  Supreme  Court  held  that 
the  Canal  Zone  was  not  under  the  Constitution  and 
was  subject  to  the  regulation  of  a  military  reservation. 
The  President  took  the  wise  view  that  the  Americans 
were  there  for  the  express  purpose  of  building  a  canal 
and  nobody  should  be  allowed  to  remain  whose  con- 
duct or  presence  might  clog  the  wheels  of  construction. 
This  power  also  has  been  used  to  expel  undesirable 
women  as  well  as  men. 

On  November  22,  19 10,  the  boilermakers  in  the 
Gorgona  and  Empire  shops  struck  for  higher  pay,  and 

192 


LABOR 

for  the  same  vacation  allowance  given  to  employees 
on  a  monthly  pay  basis.  They  v^ere  receiving  65 
cents  an  hour,  or  about  40  per  cent  more  than  similar 
work  in  the  United  States  earned,  and  in  addition  had 
quarters  free.  Their  demand  for  75  cents  an  hour 
was  refused  but  two  weeks'  vacation  with  pay  and 
extra  time  without  pay  was  granted.  Although  the 
strike  crippled  the  shops  for  a  few  weeks,  Col. 
Goethals  saw  to  it  that  they  left  on  the  first  steamers 
out  for  the  United  States  and  the  Washington  recruit- 
ing office  soon  supplied  their  places.  The  steam-shovel 
men,  in  a  restive  mood,  met  the  same  treatment  and 
the  locomotive  engineers,  who  threatened  a  walk-out, 
thought  better  when  they  had  the  alternative  of  re- 
turning forthwith  to  the  United  States,  or  going  to 
work,  presented  to  them. 

This  peremptory  manner  of  handling  employees  is 
justified  only  by  the  peculiar  conditions  at  Panama. 
In  truth  there  never  has  been  any  excuse  for  strikes 
or  dissatisfaction  with  working  conditions,  after  the 
first  two  years.  The  canal  employees  are  the  most 
pampered  set  of  workers  in  the  world.  An  eight- 
hour  day  with  a  two-hour  intermission  at  noon,  first- 
class  board  cheaper  than  in  the  United  States,  free 
quarters,  free  medical  service  on  full  pay,  nine  holi- 
days on  pay,  reduced  railroad  rates,  wages  and  sal- 
aries from  30  to  80  per  cent  higher  than  in  the  United 
States,  an  annual  vacation  of  forty-two  days  on  full 
pay  for  gold  employees,  and  the  necessaries  of  life 
for  sale  at  lower  prices  in  the  government  commis- 
sary than  in  the  United   States. 

193 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

Yet,  with  conditions  of  employment  on  this  Utopian 
basis,  there  has  been  considerable  complaining.  These 
complaints  reached  the  limit  of  absurdity,  in  191 2, 
when  a  petition  was  presented  to  Col.  Goethals  ask- 
ing that  employees  be  paid  for  all  the  sick  leave  they 
did  not  use  during  the  year.  In  other  words,  as  an 
employee  could  be  sick  for  thirty  days  on  pay  in  one 
year,  if  he  was  sick  only  five  days  they  asked  that  the 
twenty-five  days  not  used,  during  which  he  was  being 
paid  for  his  work,  should  receive  an  additional  com- 
pensation of  full  pay  for  that  time.  It  was  a  plain 
invitation  to  the  government  to  pay  employees  not 
to  get  sick.  Col.  Goethals  said  the  Commission  could 
not  even  consider  such  a  proposition. 

It  is  a  noticeable  fact  to  one  who  spends  several 
months  among  the  canal  employees  that  many  look 
upon  themselves  much  in  the  light  of  war  veterans  who 
should  be  pensioned  or  receive  special  consideration 
from  the  government.  Certain  older  employees  are 
the  worst  offenders  in  this  way.  They  think  the  gov- 
ernment owes  them  some  sort  of  a  position  at  equally 
good  pay  for  the  remainder  of  their  lives.  The  pro- 
posal to  reduce  salaries,  for  the  permanent  operating 
force,  to  a  point  25  per  cent  above  the  standard  in 
the  United  States  is  scouted  by  them  as  preposterous. 
Many  of  those  who  went  through  the  hardships  of 
the  first  two  years,  although  they  stayed  with  the  job 
because  it  looked  good  as  a  business  proposition,  now 
assume  that  such  service  entitles  them  to  be  ranked 
as  national  heroes  who  henceforth  are  to  be  the  wards 
of  Uncle  Sam's  bounty.    When  they  finish  at  Panama 

194 


LABOR 

they  expect  to  be  shifted  to  positions  in  the  govern- 
ment service  elsewhere,  at  the  same  pay,  which  would 
be  impossible,  unless  they  were  made  bureau  chiefs 
or  salaries  should  receive  a  perpendicular  treatment 
unknown  to  the  civil  service  in  the  United  States.  The 
older  employees  are  thinning  out,  however,  as  may  be 
noted  by  the  statement  that  in  May,  191 2,  there  were 
only  6^  employees  who  had  come  in  1904. 

No  one  realizes  how  generous  the  government  has 
been  to  its  employees  at  Panama  more  than  the  em- 
ployee who  leaves  the  service  to  return  to  work  in 
the  United  States.  Over  and  over  again  such  em- 
ployees have  returned  to  the  Canal  Zone  to  take  work 
at  wages  or  salaries  less  than  they  were  receiving 
when  they  quit.  One  foreman  drawing  $250  a  month 
in  Panama  decided  he  could  do  as  well  at  home.  In 
a  year  he  returned  to  the  Canal  Zone  and  gladly  took 
a  position  at  65  cents  an  hour,  or  about  $132  a  month. 
The  cost  of  living,  and  standard  of  pay,  in  the  United 
States  made  him  repent  his  action. 

In  many  departments  the  government  work  at  Pan- 
ama is  not  as  exacting  in  its  standard  of  efficiency 
as  under  private  industry  in  the  United  States.  This 
especially  is  true  of  the  transportation  department 
where  young  fellows  are  drawing  $190  a  month,  as 
dirt  train  conductors,  who  could  not  earn  $65  a  month 
as  cub  brakemen  on  a  high-grade  American  railroad. 
The  high  pay  in  the  Canal  Zone  not  only  draws  em- 
ployees back  to  the  job,  but  the  pace  of  American 
industrial  life  is  so  much  swifter  than  the  easy-going 
canal  organization,  that  this,  too,  makes  them  think 

195 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

of  the  flesh-pots  of  Egypt.  The  steam-shovel  men, 
who  are  after  records,  come  nearer  to  the  mark  of 
efiiciency  in  the  United  States  than  perhaps  any  other 
class  of  employees.  Efficiency  here  is  used  in  the 
sense  not  only  of  capability  but  of  productivity,  for 
necessarily  the  canal  organization  is  capable  in  its  en- 
gineering and  administrative  departments,  but  has 
most  of  the  ear-marks  of  a  government  J0I3 — the-take- 
your-time-and-don't-overwork  characteristic. 

Any  employee  on  a  monthly  salary  basis  may  take 
eighty-one  days  off  at  full  pay  in  every  year.  He  has 
a  vacation  of  forty-two  days  on  pay,  a  sick  leave  of 
thirty  days  on  pay,  and  nine  holidays  on  pay,  a  total 
of  eighty-one  days  that  the  government  voluntarily  de- 
prives itself  of  the  employee's  services.  The  sick 
leave,  too,  is  pretty  generally  used  up  by  the  employees, 
who  have  little  trouble  in  persuading  a  district  phy- 
sician they  need  a  rest  at  Taboga  sanitarium  or  Ancon 
hospital.  It  is  apparent  that  the  government  has  in- 
vested some  of  its  millions  in  a  way  no  private  con- 
tractor could  follow,  except  into  bankruptcy.  If  an 
employee  does  not  take  his  vacation  one  year,  he  can 
accumulate  it  for  the  next  year,  and  so  get  84  days 
at  full  pay,  and  his  trip  to  the  United  States  will 
cost  him  only  $20  or  $30  a  one-way  passage. 

Pay  days  until  October  i,  1907,  were  semimonthly. 
Since  then  monthly  pay  days  have  been  the  custom, 
the  pay  car  starting  out  on  the  12th  and  finishing  in 
three  days  for  the  entire  Canal  Zone.  The  Disburs- 
ing Office,  at  Empire,  is  a  great  bank  handling  nearly 
$3,000,000  a  month.     A  Chinaman  and  a  Hindoo  are 

196 


LABOR 

the  expert  money  counters  in  this  office.  Payments 
for  wages  have  increased  from  $600,000  monthly,  in 
1905,  to  nearly  $2,000,000  a  month  as  a  maximum  in 
1910-1911-1912, 

Silver  employees,  or  common  laborers,  earn  5,  7, 
10,  13,  16,  20,  and  25  cents  an  hour,  with  a  few 
exceptions  at  32  and  44  cents  an  hour,  and  a  maxi- 
mum monthly  silver  rate  of  $75. 

Gold  employees,  which  includes  all  the  Americans, 
are  paid  from  a  minimum  of  $75  monthly  to  a  maxi- 
mum of  $600  monthly,  not  including  in  this  classifica- 
tion heads  of  departments.  Col.  Goethals,  as  Chair- 
man and  Chief  Engineer  and  President  of  the  Panama 
Railroad  Company,  receives  $21,000  annually;  other 
members  of  the  Commission,  $14,000  annually; 
clerks,  from  $75  to  $250  monthly;  draftsmen,  $100  to 
$250;  engineers,  assistant,  special  and  designing,  $225 
to  $600 ;  foreman,  $75  to  $275 ;  inspectors,  $75  to 
$250;  marine  masters,  $140  to  $225 ;  master  mechanic. 
$225  to  $275;  physicians,  $150  to  $300;  district  quar- 
termasters, $150  to  $225;  hotel  steward,  $60  to  $175; 
storekeepers,  $60  to  $225;  superintendents,  $175  to 
$583.33;  supervisors,  $200  to  $250;  teachers,  $60  to 
$110;  trainmaster,  $200  to  $275;  yardmaster,  $190  to 
$21.0;  nurses,  $60  to  $150;  policemen,  $80  to  $107.50; 
master  car  builder,  $225 ;  fire  department  privates, 
$100;  traveling  engineer,  $250;  accountants,  $175  to 
$250;  musical  director,  $166.67;  mates,  $100  to  $175; 
postmasters,  $50  to  $137.50. 

Wages  on  an  hourly  basis  are  in  part  as  follows : 
apprentice,  10  to  25  cents;  blacksmith,  32  to  70  cents; 

197 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

boilermakers,  32  to  70  cents ;  bricklayers,  65  cents ;  car 
inspector  and  repairer,  32  to  65  cents;  carpenter,  32 
to  65  cents ;  ship  caulker,  65  cents ;  coach  cabinetmaker, 
65  cents;  coppersmith,  32  to  65  cents;  ironworker,  44 
to  70  cents;  lineman,  32  to  65  cents;  machinist,  32 
to  70  cents;  molder,  7,2  to  70  cents;  painter,  32  to  65 
cents;  pipefitter,  32  to  65  cents;  planing  mill  hand, 
32  to  56  cents;  plumber,  32  to  75  cents;  tinsmith,  32 
to  65  cents;  wireman,  32  to  65  cents;  shipwright,  44 
to  65  cents;  locomotive  engineers  earn  from  $125  to 
$210  monthly;  steam-shovel  engineer  from  $210  to 
$240;  steam  engineer,  $75  to  $200.  The  hourly  rates 
quoted  run  as  high  as  62  per  cent  greater  than  the 
pay  for  similar  work  in  the  United  States  Navy  yards, 
or  private  industries. 

The  canal  was  estimated  to  cost  $375,000,000.  Out 
of  that  amount,  the  part  which  had  gone  into  wages 
and  salaries  to  June  30,  191 2,  was  approximately 
$120,000,000.  By  the  time  the  canal  is  finished,  and 
opened  for  permanent  use,  in  191 4,  this  item  will  reach 
the  startling  total  of  $150,000,000.  From  20  to  25 
per  cent  of  it  has  gone  into  salaries  of  officers  and 
supervisory  employees,  and  from  75  to  80  per  cent 
into  wages  to  skilled  and  unskilled  labor. 

The  Commission  has  the  work  of  repatriation  of 
imported  employees  already  under  way.  While  nearly 
45,000  workers  were  imported  under  contract  that  pro- 
vided for  their  return  home  when  the  canal  was  done, 
the  Commission  will  not  have  anything  like  this  num- 
ber to  repatriate  as  thousands  have  left  voluntarily  to 
new  fields  of  labor  or  quit  the  service  under  conditions 

198 


LABOR 

that  forfeit  their  right  of  return  at  the  Commission's 
expense.  It  will  not  be  difficult  to  get  sufficient  com- 
mon labor  for  the  permanent  canal. 

As  the  conglomeration  of  races  presents  names  im- 
possible of  uniformly  correct  spelling,  every  employee 
has  a  numbered  brass  check  for  identification,  which 
he  must  show  to  get  his  pay. 


199 


CHAPTER    XVII 

COMMISSARY QUARTERS SUBSISTENCE 

DURING  the  first  year  of  American  operations  in 
Panama,  the  problem  of  food  and  merchandise 
supply  for  the  army  of  workers  was  not  worked  out. 
The  Panama  Railroad  long  had  maintained  a  commis- 
sary for  its  employees,  but  its  facilities  totally  were 
inadequate,  as  they  existed  in  1904,  for  satisfactory 
service  to  the  increased  thousands  of  employees  and 
their  families. 

Chief  Engineer  Stevens,  in  1905,  turned  his  atten- 
tion to  this  problem  as  one,  upon  the  proper  solution 
of  which  would  depend  satisfactory  conditions  of  liv- 
ing for  the  canal  workers.  By  April,  1907,  when  he 
resigned,  the  present  commissary  and  hotel  systems,  as 
well  as  the  system  of  housing  the  employees,  which 
challenge  the  admiration  of  the  tourist,  had  been  cre- 
ated, and  all  that  was  left  to  Col.  Goethals  to  do,  in 
this  phase  of  the  task,  was  to  enlarge  the  systems  as 
the  organization  expanded. 

Under  Mr.  Stevens  the  Department  of  Labor,  Quar- 
ters, and  Subsistence  covered  the  whole  ground.  In 
1908,  Col.  Goethals  modified  the  organization  by  cre- 
ating a  Quartermaster's  Department  along  Army  lines, 
which  had  charge  of  all  l)uildings  and  the  accounta- 
bility for  all  physical  property  of  the  Commission, 
the  recruiting  of  labor,  storage  of  material  and  sup- 

200 


COMMISSARY— QUARTERS— SUBSISTENCE 

plies,  collection  of  garbage,  distribution  of  commissary 
merchandise  to  employees,  and  the  cutting  of  grass  as 
directed  by  the  Sanitary  Department.  A  Subsistence 
Department  then  was  created,  which  in  addition  to 
operating  the  hotels,  kitchens,  and  messes,  was  given 
supervision  over  the  Panama  Railroad  Commissary. 
The  bookkeeping  for  the  commissary,  however,  is 
done  by  the  railroad  company  and  the  profits  go  into 
its  accounts,  but  as  the  government  owns  the  rail- 
road, the  distinction  only  is  one  of  bookkeeping. 

Merchants  in  Panama  and  Colon  objected  to  a  gov- 
ernment commissary  on  the  idea  that  it  would  be  a 
competition  not  contemplated  when  the  Canal  Zone 
was  ceded,  and  they  made  overtures  to  the  Commission 
for  taking  over  the  business  of  supplying  canal  em- 
ployees with  the  necessaries  of  life.  Had  this  been 
done  an  inconceivable  amount  of  dissatisfaction  would 
have  resulted,  through  the  ruinously  high  prices  the 
employees  would  have  been  compelled  to  pay  for  the 
privately  owned  merchandise. 

The  government  has  made  a  profit  from  the  com- 
missary operations  because  it  arbitrarily  has  fixed  the 
price  of  commodities  at  a  point  which  would  pay  for 
the  construction  of  storehouses,  and  the  usual  ex- 
penses of  merchandising  two  thousand  miles  from  the 
markets  of  the  world.  But,  owing  to  the  immense 
quantities  in  which  all  articles  are  bought,  and  the 
absence  of  a  grasping  policy  as  to  profits,  the  canal 
employees  customarily  buy  almost  everything  more 
cheaply  than  the  same  merchandise  sells  for  in  the 
United  States. 

201 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

For  one  reason,  there  is  no  tariff  in  the  Canal  Zone. 
Foreign  made  goods  are  imported  without  the  expense 
to  the  consumer  that  the  high  protective  duties  at 
home  necessitate.  Irish  Hnens,  Enghsh  and  Scotch 
cloth,  French  perfumery,  Swiss  and  Scandinavian 
dairy  products,  and  a  wide  variety  of  other  European 
manufactures,  make  the  commissary,  with  the  Ameri- 
can merchandise  in  stock,  a  great  department  store 
which  in  the  fiscal  year  191 2  did  a  business  amounting 
to  $6,702,355.68. 

General  headquarters  are  at  Cristobal,  on  the  At- 
lantic side.  The  steamships  of  the  Panama  Railroad 
Line  every  week  replenish  the  food  supplies  with  sea- 
sonable offerings  from  the  American  markets.  The 
scope  of  the  operations  include  a  laundry,  bakery,  ice 
cream  plant,  ice  factory,  cold  storage,  coffee  roasting 
plant,  and  laboratory  for  making  extracts. 

The  year  191 1  is  typical  of  the  scale  on  which  the 
commissary  has  been  operated  since  1906.  Importa- 
tions of  principal  commodities  were  as  follows : 

Groceries    $1,278,594.79 

Hardware 86,768.86 

Dry  Goods 603,490.18 

Boots  &  Shoes 164,168.89 

Cold  Storage  Supplies   1.573.202.97 

Furniture 9,020.48 

Tobacco   182,590.96 

Raw  Materials 215,375.22 

Paper,  Stationery,  etc 54.579-05 

Total $4,267,792.05 

202 


COMMISSARY— QUARTERS— SUBSISTENCE 

These  importations  do  not  represent  the  total  trans- 
actions of  the  commissary  for  that  year,  as  the  stock 
on  hand,  and  bought  on  the  Isthmus,  ran  the  volume 
of  business  to  $5, 754,955.69.  Of  this  amount  the 
Commission  paid  $1,625,348.77  for  suppHes  used  in 
the  hotels,  messes,  kitchens,  and  elsewhere;  and 
$3,609,358.01  represents  the  amount  of  the  total 
which  was  paid  by  employees  using  coupon  books. 
Nineteen  stores  were  operated  in  as  many  settlements 
and   towns  and   the   average   monthly   business   w^as 

$479-579-69- 

No  cash  sales  are  made  at  the  Commissary.  Em- 
ployees are  issued  coupon  books  in  value  from  $2.50 
to  $15.00  and  containing  coupons  ranging  in  face 
value  from  one  cent  to  twenty-five  cents.  Enough 
coupons  are  torn  out  by  the  clerks  to  cover  each  pur- 
chase. At  the  end  of  each  month  the  value  of  the 
coupon  books  is  deducted  from  the  employee's  salary. 
In  1 91 2  the  practice  of  selling  coupon  books  for  cash 
was  extended  to  the  employees.  Formerly  no  books 
would  be  issued  after  the  28th  nor  before  the  4th  of 
each  month,  and  a  gold  employee  could  only  ask  for 
books  to  the  extent  of  661  per  cent  of  his  salary,  or 
a  silver  employee  for  not  more  than  $15  in  any  one 
month.  While  the  old  method  still  is  in  vogue,  by 
selling  books  for  cash  the  employees  who  thoughtlessly 
failed  to  provide  books  to  run  them  through  the 
month  may  supply  their  needs.  The  books  are  not 
transferable. 

The  quantities  of  various  articles  handled  by  the 
commissary  in  the  year  being  reviewed  were  as  fol- 

203 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

lows:  Eggs,  692,060  dozen;  butter,  429,267  pounds; 
meats,  9,241,858  pounds;  poultry,  554,028  pounds; 
milk  and  cream,  86,466  gallons;  coffee,  320,491 
pounds;  flour,  16,638  barrels;  ice,  33,267  tons;  ice 
cream,   110,208  gallons. 

At  4.30  o'clock  each  morning  a  special  train  of  from 
fourteen  to  eighteen  cars  leaves  Cristobal  with  fresh 
supplies  for  the  towns  in  the  Canal  Zone.  The  branch 
stores  usually  have  small  cold  storage  facilities  to  pre- 
serve such  meats  and  perishable  goods  as  may  be  nec- 
essary for  the  day's  operations.  Once  a  month  the 
Commissary  Bulletin  is  issued,  with  price  lists  and 
announcements  of  special  sales  on  various  articles. 
The  feminine  instinct  for  bargains  thus  is  not 
atrophied  by  residence  in  the  Canal  Zone. 

While  the  cost  of  living  has  been  a  rampant  issue 
in  the  United  States,  the  canal  employees  have  enjoyed 
comparatively  lower  prices,  as  well  as  a  greater  pur- 
chasing power  because  of  higher  pay. 

One  central  laundry  is  operated  for  the  white,  or 
gold,  employees.  In  191 1  there  were  7,260  patrons 
and  3,581,923  pieces  were  laundered.  Patrons  deposit 
their  bundles  at  the  branch  commissaries  in  the  re- 
spective towns  and  they  are  collected  for  shipment 
over  the  railroad  to  Cristobal.  By  this  centraliza- 
tion of  work  the  cost  is  from  30  to  50  per  cent  lower 
than  for  similar  work  in  American  cities.  Cleaning 
and  pressing  are  done  for  both  men  and  women's 
clothes  at  correspondingly  low  rates. 

Panama  hats  are  not  as  extensively  worn  by  the 
Americans  as  one  might  imagine,  and  they  are  not  a 

204 


COMMISSARY— QUARTERS— SUBSISTENCE 

great  deal  cheaper  than  in  the  United  States.  Con- 
trary to  popular  belief,  Panama  hats  are  not  made 
in  Panama.  They  are  made  in  Colombia,  Ecuador, 
and  Peru,  the  finest  coming  from  Montecristi,  Ecua- 
dor. Years  ago  traders  from  those  countries  were  in 
the  habit  of  bringing  the  hats  to  Panama  to  sell  to 
ships  bound  for  the  United  States  or  Europe,  and  so 
they  came  to  be  known  as  Panama  hats.  Imitations 
are  made  in  Jamaica  and  Porto  Rico  and  many  frauds 
are  perpetrated  upon  the  American  people  by  dealers 
who  profess  to  have  genuine  Panama  hats  at  prices 
sometimes  lower  than  our  tariff  would  be  on  the  real 
article.  Prices  vary  according  to  the  length  of  the 
fibers  used  in  their  manufacture,  the  finest  ones  being 
without  any  seams,  and  cost  as  high  as  $150. 

Quarters 

Early  in  1905,  the  Commission  advertised  free 
quarters  to  both  married  and  bachelor  employees  as 
a  special  inducement  to  come  to  the  Canal  Zone. 
Thus,  in  addition  to  high  pay  the  employees  have  no 
house  or  room  rent  to  pay.  This  alone  constitutes  a 
sharp  increase  in  an  employee's  income  over  what  he 
could  earn  in  the  United  States  for  similar  work,  but 
this  is  not  all  he  receives  gratis. 

It  has  been  figured  that  in  six  years  the  Commis- 
sion grants  to  each  married  employee  gratuities  that 
cost  it  $3,000;  and  to  a  bachelor  employee  gratuities 
that  cost  $750.  The  monthly  service,  such  as  com- 
missary, fuel,  and  distilled  water  deliveries,  removal 
of  garbage,  etc.,  to  a  married  employee  costs  $12;  and 

205 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

janitor  service,  and  other  service  to  a  bachelor  em- 
ployee costs  $2.25  monthly.  In  six  years  an  average 
force  of  5,000  employees  has  been  entitled  to  these 
gratuities  and  it  is  figured  that  the  total  investment 
by  the  Commission  in  that  period  for  all  free  service 
and  gratuities  runs  between  ten  and  twenty  million 
dollars. 

To  a  married  employee  the  free  allowance  is  as 
follows :  An  individual  house,  or  an  apartment  in  a 
building  with  two  or  four  families;  a  range,  a  double 
bed,  two  pillows,  six  dining  chairs,  two  kitchen  chairs, 
one  chiffonier,  two  center  tables,  a  mosquito  bar,  a 
refrigerator,  a  double  dresser,  a  double  mattress,  a 
kitchen  table,  a  dining  table,  sideboard,  bedroom  mat, 
and  three  wicker  porch  chairs. 

The  Quartermaster's  Department  delivers  purchases 
from  the  commissary  and  ice;  the  fuel  used  in  the 
kitchen  stove  is  free,  as  are  electricity  and  hydrant  and 
bathroom  water.  Telephones  are  free  if  the  employee 
needs  one  in  connection  with  his  duties.  Housekeep- 
ers must  buy  their  own  tableware,  bedclothes,  light 
furniture  and  bric-a-brac. 

Married  quarters  were  assigned,  in  1905  and  1906, 
on  the  basis  of  one  square  foot  for  each  dollar  of 
salary,  with  extra  allowances  for  the  wife  and  chil- 
dren. This  method  was  abandoned  and  quarters  are 
assigned  without  regard  to  salary,  except  that  offi- 
cials receive  first  consideration.  There  are  one,  two, 
and  four  family  houses,  entirely  screened  on  the  out- 
side. As  a  rule  there  has  been  a  scarcity  of  married 
quarters  and  occasionally  of  bachelor  quarters.    Every 

206 


COMMISSARY— QUARTERS— SUBSISTENCE 

house,  or  apartment,  has  its  shower  bath,  tubs  not 
being  used,  and  each  town  has  a  complete  sewer  sys- 
tem. 

Bachelors,  whether  men  or  women,  are  treated  cor- 
respondingly well.  Quarters  with  two,  three,  or  four 
in  a  room,  and  janitor  service  are  free.  In  the  early 
days  there  was  unpleasant  crowding  because  of  the 
scarcity  of  buildings,  but  only  occasionally  has  there 
been  congestion  in  late  years.  These  buildings  shelter 
from  a  dozen  to  sixty  men  and  like  the  married  quar- 
ters are  screened  on  the  outside.  A  war  was  waged 
until  vermin  practically  was  eradicated.  They  are 
electrically  lighted  and  have  the  usual  shower  bath 
and  sanitary  arrangements.  Barracks  of  a  less  pre- 
tentious architecture  are  provided  for  the  silver  em- 
ployees. 

Hotels  operated  by  the  Commission  are  the  board- 
ing places  for  the  bachelor  employees.  The  wide 
verandas  are  screened  and  tables  here  are  reserved  for 
the  bachelor  girls,  and  for  the  men  who  wear  coats 
at  meal  time.  Inside  the  employees  may  eat  in  their 
shirt  sleeves.  The  meals  cost  thirty  cents  each  and 
are  paid  for  by  coupons  that  come  fifty  to  the  book. 
These  books  cost  $15,  and  the  amount  is  deducted 
from  the  employee's  salary  at  the  end  of  the  month, 
so  that  no  cash  is  handled  at  the  hotels,  except  from 
nonemployees,  who  must  pay  fifty  cents  for  a  meal. 

The  fare  could  not  be  duplicated  in  the  United 
States  for  seventy-five  cents  a  meal.  A  typical  thirty- 
cent  menu  includes  soup,  two  kinds  of  meat,  four  kinds 
of  vegetables,  hot  rolls  or  light  bread,  a  salad,  tea, 

207 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

coffee,  or  cocoa,  and  for  dessert,  ice  cream  or  pie. 
On  every  table  are  fruit,  olives,  preserves,  condiments 
— and  for  several  years  in  the  early  stages,  an  open 
bowl  of  quinine  as  a  malarial  antidote.  To  even  up 
with  the  free  goods  given  to  married  employees,  the 
Commission  furnishes  the  hotels  their  stoves,  furni- 
ture and  fuel  and  does  not  include  these  items  in 
figuring  the  cost  of  operation. 

The  hotels  for_the  gold  employees  usually  havejbeen 
operated  at  a  slight  loss,  wMeJhe_£ii]::QpeanJahoi:ers.'. 
messesTnd  the  colored  laborers'  kitchenshai 


a]2fofTt_  At  the  messes  for  the  Europeans,  principally 
Spaniards  and  Italians,  the  cost  of  three  meals  is^_forty 
cents^vhile  at  the  kitchens  where  the  West  Indian 
"laborers  get  their  food  cooked,  to  take  aw^ay  and  eat, 
the  cost  is  thirty  cents  for  three  meals.  The  food  is 
always  wholesome  and  plentiful  and  the  tastes  of  the 
various  nationalities  are  studied  to  give  them  that  to 
which  they  are  accustomed.  The  West  Indians  con- 
sume more  than  lOO  tons  of  rice  monthly,  the  Italians 
want  macaroni,  and  the  Spaniards  eat  vast  quantities 
of  bread. 

Stewards  at  the  hotels  forjhe^old  employees  jound 
that  each  man  averaged  only  two  rnf^l*^  ^  day  The 
saving  to  an  employee  by  cutting  out  one  meal  is  $9 
a  month.  They  substitute  fruit,  or  a  sandwich  from 
the  clubhouse,  for  the  third  meal  and  in  the  two  they 
do  eat,  stow  away  enough  to  satisfy  their  needs. 
Three  meals  a  day  at  thirty  cents  each  would  cost  %2y 
a  month.  Two  meals  a  day,  or  sixty  for  the  month, 
cost  $18.     Some  of  the  employees  cut  out  breakfast 

208 


COMMISSARY— QUARTERS— SUBSISTENCE 

and  some  lunch,  so  the  stewards  prepare  food  for  an 
average  of  two  meals  per  employee. 

The  Tivoli  Hotel  at  Ancon,  on  the  Pacific  side,  is 
the  tourist  hotel  operated  by  the  Commission,  Its 
rates,  American  plan,  are  $5.50  a  day  and  up.  During 
the  dry  season  it  is  crowded  with  guests,  in  191 2 
about  14,000  tourists  having  visited  the  Canal  Zone, 
There  are  218  rooms  and  a  dining  room  that  will 
seat  750  persons.  An  addition  was  finished  in  191 2 
at  a  cost  of  $57,000,  At  Colon,  on  the  Atlantic  side 
the  Commission  is  building  the  Washington  Hotel,  to 
cost  $500,000,  for  the  use  of  visitors  to  the  Canal 
Zone. 

In  191 1,  the  hotels  for  American  employees  showed 
a  loss  of  $20,905.44;  European  messes,  a  profit  of 
$39,236.63;  colored  laborers'  kitchens,  a  profit  of 
$14,461.95;  and  the  Tivoli  Hotel,  a  profit  of 
$26,227.05. 

Still  another  factor  that  makes  living  in  the  Canal 
Zone  cheaper  than  in  the  United  States  is  the  result 
of  the  climate.  With  a  uniformly  warm  temperature, 
the  quality  of  clothes  does  not  vary  the  year  round. 
For  the  women,  light  summery  goods,  largely  white; 
for  the  men,  duck  or  linen  suits  or  light  staple  cloths. 
The  saving  from  not  having  to  buy  new  clothes  with 
the  change  of  seasons  is  important,  and  the  employees 
generally  try  to  arrange  their  vacations  so  as  to  be 
in  the  United  States  in  mild  weather.  Class  distinc- 
tions are  not  drawn  rigidly,  so  that  there  is  not  a 
furious  competition  in  dressing  or  keeping  up  appear- 

209 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

ances,  but  there  decidedly  is  no  "  slouch  "  in  the  Canal 
Zone. 

A  bride  starts  out  life  there  on  a  basis  that  means 
a  rude  jolt  to  her  when  the  canal  is  finished  and  she 
returns  to  the  United  States.  Young  couples  who 
have  been  treading  the  easy  path  of  high  salary,  free 
rent,  free  water,  light  and  fuel,  cheaper  food,  clothes 
and  furniture,  elastic  class  distinctions  and  plentiful 
though  not  efficient  servants,  must  ever  look  back 
upon  their  Canal  Zone  experience  as  the  particularly 
bright  period  in  their  careers.  The  withering  blasts 
of  social  competition,  high  cost  of  living,  and  salaries 
from  one  to  two  thirds  lower  in  the  United  States, 
will  make  the  easy-going,  over-generous  life  at  Pan- 
ama seem  the  "  temps  de  luxe  "  in  their  lives. 

Transient  writers  visiting  the  canal  dilate  on  the 
happy  demeanor  of  the  employees.  A  perusal  of  the 
foregoing  conditions  of  employment  would  suggest 
that  a  good  many  million  dollars  of  government 
money  have  been  spent  to  buy  that  joyousness.  The 
employees  have  a  very  happy  time  at  the  expense  of 
the  American  people,  yet  it  has  been  a  better  way  of 
investing  money  than  maintaining  useless  navy  yards, 
or  $100,000  Federal  buildings  at  Western  prairie 
hamlets ! 


210 


CHAPTER    XViri 

CIV'IL    ADMINISTRATION 

HAVING  undertaken  an  eleven-year  task  In 
Panama,  the  Americans  realized  at  the  outset 
that  it  must  be  gone  about  with  the  deliberation  of  a 
permanent  settlement  in  the  tropics.  The  problem 
was  to  duplicate  the  civilization  of  the  United  States 
on  a  scale  suitable  to  the  Canal  Zone,  so  that  the 
employees  and  their  families  would  not  lack  for 
anything  essential  to  their  happiness  and  normal  ad- 
vancement. 

In  the  first  conception  of  the  needs  of  the  situation, 
the  position  of  Governor  was  created,  with  ]\Iaj.- 
Gen.  George  W.  Davis  as  the  head  of  civil  govern- 
ment. His  powers  were  coextensive  with  the  Chief 
Engineer  and  the  Chairman  of  the  Commission.  Dur- 
ing the  year  he  spent  in  the  Canal  Zone  as  Governor, 
]\Iaj.-Gen.  Davis  was  occupied  with  engineering  prob- 
lems and  in  settling  disputed  points  with  the  Republic 
of  Panama,  but  substantial  progress  in  organizing  the 
powers  of  government  was  made. 

Charles  E.  Magoon  was  appointed  Governor  on 
April  I,  1905,  to  succeed  Maj.-Gen.  Davis,  and  he 
served  until  September  25,  1906.  Gov.  Magoon  had 
powers  as  extensive  as  Gov.  Davis,  and  the  present 
civil  government  was  rounded  into  form  under  his 
direction.     Ex-Senator  Jo  C.  S.  Blackburn,  of  Ken- 

211 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

tucky,  became  the  head  of  civil  government  with  the 
Goethals  Commission  on  April  i,  1907,  but  the  Presi- 
dent had  transferred  the  vital  powers  of  the  office  to 
the  Chairman  and  Chief  Engineer,  and  thenceforward 
the  Governor  was  known  as  the  Head  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Civil  Administration.  Gov.  Blackburn  re- 
signed on  December  4.  1909,  and  was  succeeded  on 
April  12,  1910,  by  the  Hon.  Maurice  H.  Thatcher, 
also  of  Kentucky. 

This  department  conducts  the  diplomatic  affairs  of 
the  Commission  with  the  Republic  of  Panama  and  the 
representatives  of  foreign  governments  in  Panama. 
It  is  organized  as  follows:  Division  of  Posts,  Cus- 
toms, and  Revenues;  Division  of  Police;  Division  of 
Schools;  Division  of  Fire  Protection;  Division  of 
Public  Works;  Division  of  Courts. 

The  Division  of  Posts,  Customs,  and  Revenues  has 
the  supervision  of  the  Canal  Zone  post  offices,  the 
entrance  and  clearance  of  ships  at  Cristobal  and  Bal- 
boa, the  leasing  and  taxing  of  government  lands,  and 
the  laying  and  collecting  of  taxes  on  houses,  occupa- 
tions, and  businesses.  Every  settlement  has  a  post 
office,  which  the  employees  used  as  a  bank  until  the 
opening  of  the  postal  savings  system  on  February  i, 
191 2.  Since  the  opening  of  the  money-order  depart- 
ment on  June  i,  1906,  the  Canal  Zone  post  offices 
have  sold  more  than  $25,000,000  in  money  orders. 
Out  of  this  amount  more  than  $5,000,000  was  for 
money  orders  payable  in  the  Canal  Zone  and  repre- 
sents a  practice  of  buying  the  orders  to  have  a  safe 
depository  of  surplus  earnings.     When  an  employee 

212 


CIVIL    ADMINISTRATION 

desired  his  money,  he  presented  the  money  order  pay- 
able to  himself.  In  191 1  the  money-order  business 
was  $5,304,906.60,  divided  among  214,000  orders. 
The  great  bulk  of  the  orders  was  payable  in  the 
United  States.  Postage  rates  are  the  same  as  in  the 
United  States,  but  Panama  stamps  are  used. 

Spanish  taxing  methods  were  followed,  so  far  as 
was  practicable,  by  the  Americans  in  dealing  with  the 
natives.  The  sixty  or  seventy  saloons  that  the  Com- 
mission licensed  in  the  Canal  Zone  are  regulated 
strictly  and  pay  an  annual  license,  each,  of  $1,200. 
Selling  liquor  on  government  property  is  another  in- 
stance where  the  Canal  Zone  is  an  exception  to  the 
rules  followed  in  the  United  States.  Only  revocable 
leases  for  lands  are  issued  to  the  natives  now,  so  that 
the  Canal  Zone  may  be  cleared  of  all  but  employees  on 
short  notice. 

The  Division  of  Police  was  organized  by  George  R. 
Shanton,  a  Western  type  of  rough-and-ready  sheriff, 
specially  selected  by  President  Roosevelt.  The  divi- 
sion now  is  a  well-disciplined  body  of  officers  and 
men,  numbering  forty-one  of  the  former  and  233  of 
the  latter,  of  which  all  the  officers  and  117  of  the 
privates  are  white.  Each  town  has  a  police  station, 
and,  considering  the  conglomeration  of  races,  the 
Canal  Zone  is  conspicuously  law-abiding. 

The  judiciary  system  as  developed  for  the  Canal 
Zone  includes  a  Supreme  Court  at  Ancon,  circuit 
courts  and  district  courts,  with  right  of  appeal  to  the 
Federal  courts  of  the  United  States.  It  was  not  until 
February  6,  1908,  that  jury  trials  for  capital  offenses 

213 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

were  granted,  as  President  Roosevelt  wanted  "  fron- 
tier "  justice  to  prevail,  on  the  idea  that  discipline 
among  the  employees  and  population  best  could  be 
maintained  thereby.  The  first  execution  for  a  capital 
offense  was  on  November  20,  1908.  The  first  jury 
trial  was  on  March  19,  1908.  The  natives  found 
American  ideals  of  justice  somewhat  exacting,  espe- 
cially the  one  requiring  all  those  of  opposite  sexes 
who  lived  together  to  be  married  formally.  Free  love 
was  a  practice  of  long  standing.  A  penitentiary, 
maintained  at  Culebra,  will  be  relocated  on  the  east 
side  of  the  canal  for  the  permanent  organization.  The 
native  people  have  been  nick-named  "  spiggoty " 
by  the  Americans  from  their  expression  "  speeka-da- 
Engleesh,"  which  finally  was  contracted  into  "  spig- 
goty." 

Fires  have  been  unusually  rare  occurrences  in  the 
Canal  Zone,  where  all  construction  is  frame.  The 
largest  and  only  fire  of  consequence  was  at  Mt.  Hope 
on  April  i,  1907,  when  the  quartermaster's  store- 
house was  destroyed  at  a  loss  to  the  Commission  of 
$100,000.  There  are  sixteen  officers  and  forty-six 
firemen  on  the  regular  pay-rolls,  and  there  have  been 
as  many  as  eighteen  volunteer  companies  with  295 
members.  The  equipment  is  of  the  most  modern 
American  type. 

Gov.  Magoon  opened  the  first  public  school  in  the 
Canal  Zone  on  January  2,  1906.  In  191 2  there  were 
25  buildings  for  both  white  and  colored  pupils,  with 
46  white  and  28  colored  teachers,  an  enrollment  of 
1,240  white  and  1,524  colored  pupils,  and  an  average 

214 


I'liotos,  1,  2,  S,  Harris  d  Ewiiuj.    Wuhhujlini.   I).   C; 
Jf,  International  News  Wenxr. 

I.  Maj.-Gen.  George  W.  Davis.     2.  Charles  E.  Magoon. 
3.  Jo  C.  S.  Blackburn.     4.  M.  H.   Thatcher. 


CIVIL    ADMINISTRATION 

attendance  for  the  former  of  904,  and  of  the  latter, 
688,  The  schools  have  a  number  of  disadvantages  to 
overcome,  not  the  least  of  which  has  been  the  epi- 
demic of  matrimony  that  has  raged  unremittingly 
among  the  teachers.  Sometimes  the  personnel  changes 
40  per  cent  from  this  factor  alone.  Another  factor 
has  been  the  diversity  of  standards  and  nationalities. 
In  one  year  the  teachers  were  from  16  different  states, 
bringing  as  many  systems  of  education  into  their 
work;  732  pupils  had  come  to  the  Canal  Zone  from 
thirty-six  states,  and  there  were  twenty-one  nation- 
alities other  than  American.  To  weld  all  these  het- 
erogeneous elements  into  a  uniform  system  has  been 
a  difficult  task.  Transportation  over  the  railroad  to 
and  from  the  schools  is  free  to  the  pupils,  as  are  the 
books  and  other  materials  used.  High  schools  are 
maintained  at  Gatun  and  Ancon. 

Social  life  in  the  Canal  Zone  expresses  itself  in 
weekly  dances  at  the  clubhouses  and  Tivoli  Hotel,  in 
woman's  clubs,  lodge  auxiliaries,  church  societies,  and 
the  usual  round  of  parties.  The  Commission  has 
furnished  houses  for  use  by  the  lodges  and  religious 
denominations,  many  of  which  are  represented  in 
regular  meetings  and  services.  The  clubhouses,  un- 
der the  supervision  of  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  are  the  social 
centers  of  each  community,  as  the  women  are  given 
limited  privileges.  Soft  drinks,  tobacco,  and  lunch- 
eons may  be  obtained  at  the  clubhouses  at  all  hours. 
The  annual  cost  of  operating  them  is  about  $150,000, 
the  Commission  paying  the  deficits  where  the  member- 
ship fees  do  not  cover  the  expenses. 

215 


THE    A:MERICANS    in    PANAMA 

The  Panama  Lottery  has  found  in  the  canal  em- 
ployees generous  patrons.  It  was  started  in  1883, 
with  a  provision  in  the  concession  that  64  per  cent  of 
the  income  should  be  paid  out  in  prizes.  When  the 
President,  in  1904,  forbade  the  sale  of  the  tickets  in 
the  Canal  Zone,  the  Lottery  Company  thought  they 
had  been  damaged  several  million  dollars'  worth,  but 
the  Americans  have  been  able  to  get  all  the  tickets 
they  wanted,  either  by  going  into  Panama  and  Colon 
for  them  or  sending  others.  A  full  ticket  costs  $2.50 
and  may  draw  a  prize  of  $7,500.  A  fifth  of  the 
ticket  may  be  bought  for  fifty  cents  and,  if  of  the 
winning  number,  draws  $1,500.  There  are  smaller 
prizes  for  approximations  of  the  right  number.  Each 
Sunday  at  Panama  a  boy  draws  a  number  from  a 
box,  and  there  has  never  been  complaint  of  unfair- 
ness in  deciding  the  winning  number.  It  is  difficult 
to  estimate  the  amount  invested  each  week  in  the  lot- 
tery by  the  Americans,  but  it  runs  well  into  the  thou- 
sands of  dollars.  Many  of  them  have  won  capital 
prizes.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  moral  sense  of 
the  nation  has  condemned  lotteries,  this  free  partici- 
pation in  the  one  at  Panama  does  not  constitute  a 
praiseworthy  feature  of  the  American  occupation. 

Each  Sunday  afternoon  or  evening  in  some  Canal 
Zone  town  the  Commission  band  gives  a  concert. 
This  pleasing  organization  has  a  director  who  is  paid 
$2,000  a  year  and  the  members  receive  slightly  more 
than  $3  each  for  a  concert.  The  band  members  are 
canal  employees. 

The  first  census  of  the  Canal  Zone  was  taken  in 
216 


CIVIL    ADMINISTRATION 

1908,  and  a  population  of  50,003  was  reported.  In 
February,  19 12,  another  census  was  taken,  and  the 
population  had  increased  to  62,810.  However,  there 
were  8,871  employees  living  in  Panama  and  Colon, 
which  brings  the  population  to  71,682,  not  includ- 
ing the  native  populations  of  the  cities  of  Panama  and 
Colon.  The  white  persons  numbered  19,413;  the  col- 
ored, 31,525;  yellow,  521;  mixed,  10,323;  miscella- 
neous, 1,028.  Great  Britain  had  30,859  subjects;  the 
United  States,  11,850,  and  the  remainder  was  dis- 
tributed among  thirty-eight  other  nationalities.  Of 
the  American  citizens,  9,770  were  born  in  the  United 
States,  mainly  from  eight  States,  as  follows :  Penn- 
sylvania, 1,375;  N^w  York,  1,372;  Ohio,  692;  Illinois, 
453;  Massachusetts,  386;  Indiana,  382;  Kentucky, 
369;  Virginia,  338.  Gatun  was  the  largest  town. 
Empire  second,  Cristobal  third,  Gorgona  fourth,  Pa- 
raiso  fifth. 

Dr.  Belisario  Porras,  as  President  of  the  Republic 
of  Panama,  will  play  a  decisive  part  in  the  next  four 
years  in  guiding  the  relations  of  his  country  with  the 
United  States. 


217 


CHAPTER    XIX 

THE    SOCIETY   OF   THE    CHAGRES 

^•/^ARAMBA,"  exclaims  the  native  Panaman, 
V-><  as  the  torrential  rains  soak  him  through 
and  through,  and  he  wonders  what  reason  Providence 
has  in  the  prodigal  tropical  showers.  He  watches  the 
river  Chagres  rise  under  the  stimulation  of  the  rainy 
season  from  a  puny  creek,  fordable  almost  anywhere, 
to  a  stream  as  masterful  almost  as  the  Mississippi  on 
a  rampage. 

Balboa  saw  the  same  thing,  and  so  did  the  pirate 
Morgan,  and  many  Spanish  seekers  after  El  Dorado. 
It  was  not  until  the  engineering  mind  began  figuring 
on  a  canal  connecting  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans 
that  the  tremendous  rainfall  began  to  possess  utility, 
and  then  the  river  Chagres  assumed  a  significance, 
and  the  heavy  precipitation  a  beneficence,  which  causes 
orators  nowadays  to  see  the  hand  of  God  in  the  form- 
ing of  the  natural  conditions  of  the  Isthmus.  Thus 
does  man  change  his  conceptions  of  Deity  to  suit  his 
needs ! 

In  a  lock-type  canal,  such  as  the  Americans  are 
completing,  the  river  Chagres  absolutely  is  indis- 
pensable. Without  this  river  only  a  sea-level  canal 
could  have  been  built  at  Panama.  For  the  engineers 
have  harnessed  this  stream  so  as  to  form  the  great 
Gatun  Lake,  comprising  all  but  fifteen  miles  of  the 

218 


CHAGRES    SOCIETY 

Panama  Canal.  The  floods,  which  for  centuries  have 
emptied  unrestrained  into  the  Caribbean  Sea,  will  lave 
the  impregnable  Gatun  dam,  or  be  spilled,  at  the 
pleasure  of  the  Americans,  through  turbine  engines 
to  generate  power,  or  flow  at  their  will  through  the 
locks  to  lift  or  lower  the  commerce  of  the  world  across 
the  Isthmus. 

It  is  not  hyperbole,  therefore,  to  say  that  the 
Chagres  River  is  the  greatest  single  factor  in  the  suc- 
cess of  the  Panama  Canal.  The  locks  and  the  Culebra 
cut  are  no  more  than  preparations  for  the  utilization 
of  the  river. 

When  the  time  came  for  selecting  a  name  for  a 
society  which  should  embrace  in  its  membership  the 
canal  workers  who  had  been  with  the  job  at  least 
six  years,  the  object  of  which  should  be  to  keep  alive 
the  memories  of  those  years  in  the  future,  it  seemed 
peculiarly  appropriate  to  name  such  an  organization 
The  Society  of  the  Chagres. 

The  idea  of  an  organization  of  this  kind  first  was 
exploited  in  December,  1909,  when  a  "  Panama  Canal 
Service  Medal  Association "  was  organized,  with 
membership  limited  to  employees  who  had  earned  the 
Roosevelt  Canal  Medal,  and  having  an  insurance 
feature.  This  movement  failed.  In  August,  191 1, 
William  F.  Shipley,  of  the  Subsistence  Department, 
initiated  a  new  movement,  which  reached  a  head  on 
October  7,  191 1,  with  the  organization  of  the  Society 
of  the  Chagres  and  the  selection  of  Col.  W.  C. 
Gorgas  as  the  first  President.    Tom  M.  Cooke,  a  canal 

219 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

veteran,  and  head  of  the  division  of  posts,  customs 
and  revenues,  is  now  President. 

The  Society  is  thoroughly  democratic  in  its  mem- 
bership, any  employee,  of  either  sex,  who  is  white 
and  an  American  citizen,  and  who  has  worked  for 
six  years  continuously  on  the  canal,  being  eligible. 
An  applicant  must  have  earned  the  Roosevelt  medal 
and  two  Commission  service  bars,  and  thereby  hangs 
a  tale. 

Col.  Roosevelt,  in  a  speech  to  the  canal  employees 
at  Colon,  on  November  i6,  1906,  said:  "I  shall  see 
if  it  is  not  possible  to  provide  for  some  little  memo- 
rial, some  mark,  some  badge,  which  will  always  dis- 
tinguish the  man  who,  for  a  certain  space  of  time, 
has  done  his  work  well  on  the  Isthmus,  just  as  the 
button  of  the  Grand  Army  distinguishes  the  man  who 
did  his  work  well  in  the  Civil  War." 

The  idea  here  expressed  did  not  reach  fruition 
until  October,  1908,  when  a  ton  of  copper,  bronze, 
and  tin  taken  from  old  French  locomotives  and  ex- 
cavators, was  shipped  to  the  Philadelphia  Mint  to 
be  made  into  medals.  Victor  D.  Brenner  was  the  de- 
signer, the  medal  showing  on  one  side  a  likeness  of 
President  Roosevelt,  and  on  the  reverse  side  a  ship 
in  the  Culebra  cut.  They  are  about  the  size  of  a 
dollar.  The  first  order  was  for  5,000  medals,  and  by 
January  i,  191 1,  4,487  had  been  earned.  By  the  time 
the  canal  is  finished  more  than  6,000  will  have  been 
earned,  every  employee  who  has  worked  for  two  years 
on  the  canal  being  entitled  to  a  medal. 

For  each  successive  two  years  the  employee  works 
220 


CHAGRES    SOCIETY 

he  receives  a  bar,  made  from  the  same  material  and 
presented  by  the  Commission.  Thus,  a  Roosevelt 
medal  and  two  bars  mean  an  employee  has  worked 
for  six  years  on  the  canal,  and  is  eligible  to  member- 
ship in  the  Society  of  the  Chagres, 

Col.  George  W.  Goethals'  eligibility  dates  from 
April  I,  191 3,  from  which  date  he  will  have  com- 
pleted the  sixth  year  of  his  connection  with  the 
project.  It  undoubtedly  is  true  that  this  medal,  which 
intrinsically  is  of  little  value,  has  held  many  a  man 
to  two  years  in  Panama  from  a  sentimental  desire  to 
have  something  officially  attesting  his  connection  with 
the  great  task. 

There  has  been  much  more  changing  in  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  American  force  than  the  public  knows, 
and  to  have  been  six  years  an  employee  means  that 
one  came  when  conditions  literally  were  rotten  and 
stuck  it  out  until  to-day,  when  they  are  nearly  ideal. 
The  Constitution  provides  for  an  annual  meeting  on 
the  Isthmus  until  191 5,  and  then  in  some  American 
city,  or  the  Canal  Zone,  as  may  be  elected.  On  Janu- 
ary 12,  19 1 2,  the  first  annual  banquet  was  held  at  the 
Tivoli  Hotel. 

The  emblem  of  the  Society  is  a  circular  button,  nine 
sixteenths  of  an  inch  in  diameter,  showing  on  a  black 
background,  surrounded  by  a  narrow  gold  border,  six 
horizontal  bars  in  gold. 

A  determined  effort  was  made  to  make  Col.  Roose- 
velt the  only  honorary  member,  but  this  has  not  been 
accomplished.  It  would  be  necessary  to  amend  the 
Constitution,  and  as  every  member,  in  whatever  part 

221 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

of  the  world,  has  a  vote  by  letter,  the  two-thirds  vote 
possibly  never  will  be  registered. 

The  first  Year  Book  of  the  Society  was  published 
in  January,  191 2.  It  is  a  volume  of  145  pages  and 
contains  brief  biographies  of  the  members,  the  Con- 
stitution, speeches  by  Presidents  Roosevelt  and  Taft, 
in  the  Canal  Zone,  and  by  Chief  Engineers  Stevens 
and  Goethals.  The  six-year  men  all  worked  under 
Mr.  Stevens  and  loved  him  well. 

Forty  States  were  represented  in  the  membership 
of  304  in  July,  1912.  The  following  States  were  not 
represented :  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Delaware,  Nevada, 
New  Mexico,  North  Dakota,  South  Dakota,  Wyoming. 
As  some  of  the  members  have  not  turned  in  informa- 
tion as  to  their  native  States,  the  exceptions  noted 
may  be  represented  in  the  Society.  Members  who 
are  American  citizens,  but  who  were  born  abroad, 
represented  the  following  countries :  Canada,  England, 
Germany,  Russia,  Greece,  Italy,  Ireland,  Scotland, 
Sweden,  and  South  Africa. 

Among  the  biographies  the  one  of  Alexander  A. 
Lundisheff  perhaps  is  the  most  picturesque.  He  was 
born  in  Russia,  ran  off  to  sea,  joined  a  circus,  be- 
came a  sailor,  crossed  the  Isthmus  in  1888  as  an 
American  bluejacket,  fought  in  Mexican  revolutions, 
guarded  convicts  in  Africa,  enlisted  in  our  Navy  in 
the  Spanish-American  War,  worked  in  the  Alaska 
Coast  Patrol,  helped  to  fight  the  Panama  revolution- 
ists in  1902  and  had  his  life  saved  by  a  beautiful 
Panaman  girl,  whom  he  married,  and  when  the  Amer- 
icans came  to  Panama  went  to  work  under  Col-  Gor- 

222 


CHAGRES    SOCIETY 

gas,  in  the  sanitary  department,  where  he  has  since 
remained.  He  had  the  unique  record  of  working 
eight  years  for  the  Commission  without  being  sick  a 
day  or  losing  a  half  hour  from  work,  and  had  not 
taken  a  vacation  in  that  period.  Other  members, 
women  as  well  as  men,  have  seen  service  in  all  parts 
of  the  world. 

President  Taft,  in  a  speech  to  the  employees  in 
November,  1910,  said  of  the  older  men:  "As  the 
great  creation,  which  was  so  clear  to  the  professional 
men  who  designed  it,  opens  itself  in  concrete  mold 
to  the  observation  of  the  layman,  the  eagerness  with 
which  we  all  look  forward  to  the  completion  of  the 
work  grows  apace,  and  we  envy  the  record  of  the 
men  to  whose  skill  and  courage  and  energy,  persist- 
ence and  foresight,  the  canal  will  forever  form  an 
enduring  monument !  " 

The  time  of  the  departure  of  the  canal  workers  is 
near  at  hand.  The  old-timers  feel  that  they  have 
fought  a  good  fight  and  that  henceforth  there  is  laid 
up  for  them  the  admiration  which  President  Taft 
expressed.  In  a  space  of  time  now  measured  in 
months  all  will  have  left  except  those  who  remain 
with  the  permanent  operating  force.  Already  they 
are  scattering  to  the  four  ends  of  the  earth,  whence 
they  came.  The  Society  of  the  Chagres  will  become 
one  of  the  historic  organizations  of  the  United  States, 
along  with  the  Grand  Army  of  the  Republic,  the 
United  Confederate  Veterans,  the  Spanish-American 
War  Veterans,  and  the  Sons  and  Daughters  of  the 
American  Revolution. 


THE    AIMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

The  Inca  Society 

This  organization  includes  in  its  membership  only 
those  employees  who  came  to  the  Canal  Zone  in  1904 
and  have  been  with  the  job  ever  since.  At  the  annual 
banquet  at  the  Tivoli  in  May,  1912,  the  eighth  anni- 
versary of  American  occupation,  there  were  found  to 
be  only  63  such  employees  in  the  Canal  Zone. 

I.  O.  P.  K. 

Recreation  ever  has  been  the  least  satisfactorily 
solved  problem  at  Panama.  In  1904,  1905,  and  1906 
the  employees  did  not  have  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  club- 
houses which,  after  1907,  became  the  centers  of  social 
activities.  State  Clubs  and  various  social  organiza- 
tions were  formed,  but  most  of  them  passed  out  of 
existence,  the  University  Club  in  Panama  being  a 
conspicuous  exception. 

One  night,  a  few  of  the  boys,  who  congregated  in 
the  box  cars  connected  with  the  wrecking  train,  au- 
thorized several  of  their  number  to  arrest  an  employee 
suspected  of  having  some  cash  on  his  person.  He 
was  brought  to  the  cars  and  placed  on  trial,  on 
trumped-up  charges,  before  a  Kangaroo  Court.  He 
was  fined  the  amount  of  money  found  in  his  pockets 
and  the  sum  was  invested  in  refreshments  at  the 
nearest  saloon  and  grocery. 

This  proved  to  be  so  interesting  that  the  events  be- 
came weekly,  no  employee  knowing  when  he  might  be 
arrested  and  fined  to  pay  for  the  refreshments.  Out 
of  this  incident  grew  the  Independent  Order  of  Pana- 

224 


CHAGRES    SOCIETY 

manian  Kangaroos,  the  only  original  lodge  started 
successfully  among  the  white  canal  employees. 

The  first  meeting  was  on  October  lo,  1906,  and 
subsequently  Kangaroo  Courts  were  organized  in 
Tabernilla,  Gorgona,  and  other  Canal  Zone  towns. 
A  Supreme  Court  was  organized,  with  a  supreme  jus- 
tice, two  associate  justices,  prosecuting  attorney,  de- 
fendant attorney,  chaplain,  comptroller,  clerk,  and 
sheriff.  The  order  was  incorporated  under  the  laws 
of  the  State  of  Tennessee,  and  the  Constitution, 
adopted  on  March  18,  1908,  forbids  membership  to 
liquor  dealers,  gamblers,  or  procurers,  and  requires 
American  citizenship,  white  color,  legal  age,  a  belief 
in  a  Supreme  Being,  and  an  honorable  means  of  sup- 
port in  those  accepted.  The  first  Sunday  in  December 
is  Memorial  Day.  Clinton  O.  Simmons  was  Chief 
Justice  in  191 2. 

This  order  has  done  a  great  amount  of  charity 
work  among  members,  or  their  families,  and  others 
who  got  in  hard  lines  in  the  Canal  Zone.  It  is  sig- 
nificant of  the  character  of  the  employees  in  the  ster- 
ling ideals  maintained.  The  membership  is  more  than 
800. 


225 


CHAPTER    XX 

THE    TRADE    OUTLOOK 

TIME  and  space,  if  they  will  not  be  annihilated, 
certainly  will  be  tremendously  lessened  by  the 
Panama  Canal. 

On  February  ii,  1912,  a  tug  and  three  barges  lay 
at  the  wharf  in  Cristobal,  on  the  Atlantic  side  of  the 
canal.  They  were  needed  at  Balboa,  on  the  Pacific 
side,  only  forty-seven  miles  across.  There  were  two 
methods  of  getting  the  craft  and  barges  to  the  desired 
point,  one  being  to  take  them  to  pieces  and  transport 
them  by  the  railroad  and  reerect  them  on  the  other 
side,  and  the  other  method  being  to  send  them  around 
Cape  Horn. 

They  started  on  the  journey  of  10,500  miles  on 
that  date,  and  arrived  safely  at  Balboa  on  June  16, 
191 2,  consuming  126  days  in  the  trip.  If  the  canal 
had  been  finished,  the  distance  of  forty-seven  miles 
could  have  been  traversed  in  ten  hours !  This  is  only 
one  graphic  illustration  of  the  utility  of  the  Panama 
Canal. 

San  Francisco  is  now  14,000  miles  from  New  York 
around  Cape  Horn.  Through  the  Panama  Canal  it 
will  be  8,000  miles  nearer,  or  a  little  more  than  5,000 
miles  distant.  From  New  York  to  Valparaiso,  by  the 
Straits  of  Magellan,  the  distance  is  about  9,000  miles. 
Via  the  canal  it  will  be  less  than  5,000  miles. 

226 


THE    TRADE    OUTLOOK 

Our  Atlantic  coast  will  be  brought  4,000  miles 
nearer  to  Australia  than  by  the  Suez  Canal,  through 
the  Panama  Canal  route.  New  York  will  be  5,000 
miles  nearer  to  New  Zealand  via  Panama  than  around 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  The  distance  to  the  Philip- 
pines will  not  be  materially  reduced  from  Eastern 
Atlantic  ports,  but  the  Panama  route  will  make  Hong- 
kong, Yokohama,  and  San  Francisco  ports  of  call  for 
our  own  and  European  vessels,  which  the  Suez  Canal 
does  not  readily  permit. 

Equally  great  advantages  in  shortened  trade  routes 
w^ill  come  to  the  Gulf  and  Pacific  ports  of  the  United 
States.  San  Francisco,  Seattle,  and  Portland  may 
place  their  products  on  our  Atlantic  coast,  the  West 
Indies,  the  east  coast  of  South  America,  and  in  Eu- 
rope at  correspondingly  great  savings  in  time  and 
distance. 

For  coal-  or  oil-burning  ships  this  saving  in  time 
represents  an  impressive  lowering  in  freight  rates. 
Sailing  vessels  will  not  feel  the  fuel  saving,  but  the 
difference  in  time  effected  by  the  Panama  Canal  doubt- 
less will  serve  to  hold  that  slow-transit  method  much 
longer  in  use  than  it  otherwise  would  be  held  for 
those  commodities,  like  lumber,  which  do  not  require 
speedy  delivery. 

Already  the  United  States  does  a  larger  coastwise 
trade  than  any  other  nation  in  the  world,  and  the 
canal  will  give  this  a  spurt  that  cannot  be  measured 
accurately  at  present.  Pacific  coast  wheat,  wines, 
lumber,  barley,  hops,  wool,  dried  fruits,  and  mining 
products  may  be  laid  down  in  Gulf  and  Atlantic  ports 

227 


THE    TRADE    OUTLOOK 

through  the  canal  much  more  cheaply  than  by  the 
continental  railroads.  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coast  ma- 
chinery, manufactures,  textiles,  and  finished  products 
generally,  likewise  may  be  delivered  to  the  Pacific 
ports  at  a  lower  cost. 

The  great  staple  products  of  the  South,  cotton,  to- 
bacco, lumber,  iron,  and  coal,  when  destined  for 
Asiatic  ports,  will  have  an  immense  advantage  by  the 
Panama  route,  and  much  of  the  ocean  freight  which 
has  been  shipped  long  distances  to  Eastern  ports  to 
ships  will  go  through  the  Gulf  ports.  There  neces- 
sarily will  be  a  radical  readjustment  of  our  whole  in- 
ternal freight  movements,  but  the  increase  in  volume 
still  will  leave  the  railroads  their  proportionate  share. 

Geographically,  the  United  States  is  magnificently 
situated,  facing  as  it  does  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
oceans  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  natural  flow  of 
commerce  will  be  southward  to  the  republics  which  so 
far  have  bought  more  in  Europe  than  they  have  in 
America.  The  intensely  self-centered  industrial  de- 
velopment which  has  characterized  the  United  States 
to  date  seems  to  have  reached  a  turning  point,  with 
the  nation,  after  the  first  great  attack  at  our  own 
resources,  ready  to  look  around  and  participate  more 
extensively  in  foreign  commerce.  It  is  true,  of  course, 
that  our  foreign  commerce  already  is  stupendous,  but 
it  will  be  immeasurably  greater  when  our  enterprise 
is  directed  as  absorbingly  toward  that  phase  of  indus- 
trialism as  it  has  been  toward  internal  development. 

The  Panama  Canal  is  bound  to  affect  the  politics 
of  the  United  States,  with  especial  regard  to  the  tariff 

229 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

policy.  So  long  as  we  were  engrossed  in  our  own 
provincial  affairs,  taking  such  foreign  trade  as  vol- 
untarily came  our  way,  the  exclusiveness  of  the  high 
protective  tariff  was  beneficial.  When  we  get  out 
into  the  realm  of  international  trade  with  our  full 
capacity,  it  is  inevitable  that  we  must  modify  that 
policy  as  the  particular  demands  of  commerce  may 
require. 

The  United  States  has  been  too  busy  farming, 
mining,  manufacturing,  and  exchanging  these  prod- 
ucts among  its  own  people  to  care  whether  the  national 
flag  floated  on  few  or  many  ships.  It  must  be  dif- 
ferent when  international  competition  becomes  so  keen 
that  a  nation  operating  its  own  ships  would  have  a 
substantial  differential  in  freight  rates  over  a  nation 
that  must  depend  upon  foreign  bottoms  for  its  carry- 
ing business. 

England  has  had  an  absurdly  disproportionate  share 
of  the  world's  shipping,  due  partly  to  our  tariff  policy, 
but  more  largely  to  the  fact  that  its  smaller  internal 
resources  made  it  necessary  for  its  citizens  to  develop 
shipping  as  a  main  industry.  Following  the  opening 
of  the  Panama  Canal  an  increase  in  American  registry 
will  be  noticeable. 

If  we  simply  are  anxious  to  see  ships  running  about 
the  oceans  flying  the  American  flag.  Congress  has 
acted  effectively  by  throwing  down  the  bars  and  allow- 
ing American  capital  not  only  to  build  its  ships  abroad, 
but  to  import  ship-building  materials  duty  free.  It 
is  obvious,  however,  that  such  a  method  of  building 
up  our  merchant  marine  will  enrich  European  ship- 

230 


THE    TRADE    OUTLOOK 

yards  rather  than  our  own,  because  Congress  has  set 
its  seal  of  approval  upon  the  practice  of  buying  abroad 
if  it  can  be  done  more  cheaply  than  in  the  United 
States.    Coastwise  ships  still  must  be  built  in  America. 

Congress  will  be  called  upon  to  provide  some  way 
for  handling  the  passenger  traffic  that  would  prefer 
to  go  to  the  San  Francisco  Exposition  through  the 
canal  from  Atlantic  and  Gulf  ports.  This  will  be 
coastwise  trade,  and  there  are  no  American  ships  ade- 
quate for  the  probable  traffic.  Unless  Congress  grants 
a  special  dispensation  allowing  the  foreign  lines  to 
handle  this  traffic  during  the  Exposition,  it  is  likely 
that  they  would  have  to  relay  the  Atlantic  traffic  to 
Bermuda  Islands  and  the  Gulf  traffic  to  Cuba,  and  so 
make  it,  by  reembarkation,  travel  from  a  foreign  port 
to  San  Francisco. 

There  has  been  speculation  as  to  whether  the  canal 
would  pay.  Congress  has  authorized  a  maximum 
freight  rate  of  $1.25  a  ton  and  a  rate  of  $1.50  for 
each  passenger  that  passes  through  the  canal.  The 
President  has  the  power,  through  proclamation,  to 
reduce  these  rates  to  any  point  that  will  still  supply 
sufficient  revenues  to  pay  operating  and  maintenance 
expenses.  The  Suez  Canal  pays  for  itself  every  four 
years,  but  it  cost  less  than  a  third  as  much  as  the 
Panama  Canal,  which  also  will  require  2,500  em- 
ployees as  a  permanent  operating  force. 

Operating  and  maintenance  expenses  for  the  canal 
in  Panama  will  be,  annually,  about  $4,000,000.  In- 
terest on  the  investment,  part  at  2  per  cent  and  part 
at  3   per  cent,  will  be  around  $10,000,000  a  year. 

231 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

Thus  the  canal  must  bring  in  approximately  $14,- 
000,000  a  year  to  be  self-sustaining.  Traffic  experts 
estimate  that  the  possible  tonnage  by  1914  will  be 
10,000,000  tons.  At  the  $1.25  rate,  the  income,  there- 
fore, would  be  $12,500,000,  or  $2,500,000  less  than 
operating  cost,  but  this  loss  would  be  reduced  by  the 
tolls  from  passengers.  It  is  possible  that  the  canal 
may  not  pay  right  at  the  start,  but  ultimately  there  is 
no  doubt  that  it  will. 

Suez  may  be  expected  to  fight  for  its  business  by 
reduced  rates.  This  will  not  be  so  formidable  as  our 
own  short-sighted  management.  Congress,  by  ex- 
empting American  coastwise  ships  from  tolls,  delib- 
erately affronted  England,  the  largest  prospective 
patron  of  the  canal,  because  the  greatest  maritime 
nation.  And  England,  it  should  be  remembered,  con- 
trols Suez.  Misguided  patriotism  alone  dictated  the 
exemption  of  our  coastwise  ships.  They  already  have 
a  natural  monopoly  of  coastwise  trade.  If  the  nation 
desires  to  give  a  special  industry  a  gratuity,  it  should 
be  done  without  antagonizing  the  best  customer  we 
are  likely  to  have  at  Panama — England.  The  Ameri- 
can people  show  an  inconsistency  in  sanctioning  this 
treaty  violation,  inasmuch  as  the  whole  cry  for  the 
last  ten  years  has  been  against  special  interests  and 
private  monopolies  fostered  by  the  government.  To 
deliberately  subsidize  the  shipping  business,  as  much 
a  private  industry  as  Standard  Oil,  not  only  violates 
the  spirit  of  the  times  but  inevitably  will  result  in  a 
great  economic  loss  at  Panama,  if  the  present  method 
is  continued. 

232 


THE    TRADE    OUTLOOK 

One  advantage  Panama  will  have  over  Suez  will 
be  in  the  coaling  rates.  We  can  sell  coal  at  Panama 
for  $5  a  ton,  or  a  trifle  less,  whereas  $6  a  ton  is  the 
prevailing  rate  at  Suez.  This  saving  will  go  far 
toward  paying  for  the  passage  of  a  ship  through  the 
canal.  For  instance,  a  ship  leaving  New  York,  or 
Liverpool,  would  take  on  only  enough  coal  to  run  to 
Panama,  where  a  fresh  supply  could  be  obtained,  and 
thus  room  that  otherwise  would  be  filled  with  coal 
for  the  whole  journey  may  be  used  for  additional 
freight.  The  same  saving  to  ships  will  be  experienced 
in  securing  all  kinds  of  supplies  from  the  government 
at  Panama,  while  dry  docks  and  other  facilities  will 
be  available. 

Col.  Goethals  has  displayed  a  high  order  of  busi- 
ness acumen  in  guiding  the  government  into  this  pol- 
icy. The  advantage  to  the  United  States  lies  in  the 
fact  that  other  nations  will  not  have  to  establish  coal- 
ing stations  and  repairing  facilities  on  the  pretense  of 
caring  for  their  merchant  marine,  and  so  lead  into  a 
possible  infringement  of  the  Monroe  doctrine.  An 
incidental  benefit  of  the  policy,  though  decidedly  one 
worth  while,  lies  in  the  fact  that  our  coal  mines  will 
find  a  great  market  at  Panama  through  the  practice 
of  selling  to  ships.  The  government  will  not  have 
private  competition,  because  private  capital  could  not 
operate  on  the  margin  of  profit  that  will  satisfy  the 
government. 

The  rapid  development  of  South  America  is  the 
surest  promise  of  a  commerce  that  will  make  the  canal 
economically  profitable.     The  business  that  originates 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANA^NIA 

there  and  our  own  expanding  foreign  trade  will  be 
great  feeders  of  the  canal,  not  considering  Europe, 
Asia,  Africa,  and  Australasia. 

As  the  United  States  becomes  more  thickly  popu- 
lated the  overflow  will  go  largely  to  the  South.  With 
the  practical  proof  afforded  at  Panama  that  health 
can  be  maintained  in  a  tropical  climate,  Americans 
more  and  more  will  swarm  to  South  and  Central 
America.  Hundreds  of  canal  employees  have  gone 
into  business  in  the  tropical  countries  rather  than  re- 
turn to  the  harsher  climate  and  sterner  industrial 
competition  of  the  United  States.  South  America, 
however,  is  not  the  place  for  the  man  with  small  cap- 
ital such  as  the  United  States  has  been.  The  cultiva- 
tion of  the  staple  products,  such  as  bananas,  coconuts, 
coffee,  cocoa,  sugar,  rubber  trees,  etc.,  is  precarious 
on  a  small  scale  because  great  monopolies  dominate 
these  industries  and  crush  individual  enterprise.  Syn- 
dicate operations  on  a  large  scale  are  the  only  suc- 
cessful means  of  business  promotion,  though  here  and 
there  the  prospector  strikes  a  good  thing.  For  men 
of  ability  who  are  willing  to  work  as  employees  there 
are  many  good  openings  in  Latin  America. 

The  Americans  have  a  great  deal  to  learn  from  the 
older  nations  of  Europe  in  order  to  make  the  most 
of  their  natural  advantage  in  South  American  mar- 
kets. Our  merchandise  is  more  attractive  to  the  Latin 
American  because  usually  it  is  smarter  in  design  and 
appearance,  though  frequently  inferior  in  quality,  and 
simply  because  the  United  States  dazzles  the  Southern 
imagination.     The  Germans  and  the  English  are  past 

234 


THE    TRADE    OUTLOOK 

masters  in  getting  foreign  business.  They  send  out 
salesmen  who  speak  the  native  languages,  and  when 
they  make  shipments  it  is  in  a  manner  most  con- 
venient to  the  peculiar  conditions  of  the  particular 
country. 

Your  American  manufacturer  or  exporter  gets  the 
biggest  box  he  can  find  and  puts  as  much  into  it  as 
it  will  hold.  Frequently  the  big  box  is  broken  when 
it  is  unloaded  at  the  South  American  port,  occasion- 
ing trouble  to  the  consignee.  Often  the  shipment  is 
consigned  to  some  interior  point  to  which  a  mule 
pack  train  is  the  only  means  of  transportation.  This 
occasions  more  trouble  and  expense  to  the  purchaser. 
The  Germans  do  things  differently.  They  pack  their 
merchandise  in  small  packages  and  in  durable  boxes, 
knowing  that  it  may  have  to  be  handled  over  moun- 
tain passes  by  hand  or  muleback.  They  have  a  regard 
to  the  high  temperature  and  the  character  of  the  mer- 
chandise so  that  it  may  not  spoil.  But  these  are  not 
insuperable  faults  upon  the  part  of  the  Americans, 
and  already  they  are  being  eliminated  intelligently 
after  bitter  experience.  In  nearly  all  our  Eastern  or 
seaport  cities  every  exporting  office  has  a  Spanish- 
speaking  attache  to  conduct  correspondence  in  the  lan- 
guage of  its  Southern  customers. 

Among  the  agencies  at  work  to  bring  Americans 
to  a  realization  of  the  opportunities  that  lie  in  plenti- 
ful profusion  in  South  and  Central  America  none  is 
more  ably  and  successfully  managed  than  the  Bureau 
of  American  Republics,  in  Washington,  with  John 
Barrett  as  Director-General.     The  most  striking  fea- 

235 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

tiire  of  Mr.  Barrett's  work  is  the  statesmanlike  plane 
on  which  he  seeks  to  interest  Americans  in  the  twenty 
republics  to  the  South.  Get  business  is  his  motto,  but 
get  it  by  straightforward,  respectful,  and  enduring 
methods.  The  constant  aim  of  the  Bureau  is  to  abol- 
ish the  foolish  opinions  Americans  have  entertained 
about  the  business,  social,  and  political  capacities  of 
Latin  Americans.  They  are  not  the  comic-opera  revo- 
lutionist type  at  which  we  laugh  on  Broadway.  They 
are  cultured  people  who  expect  to  be  approached  as 
gentlemen,  and  the  periodic  fighting  that  attends  a 
change  in  administration  in  some  Central  American 
countries  does  not  gainsa}^  that  fact. 

Mr.  Barrett  edits  a  monthly  Bulletin  which  already 
is  in  the  most  wide-awake  American  exporting  offices, 
and  should  be  in  the  hands  of  every  business  head 
who  directly  or  indirectly  touches  South  American 
commerce.  Printed  as  it  is  in  English  and  Spanish, 
it  is  serving  to  remove  many  prejudices  by  making 
closer  acquaintances.  An  impartial  monthly  review 
of  all  subjects  of  real  interest,  industrial,  political, 
and  general,  enables  its  readers  to  keep  in  touch  au- 
thoritatively with  Latin  America.  'In  view  of  the 
forebodings  some  of  the  Southern  republics  have  had 
at  the  possible  territorial  expansion  of  the  United 
States  at  their  expense,  this  Bureau  under  Mr.  Barrett 
is  doing  an  inestimably  valuable  service  to  American 
business  interests  by  its  sympathetic  and  tactful  policy. 

The  dynamic  expansion  of  American  industrial  life 
is  the  one  overshadowing  fact  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, as  indeed  it  is  in  the  whole  world.     It  is  a 

236 


THE    TRADE    OUTLOOK 

new  kind  of  conquest,  not  preceded  by  the  sword,  and 
if  we  maintain  our  moral  poise  will  not  be  followed 
by  any  other  than  happy  results  to  the  conquered. 
English  is  destined  to  be  the  sole  language  of  the 
Western  world.  American  merchandise  will  form 
the  bulk  of  its  commerce.  American  citizens  will  be 
found  in  every  out-of-the-way  corner  of  the  two  con- 
tinents, carrying  with  them,  even  if  in  diminished 
luster,  the  ideals  and  abilities  which  have  made  the 
nation  eclipse  all  records  thus  early  in  its  youth.  The 
Panama  Canal  marks  our  passage  from  unfledged 
provincialism  to  the  full  stature  of  national  manhood 
among  the  industrial  activities  of  the  nations  of  the 
world. 


237 


CHAPTER    XXI 

SETTLING    OUR    ACCOUNT    WITH    COLOMBIA 

THE  American  people,  like  the  Israelites  of  old, 
are  a  peculiar  people,  chosen  of  God  to  fulfill 
a  high  destiny  among  the  nations  of  the  world. 

Whether  it  was  a  good  thing  for  Puritanism  to  be 
set  down  in  the  lap  of  material  luxury  on  the  North 
American  continent  is  not  yet  disclosed,  although  we 
have  abundant  evidence  of  the  struggle,  already 
sharply  drawn,  between  the  spiritual  and  materialistic 
forces  in  the  national  character. 

The  Civil  War  was  an  even  mightier  conflict,  be- 
tween the  Puritan  and  Cavalier,  than  Marston  Moor 
and  Naseby.  In  it  the  Puritan  triumphed  even  more 
gloriously.  In  it  the  Puritan  was  clinching  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  great  English  struggle.  He  was  stamp- 
ing out  the  embers  of  the  unspiritual  forces  in  Anglo- 
Saxon  character. 

Our  unparalleled  material  prosperity  is  at  work  to 
revive  the  spirit  of  the  Cavalier  and  to  dull  the  keen 
edge  of  Puritanism.  Righteousness  never  has  flour- 
ished under  great  material  prosperity.  The  cocksure 
feeling,  that  comes  from  the  possession  of  much 
worldly  goods,  is  beginning  to  appear  in  the  external 
and  internal  actions  of  the  American  nation.  The 
letter  of  "  In  God  We  Trust  "  remains  unimpaired 
on  our  currency,  but  its  Puritanic  spirit  has  weakened 

238 


OUR    ACCOUNT    WITH    COLOMBIA 

perceptibly.  We  are  depending  on  a  big  navy  to  see 
us  through. 

Probably  no  war  ever  was  fought  with  more  dis- 
interested motives  than  the  Spanish-American  War. 
The  Americans  seemed  to  relish  the  opportunity  to 
lay  aside  the  rich  pursuits  of  commercialism  for  a 
while  to  exercise  the  old  spiritual  forces  of  the  Puri- 
tan. The  dash  and  vitality  of  that  outburst  caused 
Europe  to  think  deeply. 

But  the  Spanish-American  War  had  one  result  that 
shows  the  American  people  are  measurably  less  deter- 
mined in  their  spiritual  conceptions  than  the  genera- 
tion of  '65.  W^e  kept  the  Philippines,  much  as  the 
warriors  of  Israel  kept  the  plunder  of  the  Philistines 
when  they  had  been  commanded  sternly  not  to  make 
their  cause  one  of  material  aggrandizement. 

Our  treatment  of  the  Filipinos  has  been  as  unparal- 
leled in  its  humanitarianism  as  our  conduct  in  the  war 
that  gave  them  to  us.  But  that  is  our  way  of  assuag- 
ing our  conscience  for  holding  them,  a  sugar-coating 
process  to  make  the  act  pass  muster.  Down  in  our 
national  heart  we  know  we  are  holding  the  Philip- 
pines for  what  they  ultimately  will  mean  to  us  mate- 
rially, not  what  we  can  do  for  them  spiritually.  If 
the  ten  million  Filipinos  were  in  the  Southern  States, 
where  we  could  see  them  and  feel  the  pulsation  of 
democratic  forces,  and  not  seven  thousand  miles  away, 
we  would  fight  another  Civil  War  over  them,  just  as 
we  did  over  the  Negro. 

All  of  this  by  way  of  introduction  to  the  act  that 
gave  us  the  Canal  Zone.     We  have  the  admission  of 

239 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

the  President  himself  that  he  abandoned  the  regular 
diplomatic  methods  of  securing  the  territory  needed 
for  building  a  canal  in  favor  of  the  primitive  method 
of  taking  it  by  force.  This  leads  straight  to  the  ad- 
mission that  we  set  up  the  Republic  of  Panama  merely 
to  make  an  otherwise  bald  steal  appear  to  bear  some 
evidence  of  justification.  It  has  been  shown  in  a 
previous  chapter  that  the  revolution  that  gave  the 
Republic  its  independence  was  made  a  success  by  the 
United  States. 

So  far,  the  national  conscience  has  not  stirred  itself 
greatly  over  this  act.  At  least  it  has  not  stirred  itself 
decisively,  and  that  is  another  proof  that  the  Puritan 
spirit  is  taking  itself  much  less  seriously  than  it  did 
so  short  a  time  ago  as  1898.  One  reason  has  been 
that  the  American  people  only  recently  have  begun  to 
get  the  true  understanding  of  what  did  happen  at 
Panama.  President  Roosevelt  exerted  the  full  capaci- 
ties of  his  versatile  mind  to  cloud  the  situation,  so 
that  the  moral  sense  of  the  people  would  not  be 
aroused,  until  it  would  be  too  late  to  undo  his  act. 

He  pretended  that  the  treatment  Panama  had  re- 
ceived, as  a  kind  of  stepchild  of  Colombia,  warranted 
the  same  kind  of  action  we  took  to  free  Cuba.  His 
Secretary  of  State  advanced  the  strained  construction 
of  our  solemn  treaty  with  Colombia  that  we  were 
under  obligation  to  maintain  the  neutrality  of  the 
Panama  Railroad,  and  so  prevent  the  soldiers  of  Co- 
lombia from  striking  down  the  revolution.  The 
President  further  recognized  the  independence  of  the 
Republic,  and  insisted  that  it  was  an  act  as  disinter- 

240 


OUR   ACCOUNT    WITH    COLOMBIA 

ested,  for  instance,  as  our  recognition  of  the  new 
Republic  of  China.  In  truth,  they  bear  no  similarity 
of  feature. 

'In  China  the  masses  of  the  people  were  trying  to 
demonstrate  an  advance  in  their  understanding  of 
government  to  the  point  where  authority  would  be 
recognized  as  inherent  in  them,  and  not  an  external 
imposition  by  an  alien  line  of  Emperors.  In  Panama 
the  masses  of  the  people  not  only  did  not  know  about 
the  revolution  until  it  had  passed,  but  no  more  than 
an  ordinary  mob,  such  as  may  be  aroused  on  an  hour's 
notice  in  any  city,  participated  in  it. 

It  was  not  necessary  that  the  people  of  Panama 
should  know  about  it.  The  United  States  had  agreed 
to  stand  between  the  clique  of  PSnaman  financiers 
and  any  offensive  act  Colombia  might  undertake. 
Undoubtedly  there  had  been  popular  uprisings  against 
Colombia  in  Panama,  but  the  revolution  of  November 
3,  1903,  was  not  one  of  them.  This  revolution  had 
three  sources  of  inspiration — The  French  Canal  Com- 
pany, the  capitalist  Junta  in  Panama,  and  Theodore 
Roosevelt's  desire  to  get  a  canal  started  before  his 
inherited  administration  should  end. 

In  this  review  of  the  canal  President  Roosevelt's 
action  in  taking  Panama  has  been  approved.  It  is 
approved  as  an  international  act  of  eminent  domain. 
Where  criticism  is  directed  is  at  our  refusal  to  pay 
for  what  we  took.  The  $10,000,000  we  paid  Panama 
was  a  moral  quibble,  as  may  be  illustrated. 

Any  American  railroad,  or  any  municipality,  county 
or  State,  may  exercise  the  right  of  eminent  domain 

241 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

to  secure  property  in  its  right  of  way,  or  necessary  to 
their  well  being.  But  property  so  taken  must  be  paid 
for  at  a  fair  valuation  to  the  rightful  owner. 

The  rightful  owner  of  the  territory  we  desired  for 
a  canal  was  Colombia.  When  we  took  that  territory 
we  took  it  from  Colombia.  The  way  we  took  it  was 
to  participate  in  a  bogus  revolution,  engineered  by  a 
Junta  of  wealthy  Panaman  business  and  professional 
men.  It  turned  out  that  the  part  they  played  in  mak- 
ing the  revolution  a  success  was  farcical,  while  the 
part  the  United  States  Marines  played  was  vital. 

The  Marines  at  first  had  orders  not  to  allow  either 

1  Colombian  or  revolutionary  troops  to  use  the  railroad. 

iVWhen  this  order  was  issued  the  revolution  had  not 

'started.     Besides,  there  were  no  revolutionists  after 

it  did  start  on  the  Atlantic  side  to  use  the  railroad, 

except  a  handful  of  the  hirelings  of  the  Junta.     The 

f' econd  order  the  Marines  received  was  that  Colombia 
vould  not  be  allowed  to  settle  the  revolution  by  force. 
In  two  days  the  United  States  recognized  the  inde- 
pendence of  a  republic  thus  created.  Twelve  days 
later  it  had  signed  a  treaty  with  this  republic  guaran- 
teeing that  Colombia  would  not  be  allowed  to  recover 
possession.  The  treaty  recited  that  the  United  States 
was  to  be  ceded  a  Canal  Zone  in  consideration  of  this 
guarantee. 

There  we  have  the  facts  in  the  "  taking  "  of  Pan- 
ama.   What  we  did  was  to  help  the  Panama  capitalist 
Junta  to  steal  the  Isthmus  from   Colombia,  then,  in 
j  the  division  of  spoils,  we  obtained  a  Canal  Zone.    The 
$10,000,000  to  the  new  republic  was  part  of  the  ad- 

242 


OUR    ACCOUNT    WITH    COLOMBIA 

•  ministration's  efforts  to  create  an  appearance  of  regu- 
i  larity  in  the  proceedings.     It  was  meant  to  ease  the 
national    conscience — not    the    administration's    con- 
science. 

Anyone  who  will  spend  a  month  in  Panama  will 
discover  that  the  republic  would  not  stand  from  supper 
until  breakfast  if  it  were  not  for  the  supporting  arm 
of  the  United  States.  It  has  become  rather  a  burden- 
some task,  too,  as  our  interference  three  times  with 
Marines  to  keep  the  government  from  toppling  over 
proves.  This  is  not  because  the  Panamans  are  infe- 
rior to  any  other  Central  American  peoples.  It  is 
because  there  is  not  sufficient  inherent  vitality  in  so 
tiny  a  republic  to  hold  it  up  alone. 

If  any  American  railroad  should  desire  property 
for  a  right  of  way  and,  instead  of  condemning  it  by 
due  process  of  law,  should  connive  w^ith  a  neighbor 
to  falsely  claim  possession  of  the  property  and  then 
buy  the  property  from  the  illegal  owner,  the  action 
not  only  would  not  stand  in  law  but  it  would  outrage 
public  opinion.  That  precisely  is  the  course  we  fol- 
lowed at  Panama.  President  Roosevelt  did  not  dare 
to  take  the  property  outright  from  Colombia,  the 
compensation  to  be  fixed  by  due  process  afterward, 
but  connived  with  a  revolutionary  Junta,  through  his 
Secretary  of  State,  to  have  the  property  claimed  by 
a  Republic  to  be  set  up  specifically  for  that  purpose, 
which  Republic  would  sell  the  property  to  the  United 
States. 

The  whole  thing  was  done  with  the  Rooseveltian 
dash  that  won  frequently  by  sheer  momentum.     Eight 

243 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

years  later,  believing  it  to  be  a  closed  incident,  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  confesses :  "  I  took  Panama  and  left 
Congress  to  debate  the  matter  afterwards."  There  is 
a  deal  of  contempt  for  the  acumen  of  Congress  in 
that  remark,  and  looking  back  at  the  way  Congress 
swallowed  the  incident,  it  is  merited  contempt. 

It  is  a  closed  incident  so  far  as  the  territory  com- 
prised in  the  Canal  Zone  is  concerned.  The  issue 
to-day  only  is  this :  Have  the  American  people  enough 
of  the  old  Puritanic  righteousness  left  to  insure  that 
if  a  clear  case  of  national  wrongdoing  is  proved  they 
will  make  reparation? 

Colombia  cannot  compel  reparation,  nor  can  Eu- 
rope. When  we  consider  Germany  and  France  quar- 
reling over  the  spoils  of  Morocco,  Italy  taking  Tripoli, 
England  and  Russia  partitioning  Persia,  and  Japan 
annexing  Korea,  what  is  left  of  The  Hague  to  sit  in 
judgment  upon  the  action  of  the  United  States  in 
Panama  ? 

Absolutely  nothing  will  compel  the  United  States  to 
do  justice — except  the  still,  small  voice  of  national 
conscience.  The  action  of  the  Minister  from  Colom- 
bia in  declining  an  invitation  to  Secretary  Knox  to 
visit  Colombia,  in  the  spring  of  1912,  is  the  limit  of 
Colombia's  ability  to  protest. 

But  it  ought  to  be  set  down  as  a  maxim  of  canal 
management,  if  not  of  national  policy,  that  no  neigh- 
bor of  the  canal  should  be  allowed  to  remain  on  bad 
terms  with  the  Americans.  It  is  not  good  that  a 
nation  so  near  as  Colombia  should  be  in  a  hostile 
frame  of  mind  toward  the  United  States.     This  is 

244 


OUR    ACCOUNT    WITH    COLOMBIA 

true,  not  so  much  for  what  a  sense  of  injustice  rank- 
Hng  in  the  minds  of  her  citizens  might  precipitate, 
but  because,  if  anything  happened  to  the  canal,  Co- 
lombia, in  the  event  blame  was  not  promptly  fixed, 
inevitably  would  have  to  bear  the  burden  of  our 
suspicion. 

There  is  still  doubt  as  to  whether  Spain  set  off  the 
mine  that  wrecked  the  Maine,  but  that  did  not  keep 
Spain  from  taking  the  consequences.  So  with  the 
canal.  If  it  should  be  disabled  without  a  clear  cause 
or  responsibility,  the  jingoes  in  the  United  States 
would  point  to  Colombia  as  one  with  a  grudge.  Thus, 
the  bad  feeling  engendered  in  the  taking  of  Panama 
might  precipitate  the  mighty  United  States,  in  a  fit  of 
national  passion,  upon  an  innocent  nation,  more  sinned 
against  than  sinning. 

But,  ultimately,  the  question  of  reparation  must 
rest  squarely  upon  a  moral  issue.  It  is  not  so  much 
the  rights  of  Colombia  that  should  impel  us  to  an  act 
of  reparation  as  a  desire  to  live  up  to  our  own  best 
instincts.  The  American  ideal  is  something  far  dif- 
ferent from  law-compelled  righteousness;  it  rises  to 
the  grandeur  of  righteousness  for  the  sake  of  right- 
eousness. Colombia  suffered  materially  by  our  act, 
but  we  have  suffered  morally,  and  an  enlightened 
judgment  would  be  that  we  suffer  the  most. 

Is  it  compatible  with  the  dignity  of  a  great  nation 
like  the  United  States  to  reverse  its  position  by  mak- 
ing reparation?  This  question  more  properly  should 
read,  Is  it  compatible  with  the  pride  of  a  great  nation 
like  the  United  States  to  make  reparation?    The  an- 

245 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

swer  is :  The  United  States  has  no  dignity  to  uphold. 
It  may  restore  its  dignity  and  sense  of  righteousness 
only  by  reversing  its  wilful  and  headstrong  action. 
We  merely  play  the  ostrich  in  sticking  our  national 
head  into  the  sand  of  the  Panama  revolution  and 
fancy  our  action  is  hid. 

There  are  three  courses  open  to  the  United  States. 
The  first  is  to  consider  the  acquisition  of  the  Canal 
Zone  a  closed  incident  and  decline  discussion  or  repa- 
ration. The  second  is  to  pay  Colombia  a  cash  indem- 
nity for  the  loss  of  her  richest  province.  The  third 
is  to  make  reparation  by  restoration. 

Manifestly,  the  first  course  involves  national  dis- 
honor. This  is  true  even  if  it  has  become  an  inter- 
national fad  for  strong  nations  to  pillage  the  v^eak 
ones.  The  second  course  would  involve  the  arbitra- 
tion of  Colombia's  claim  and  a  payment  by  the  United 
States  in  some  form  for  the  adjudicated  damage. 
Naturally,  in  such  an  event,  the  excuse  for  the  con- 
tinued existence  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  would 
vanish,  unless  after  paying  for  the  whole  territory  we 
should  make  the  Republic's  title  clear  by  gift. 

The  third  course  involves  the  restoration  to  Co- 
lombia of  the  territory  comprised  in  the  Republic 
of  Panama,  except  the  Canal  Zone.  It  also  would 
involve  some  cash  indemnity  equal  to  the  loss  of 
revenues  during  the  nine  years  of  separation,  minus 
the  improvements  made  by  the  United  States.  Article 
XXIV  of  our  treaty  with  the  Republic  of  Panama 
seems  to  have  contemplated  some  such  contingency  as 

246 


OUR    ACCOUNT    WITH    COLOMBIA 

this,  as  we  note  the  fine  hand  of  Secretary  Hay  in 
the  following: 

"If  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  here- 
after enter  as  a  constituent  into  any  Govern- 
ment, or  into  any  union  or  Confederation  of 
States,  so  as  to  merge  her  sovereignty  or 
independence  in  such  government,  union  or 
confederation,  the  rights  of  the  United 
States  under  this  convention  shall  not  be  in 
any  respect  lessened  or  impaired." 

In  other  words,  if  we  should  restore  Panama  to 
Colombia,  less  the  Canal  Zone,  which  ostensibly  was 
all  we  wanted,  the  point  to  be  arbitrated  would  be 
the  value  of  the  Canal  Zone.  It  would  be  necessary, 
of  course,  as  the  foregoing  article  provides,  thpt  all 
our  privileges  under  the  present  treaty  with  Panama 
should  be  binding  if  the  province  returned  to  the 
sovereignty  of  Colombia.  Those  privileges  include  the 
vital  right  to  use  any  rivers  or  lands  in  the  Republic 
that  may  be  necessary  to  the  construction,  maintenance, 
operation,  or  defense  of  the  canal. 

Colombia  would  regain  control  of  a  province  vastly 
improved  since  the  separation.  The  cities  of  Panama 
and  Colon  have  been  made  into  modern  cities  by  the 
Americans.  Of  the  $10,000,000  we  paid  to  Panama, 
about  $6,000,000  remains  unexpended  and  invested  in 
New  York  real  estate.  This  would  revert  to  Colom- 
bia, as  well  as  the  improvements  made  with  the  por- 
tion expended.    Whatever  loss  in  revenues  during  the 

247 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

separation  that  Colombia  might  claim  would  not  be 
a  material  consideration  to  the  United  States. 
N     Undoubtedly  under  such  an  arrangement  provision 
/  would  have  to  be  made  whereby  the  old   order  of 
'  things  that  existed  prior  to  the  revolution  should  not 
recur.     The  United  States  could  not  tolerate  a  turbu- 
lent situation  on  the  banks  of  the  canal.     It  still  would 
have  to  retain  the  plenary  powers  in  respect  of  sani- 
I  tation  and  order  that  exist  under  the  present  treaty. 
j  This  doubtless  would  be  the  hitch  that  would  come  in 
attempting  such  a  solution. 

The  people  of  Panama,  remembering  the  old  days, 
and  keen  in  the  enjoyment  of  conditions  as  created 
and  maintained  by  the  United  States,  probably  would 
object  to  any  solution  that  gave  Colombia  renewed 
sovereignty.  It  would  be  far  less  of  an  exercise  of 
arbitrary  power  to  overrule  this  objection  than  it  was 
to  set  the  republic  up  in  1903.  In  whatever  solution 
that  may  be  selected  some  authoritative  actions  will 
be  necessary. 

Those  Americans  who  balk  at  the  prospect  of  a 
large  money  indemnity  to  Colombia,  for  taking  Pan- 
ama, should  ask  themselves  whether  any  mere  love  of 
lucre  should  stand  between  us  and  a  clean  conscience. 
The  situation  in  which  we  are  involved  may  cost 
dearly  to  straighten  out,  but  that  is  the  inevitable 
price,  in  the  individual  or  national  life,  of  walking 
in  the  paths  of  unrighteousness.  The  Colombian 
claim  is  a  call  to  arms  between  the  forces  of  good  and 
evil  in  the  American  national  character.  Do  we  stand 
at  Armageddon,  and  do  we  battle  for  the  Lord? 

248 


CHAPTER    XXII 

THE    MONROE   DOCTRINE 

IT  is  to  be  doubted  if  so  lion-hearted  a  policy  evet 
was  announced  by  so  weak  a  people  as  the  prin- 
ciple that  is  involved  in  the  Monroe  doctrine,  promul- 
gated in  1823.  That  it  should  have  stood  all  the  years 
prior  to  our  attainment  of  the  physical  strength  to 
make  it  good,  is  proof  that  its  real  vitality  lies  in  the 
truth  that  it  expresses  rather  than  in  the  battleships 
we  can  summon  to  intimidate  its  acceptation. 

To-day,  more  than  ever,  the  American  people  need 
[to   study  the  spirit  that  prompted   that   declaration. 
^The  United  States  in  recent  years  has  been  perilously 
near  to  just  the  violation  of  it  that  we  prohibited  to 
Europe.     It  is  certain  that  if  we  ourselves  ever  step 
bver  its  spirit  we  will  need  all  the  steel  and  powder 
his  resourceful  nation  can  command  to  hold  Europe 
nd  Asia  back;  whereas,  if  we  continue  to  interpret 
it  aright,  the  land-hungry  nations  may  look  covetously 
upon  the  Western  Hemisphere,  but  that  same  vital 
quality  that  restrained  them  in  the  days  of  our  weak- 
ness will  hold  them  back  now. 

The  Monroe  doctrine  asserted  that  the  principle  of 
democracy,  which  had  sought  a  haven  in  this  Hemi- 
sphere, must  not  be  pursued  and  persecuted  by  the 
institution  of  monarchy.  The  phraseology  declared 
that  the  Americas  must  not  henceforth  be  considered 

249 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

a  place  for  European  colonization,  but  the  spirit  of 
the  policy  meant  that  two  such  irreconcilable  systems 
of  government  as  monarchy  and  democracy  could 
not  live  side  by  side  in  the  same  hemisphere,  and 
that  the  safety  of  democracy  required  the  exclusion 
of  monarchy. 

In  these  latter  days  there  has  sprung  up  a  tendency, 
not  strongly  developed  as  yet,  to  interpret  that  doc- 
trine to  mean  that,  while  Europe  and  Asia  must  keep 
out,  the  United  States  is  destined  to  dominate  the 
whole  situation.  That  instead  of  America  for  Amer- 
icans, it  means  the  Western  Hemisphere  for  the 
United  States. 

It  is  certain  that  the  nations  of  the  Gulf  of  IMexico 
and  the  Caribbean  Sea  discern  such  a  tendency  in  the 
actions  of  the  United  States.  The  United  States 
looms  up  to  them  ^^•ith  a  strength  far  more  formidable 
than  we  are  conscious  of,  and  they  fear  the  day  when 
we  grow  conscious  of  that  strength  with  a  waning 
sense  of  Puritan  justice. 

The  Spanish-American  War  w'as  a  revelation  to 
them  as  it  was  to  us.  Far-sighted  Latin  Americans 
could  read  in  that  altruistic  interference  in  their 
affairs  the  forerunner  of  interferences  which  might 
not  be  so  altruistic.  So  far  it  substantially  is  true 
that  we  have  not  interfered  anywhere  in  Central  or 
South  America  that  it  was  not  to  the  benefit  of  the 
nation  involved. 

When  the  United  States  executed  the  coup  that  rid 
Venezuela  of  Castro  it  did  a  service  of  inestimable 
value   to   that   nation.      When   it   rid    Nicaragua   of 

250 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

Zelaya  it  did  a  similar  service.  In  aiding  Santo  Do- 
mingo to  straighten  out  its  finances,  in  setting  civil 
government  upon  its  feet  in  Cuba,  and  in  other  in- 
stances of  interference  not  so  important,  the  Ameri- 
cans have  played  the  role  of  disinterested  friendship. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  manner  in  which  we  ac- 
quired the  Canal  Zone  suddenly  showed  Latin  America 
that,  though  Uncle  Sam  might  bear  the  visage  of  a 
rector,  he  could  just  as  readily  play  the  role  of  a 
strong-arm  man  not  overly  scrupulous  when  he  is 
selfishly  impelled. 

In  the  early  days  of  our  own  republic  political  con- 
troversy revolved  around  the  relation  to  England, 
with  one  faction  being  intensely  provincial,  and  gen- 
erally successful,  and  the  other  faction  rather  inclined 
to  take  the  European  view  of  our  affairs.  The  situa- 
tion in  the  republics  that  fringe  the  Gulf  and  Carib- 
bean Sea  to-day  is  identical,  only  the  factions  revolve 
around  the  issue  of  American  interference. 

Our  smaller  Southern  neighbors  have  grown  to  look 
upon  American  interference  as  inevitable,  with  the 
faction  that  can  enlist  our  sympathy  pretty  well  as- 
sured of  success.  Hence  the  revolutionary  factions 
struggle  for  the  strategic  position  involved  in  the 
approval  of  our  State  Department.  Sooner  or  later 
such  approval  means  United  States  Marines  to  help 
the  favored  side. 

This  strikingly  was  illustrated  in  the  June  and  July 
Presidential  elections  in  the  Republic  of  Panama  in 
1912.  Dr.  Belisario  Porras,  the  popular  candidate, 
openly  solicited  American  military  intervention,  and 

251 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

it  was  forthcoming.  In  Nicaragua,  in  August  of  1912, 
Marines  were  landed  ostensibly  to  protect  American 
interests,  but  one  faction  had  allied  itself  with  those 
interests,  so  that  our  interference  was  in  reality  to 
aid  that  faction  of  revolutionists. 

These  incidents  are  not  cited  as  instances  of  unwar- 
ranted interpretation  of  the  Monroe  doctrine.  Each 
was  justified  by  the  facts  of  the  individual  case.  The 
point  in  mind  is  that  we  are  embarked  upon  a  role, 
as  umpire  in  Central  and  South  American  affairs,  that 
will  require  the  utmost  keenness  of  Puritanic  justice 
to  prevent  a  change  from  a  policy  of  altruism  to  one 
of  open  selfishness. 

When  President  Roosevelt  announced  that  if  we 
ever  went  into  Cuba  again  it  would  be  to  stay,  he 
made  just  such  a  change  imminent.  There  never  was 
a  declaration  of  policy  that  more  widely  missed  the 
true  spirit  of  the  Monroe  doctrine.  It  would  start 
the  United  States  upon  a  course  that,  in  twenty-five 
years,  would  reduce  every  Gulf  and  Caribbean  repub- 
lic to  the  position  of  a  satrapy  of  the  United  States, 
with  United  States  soldiers,  as  in  the  Philippines, 
exercising  the  final  powers  of  the  legislative,  execu- 
tive, and  judicial  functions. 

The  lesson  President  Roosevelt  had  in  mind  was  that 
the  United  States  could  not  be  continually  troubling 
itself  to  maintain  order  among  any  people  that  were 
not  capable  of  self-government.  But,  with  the  mem- 
ory of  other  great  nations,  which  undertook  to  manage 
the  affairs  of  widely  distributed  peoples  by  the  power 
of  military  might,   not  to  mention  the   fundamental 

252 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

tenets  of  our  governmental  faith  on  such  an  imperial 
policy,  it  will  be  wise  for  the  Americans  to  be  cautious 
in  endorsing  the  Cuban  declaration. 

Our  Civil  War  ought  to  have  taught  us  that  the 
American  people  cannot  live  in  the  face  of  a  flagrant 
lie  to  our  institutions.  Slavery  was  such  a  lie,  and  it 
was  stamped  out.  The  military  control  we  exercise 
over  the  Philippines  is  another  such  lie,  but  so  far 
away  and  vague  that  the  Puritan  conscience  does  not 
grasp  its  significance.  The  moment  we  begin  the 
forcible  military  occupation  of  Cuba,  Mexico,  or  other 
American  republics,  we  will  be  adding  other  lies  to 
the  foundation  of  our  republic,  namely,  "  that  all  men 
are  free  and  equal  and  have  certain  inalienable  rights." 

The  right  of  Cuba  to  manage  its  own  affairs,  how- 
ever wretchedly,  is  an  inalienable  right.  Our  inter- 
ference is  never  justified  except  to  enable  the  Cubans 
to  continue  that  right.  Where  we  interfere  to  per- 
manently remove  that  right,  such  as  would  occur  in 
annexation  or  habitual  military  supervision,  we  pass 
the  lie  direct  upon  our  own  profession  of  principles. 

God  made  the  Americans  a  superior  people  to  ful- 
fill a  high  destiny,  but  he  never  made  them  so  superior 
that  they  can  trample  all  rights  of  weaker  nations  in 
the  dust  from  a  supercilious  idea  that  we  can  manage 
their  affairs  better  than  they. 

When  President  Roosevelt  asks,  Shall  we  forgive 
Cuba  unto  three  times  for  its  shortcomings?  the  an- 
swer of  the  American  people  must  be.  Yea,  until 
seventy-times  seven.  But  this  does  not  mean  that  the 
United  States  must  continue  to  bear  the  expense  of 

253 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

such  efforts  to  prevent  a  collapse  in  Southern  govern- 
ments. Our  interference  primarily  is  to  obviate  the 
necessity  of  European  interference,  and  if  we  act  as 
police  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  there  should  be  a 
compensation,  at  least,  equal  to  our  outlay  in  such 
efforts. 

Whenever  we  go  into  Cuba,  Nicaragua,  Panama, 
or  any  other  republic,  to  protect  American  and  Euro- 
pean interests,  the  cost  of  the  expedition  should  be 
assessed  against  the  country  which  necessitated  the 
expedition.  Then  we  should  retire  and  allow  them 
to  try  again  at  the  task  of  self-government.  And  we 
should  stay  off  from  annexation,  or  permanent  mili- 
tary occupation,  as  we  would  from  taking  a  tarantula 
into  our  national  breast. 

There  is  no  truth  quite  so  important  for  the  Ameri- 
can people  to  burn  into  their  consciousness,  as  with 
a  hot  iron,  to  guide  their  foreign  policy  as  this : 
The  Lord  we  serve  is  no  less  the  God  of  the  Mon- 
golian, the  Ethiopian,  or  the  Latin  American  than  he 
is  of  the  Caucasian  and  the  American.  Let  us  beware 
what  we  do  against  these  other  peoples  in  His  name. 

The  wise  decision  of  President  Taft  to  stay  out, 
both  of  Cuba  and  Mexico,  during  recent  troubles,  was 
in  accordance  with  the  best  spirit  of  the  Monroe  doc- 
trine. It  allows  these  nations  latitude  to  work  out 
their  own  destinies,  certainly  the  very  least  that  they 
could  ask.  Meanwhile  they  are  responsible  for  every 
/  dollar's  damage  they  do  to  our  own  or  foreign  prop- 
/  erty,  and  any  attempt  to  make  them  pay  such  damage 
would  be   founded  in  right.     Forcible  interference, 

254 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

however,  automatically  cancels  a  claim  for  damages, 
except  such  as  may  be  won  by  the  sword.  And  that 
would  mean  that  our  young  manhood  henceforth 
would  have  to  be  enlisted  to  sacrifice  their  lives  in 
maintaining  a  suzerainty  radically  antagonistic  to  true 
Americanism. 

Aside  from  the  turbulent  characteristic  of  the  Latin 
American  temperament,  the  most  prolific  cause  of 
American  interference  in  Central  and  South  American 
affairs  is  the  American  capitalist.  This  especially  is 
true  in  Cuba  and  Mexico,  and  in  the  republics  south 
of  Mexico  to  Panama. 

Your  American  capitalist  in  these  countries  smiles 
indulgently  when  you  talk  about  the  departure  of  the 
United  States  from  its  principles  in  establishing  sov- 
ereignty over  the  smaller  republics.  To  him  there  is 
absolutely  nothing  on  the  horizon  but  the  dollar  he 
has  invested,  and  his  government  does  not  exist  ex- 
cept to  guard  that  dollar.  But  he  goes  much  further 
than  that.  He  believes  his  dollar  will  have  added 
value  if  the  United  States  were  sovereign  instead  of 
the  particular  native  government  under  which  he 
operates. 

The  sugar-plantation  owners  in  Cuba  are  more  re- 
sponsible for  the  unsettled  conditions  in  that  island 
than  the  Cubans  themselves.  And  they  almost  in- 
variably are  Americans.  They  believe  that  the  free 
trade  that  would  follow  American  occupation  would 
benefit  them  as  well  as  other  phases  of  American 
governmental  methods.     Hence  they  finance  revolu- 

255 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

tions  and  assiduously  work  to  create  public  opinion 
favorable  to  American  sovereignty. 

Native  political  factions,  in  their  extremity,  make 
alliances  with  the  American  interests  of  one  kind  or 
another,  and  so  complicate  the  situation  that  it  appears 
to  be  the  usual  case  of  a  revolution.  But  the  Ameri- 
can dollar,  even  if  not  the  primary  cause,  always  is 
a  potent  secondary  cause,  and  for  that  reason  the 
United  States  should  look  a  long  time  before  it  leaps 
at  annexation  or  military  suzerainty. 

So  far  as  the  Latin  republics  are  concerned,  what 
difference  would  it  make  to  them  whether  a  European, 
or  the  American  power,  dispossesses  them  of  self- 
government?  If  the  Monroe  doctrine  does  not  stand 
as  a  bulwark  against  American  domination,  as  well  as 
against  European  domination,  what  boots  it  to  them? 
Would  American  domination  be  wiser  or  less  distaste- 
ful to  a  proud  people  than  European  domination  ?  To 
what  effect  was  all  the  revolting  from  Spain  in  the 
eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  if  it  is  to  be  suc- 
ceeded in  the  twentieth  century  by  American  sover- 
eignty? And  would  not  the  American  sword  in  Cuba 
be  just  as  relentless  in  its  autocratic  sway  as  the 
Spanish  sword? 

We  cannot  afford  to  embark  on  a  policy  of  pater- 
nalism in  Latin  America  because  of  the  damage  it 
would  do  to  us  through  underliving  our  basic  ideals. 
This  generation  of  Americans  has  before  it  the  neces- 
sity of  demonstrating  that  self-government  is  possible 
,  among  our  neighbors  to  the  South.  If  we  do  not 
prove  this  truth,  we  may  build  a  material  civilization 

256 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

as  high  as  the  combined  achievements  of  Egypt, 
Babylon,  Greece,  and  Rome,  and  still  the  eternal  query 
will  arise.  What  shall  it  profit  a  nation  if  it  gain  the 
whole  world  and  lose  its  own  soul  ? 

The  Magdalena  Bay  incident  is  typical  of  the  opera- 
tions of  capital  in  Latin  America.  Instead  of  jingoing 
about  Japan  over  this  Bay,  why  not  find  out  what 
syndicate  of  capitalists  is  trying  to  force  the  United 
States  to  buy  it,  by  spreading  all  kinds  of  rumors 
against  a  friendly  power?  There  is  no  nation  direct- 
ing its  foreign  policy  so  wisely  to-day  as  Japan,  and 
it  would  as  soon  think  of  securing  a  naval  base  in  the 
Americas  as  it  would  of  attempting  to  annex  China. 

The  Senate  issued  a  warning  to  the  world,  reaffirm- 
ing the  Monroe  doctrine  as  regards  the  securing  of 
naval  stations  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  Europe 
will  respect  the  Monroe  doctrine  as  long  as  the  United 
States  does.  It  will  respect  it  as  long  as  the  United 
States  maintains  it  as  a  disinterested,  unselfish  pro- 
nunciamento.  But  the  moment  we  begin  gobbling  up 
these  weak  republics,  that  moment  will  Europe  pounce 
down  upon  Central  and  South  America.  And  then 
we  will  need  the  biggest  navy  our  forests  and  mines 
can  supply  to  maintain  the  Monroe  doctrine. 

There  is  more  than  one  South  American  republic 
where  Germany  is  regarded  in  a  more  friendly  light 
than  the  United  States.  Germany  has  aided  Brazil 
and  Argentine  to  discipline  their  armies  along  modern 
lines,  and  these  republics  do  not  have  to  grovel  at 
Uncle  Sam's  feet.  Argentine  is  completing  one  of  the 
largest  battleships  in  the  world.    The  European  policy 

257   . 


THE    AMERICANS    IN    PANAMA 

will  be  to  encourage  these  Latin  republics  on  the  as- 
sumption that  some  day  they  may  combine  to  humble 
the  United  States.  Napoleon  sold  the  United  States 
the  Louisiana  purchase  and  remarked  that  he  thereby 
sold  a  territory  that  would  one  day  humble  England. 

The  most  salutary  thing  that  could  happen  in  the 
American  foreign  policy  would  be  the  apprehension 
and  execution  of  any  American  capitalists  who  inspire 
revolutions  in  Latin  America,  rather  than  the  hound- 
ing of  these  republics,  more  sinned  against  than  sin- 
ning. From  now  on  it  is  going  to  be  a  titanic  struggle 
with  the  American  people  to  prevent  the  ascendency 
of  the  dollar  over  principle  in  the  interpretation  of  the 
Monroe  doctrine.  There  is  not  the  slightest  doubt 
about  our  getting  all  that  rightfully  belongs  to  us. 
Can  we  restrain  ourselves  from  taking  more  than  our 
just  desserts? 

The  Panama  Canal  makes  us  rub  elbows  with  Latin 
America  as  never  before.  Secretary  Knox,  in  his 
1912  junket  to  Central  America,  assured  the  Latin 
republics  that  the  United  States  does  not  crave  one 
foot  of  their  territory.  Such  a  declaration  will  serve 
to  keep  the  Monroe  doctrine  inviolate  better  than  the 
largest  caliber  rifles,  because  it  notified  the  world  that 
we  will  not  ourselves  do  what  they  have  been  for- 
bidden to  do.  There  is  no  nation  in  the  world  that 
will  dare  fight  the  United  States  when  the  right  is  on 
our  side.  We  can  keep  it  there  only  by  loving  our 
South  American  neighbors  as  we  love  ourselves. 


258 


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